Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2010, the City of Whitefish passed Resolution 10-46, which authorized the City to enter into an interlocal agreement with Flathead County concerning planning and zoning authority over a two-mile area surrounding the City. In 2011, voters in Whitehead passed a referendum repealing the Resolution. Plaintiffs, residents of the City and the County, filed the present lawsuit claiming that the citizens’ power of referendum and initiative did not extend to the Resolution. The district court agreed with Plaintiffs and granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs and the County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by not dismissing the suit as untimely based upon the doctrine of laches; and (2) did not err by determining that the Resolution was not subject to the right of voter initiative and referendum because the Resolution was an administrative act by the City.View "Phillips v. City of Whitefish" on Justia Law

Martin Vincent Lau was charged with deliberate homicide. Lau claimed that the fatal shooting was an act of self-defense. Lau sought to offer his own out-of-court statement to prove that at the time of the shooting, he knew of specific instances of violence by the victim. The State moved in limine to prohibit Lau from introducing the statement on hearsay grounds. Lau, in turn, argued that the exclusion of his statement would limit his ability to put forth a defense and that he would be required to testify in order to establish his knowledge of specific instances of conduct by the victim. The district court ruled that Lau would be permitted to cross-examine witnesses about the victim's specific acts of violence and Lau’s knowledge of those acts, as contained in his statement. The Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for writ of supervisory control, holding that the Montana Rules of Evidence did not permit Lau to offer his own out-of-court statement in support of his claim of justifiable use of force.View "State v. District Court" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with trespass to property and possession of dangerous drugs, both misdemeanor offenses. Defendant subsequently decided to enroll in the Mineral County Treatment Court. Defendant was aware that he could be sanctioned with incarceration if he was dishonest during his participation in the Treatment Court. During his participation in the Treatment Court Defendant tested positive for drug use and was interviewed by the Treatment Team regarding the results. Subsequently, a member of the Treatment Team sent a report to law enforcement detailing the information he learned from the interviews with Defendant. Defendant was subsequently charged with distribution of dangerous drugs and two counts of possession of dangerous drugs. Defendant filed motions to suppress and dismiss, arguing that the State violated the confidentiality provision of Mont. Code Ann. 46-1-1111(4) and his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination by disclosing the confidential Treatment Court material to law enforcement. The district court denied the motions. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motions to suppress and dismiss, holding that the State violated section 46-1-1111(4) by disclosing confidential drug testing information to law enforcement in order to investigate a new criminal offense.View "State v. Plouffe" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of deliberate homicide. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging that the State had failed to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence relevant to the case in violation of Brady v. Maryland and that his trial attorneys failed to provide effective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly denied Defendant’s postconviction petition because the petition did not fulfill the elements of a Brady violation; and (2) any alleged error on the part of trial counsel did not prejudice Defendant, and therefore, the trial court did not err in concluding that Defendant had not received ineffective assistance of counsel.View "McGarvey v. State" on Justia Law

In 2011, Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and disorderly conduct. Defendant pleaded not guilty and requested a jury trial. The trial court later informed Defendant that his scheduled trial was rescheduled because an older case had been set for trial on the same day. Before his rescheduled trial, Defendant moved to have his case dismissed for lack of a speedy trial. The municipal court granted the motion. The district court reversed. On remand, Defendant was convicted of DUI and acquitted of disorder conduct. The Supreme Court reversed the district court ruling reversing the municipal court’s dismissal of the charges, holding that the City failed to meet its burden of showing “good cause” for the delay in bringing Defendant to trial.View "City of Helena v. Broadwater" on Justia Law

Greg LeMond had an oral contract to purchase a five-acre lot (Lot 11) at the Yellowstone Mountain Club from the lot's owner, Yellowstone Development. Yellowstone Development allegedly breached its contract with LeMond by combining twenty-three acres of additional property with Lot 11 to create what became the Overlook Lots, comprising a total of twenty-eight acres. LeMond sued, claiming that Yellowstone Development breached its contract to convey Lot 11 and was under an equitable duty to convey the entirety of Overlook Lots to LeMond. In its final determination, the district court quieted title to the Overlook Lots in favor of LeMond. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court did not provide adequate insight into the equitable considerations involved in granting LeMond title to the Overlook Lots, as Yellowstone Development was obligated to transfer Lot 11 to LeMond and was unjustly enriched by failing to do so, but LeMond was entitled to enforce a constructive trust worth only the equitable value of the parties’ bargain. View "LeMond v. Yellowstone Dev., LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of theft by a common scheme stemming from the theft of property from a salvage yard owned by Robert Appley. After a hearing, the district court ordered Defendant to pay a total of $31,878 to the victims. Defendant appealed the court’s order for restitution. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Defendant did not preserve his objection to the award of restitution for two victims based on their lack of affidavits or testimony; and (2) the district court’s restitution order to Appley for the value of scrap metal, road repairs, miscellaneous parts and radiators was supported by substantial evidence, but the court’s calculation of restitution for Appley for the value of two aluminum boats and a 1951 GMC truck was not supported by substantial evidence. Remanded.View "State v. Simpson" on Justia Law

Drew Wendt and Jennifer Wendt had one child from their marriage, and another child from Jennifer’s previous marriage also resided with the couple. After the parties divorced, Jennifer filed a motion to modify the parenting plan requesting that Drew’s parenting time be dramatically reduced. The district court ordered the parties to attend mediation on the matter. Due to Drew’s failure to appear at the mediation the district court entered an order amending the parenting plan. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the judgment was void as a matter of law because the court did not follow the statutory procedure for amending parenting plans, thus depriving Drew of due process of law.View "In re Marriage of Wendt" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with felony driving under the influence (DUI) and misdemeanor driving without valid liability insurance. Defendant entered pleas of not guilty and then filed a motion to dismiss for denial of his right to a speedy trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Defendant then changed his plea to guilty on both charges, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his speedy trial motion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for dismissal of the charges, holding that the delay in bringing Defendant to trial violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial.View "State v. Zimmerman" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with two counts of felony partner or family members assault (PFMA), one charge pertaining to his brother and one charge pertaining to his niece. The case proceeded to trial. At the close of the State’s case, Defendant moved for judgment of a matter of law as it pertained to the second count, arguing that his niece was not a “family member” as that term is defined in the applicable statute, Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-206. The district court denied the motion. The jury subsequently convicted Defendant PFMA for his assault on his niece. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant’s niece was not a family member as defined by section 45-5-206 because no evidence was presented that Defendant and his niece resided together in the same household at any time.View "State v. Gregori" on Justia Law