Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual intercourse without consent for engaging in a continual sexual relationship with his stepdaughter, who was twelve years old at the time the offenses began. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by denying his challenge for cause of a juror whose daughter had been the victim of sexual violence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the facts of this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the challenge for cause. View "State v. Cudd" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony sexual assault against his girlfriend’s four-year-old daughter. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the district court did not err when it found that the victim was unable to testify in open court in the presence of Defendant; and (2) the district court properly applied Montana law and did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the State to present the testimony of a forensic interview about the victim’s statements that were inconsistent with the victim’s trial testimony.View "State v. Pound" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony sexual assault. Defendant later filed a petition for postconviction relief seeking DNA testing and alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). The district court denied the petition, but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Defendant subsequently filed a second petition requesting that he be allowed to conduct discovery. The district court denied both Defendant’s petition for DNA testing and his request to conduct discovery but granted relief as it pertained to his IAC claim. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in denying Defendant’s petition for DNA testing; and (2) erred in granting Defendant’s petition as it pertained to IAC of appellate counsel, as any error on appellate counsel’s part was harmless. View "Golden v. State" on Justia Law

When E.G. was fifteen years old, the Youth Court found him to be delinquent and ordered that he be committed to the Department of Corrections until age eighteen. After remand, the Youth Court stated that it would retain jurisdiction until E.G. was twenty-one and consider transfer of the case to the district court. When E.G. turned eighteen, the Youth Court, after a hearing, transferred supervision of E.G. to the district court. E.G. subsequently violated his probation, and the district court sentenced him to the Department of Corrections until age twenty-five. E.G. appealed, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation and sentence because his parents did not receive notice of the hearing on the State’s motion to transfer supervision of his probation from the Youth Court to the District Court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statutory parental notice requirement did not withdraw, circumscribe, limit or affect the Youth Court’s jurisdiction over the issue of transferring supervision of E.G. to the District Court. View "In re E.G." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony sexual intercourse without consent, misdemeanor partner or family members assault, and felony tampering with witnesses and informants. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence that Defendant had previously assaulted and harassed the victim; (2) plain error review was not warranted for the Court to review the district court’s jury instruction regarding the evidence of the previous bad acts; and (3) Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel due to his counsel’s failure to object to the State’s use of the previous bad acts.View "State v. Crider" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a buy-sell agreement for the purchase of Plaintiff’s home. As agreed upon, Defendant moved into Plaintiff’s home and began paying rent. Before the closing date, however, Defendant notified Plaintiff that he had decided not to purchase the property and had vacated the premises. Plaintiff sued Defendant, alleging constructive fraud, deceit, and negligence. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s tort claims on the ground that they arose strictly out of a breach of contract. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) summary judgment was appropriate on Plaintiff’s constructive fraud and deceit claims; but (2) the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s negligence claim on the ground it arose solely out of duties imposed under the agreement. Remanded.View "Dewey v. Stringer" on Justia Law

After Defendant accused her ex-boyfriend of raping her, the State charged Defendant with one count of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence in violation of Mont. Code Ann. 45-7-207(1)(b). Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charge, arguing that the Information did not allege a cognizable basis to find probable cause that the charged offense had occurred. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on the State’s allegations, there were sufficient facts from which a rational trier of fact could conclude that each element of the charged offense had been proven. View "State v. Nelson" on Justia Law

The Youth Court declared A.S.M. a delinquent youth and serious juvenile offender. The Youth Court later issued an order under Mont. Code Ann. 41-5-208 ("section 208 order") transferring jurisdiction over A.S.M. to the district court and transferring supervisory responsibility of A.S.M. to the Department of Corrections (DOC). Pursuant to the order, A.S.M. was transferred to to Montana State Prison (MSP) on his eighteenth birthday and was not eligible for parole until he completed MSP’s sexual offender program. A.S.M. filed a motion to modify the order, requesting that the DOC send him to Whitney Academy in Massachusetts. The district court partially modified the section 208 order to remove the parole eligibility requirement but refused further to modify the order, thus keeping A.S.M. in the adult corrections system. A.S.M. appealed, requesting that the district court modify its order to facilitate his placement at the Academy by suspending his sentence and terminating supervision by the DOC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by refusing to further modify the section 208 order.View "In re A.S.M." on Justia Law

Mother and Father were married in 2005 and had a child in 2009. Father subsequently filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. In 2013, the district court ordered a parenting plan in which the parties’ child would travel between Mother’s and Father’s respective residences every six weeks. Mother appealed, alleging several errors in the district court’s parenting determination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that it would be in the child’s best interests to spend equal time with both parents until he reached school age.View "In re Marriage of Woerner" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to tampering with witnesses and informants. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the district court denied. Defendant appealed, arguing that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because his counsel misinformed him about his eligibility for a persistent felony offender designation. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, holding (1) the district court correctly determined that Defendant was fully aware of the direct consequences of his plea and that the plea was not induced by misrepresentation; and (2) therefore, Defendant failed to show that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, he would not have entered a guilty plea.View "State v. Hendrickson" on Justia Law