Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2012, Defendant pleaded guilty to bad check and bail jumping charges. The State thereafter charged Defendant with two new offenses of bail jumping for failing to appear at two sentencing proceedings in 2010 and 2011. Defendant moved to dismiss the new charges, alleging that they constituted vindictive prosecution. The district court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that the subsequent bail jumping offenses, which had been discussed in prior plea negotiations, fell within the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Defendant pled guilty to the new bail jumping charges but reserved his right to appeal the vindictive prosecution issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no support for a finding of vindictive prosecution. View "State v. Ridge" on Justia Law

In 2007, Plaintiff was convicted of several sex-related crimes. In 2008, Plaintiff was sentenced to thirty-five years imprisonment. In 2013, Plaintiff filed a pro se claim against Defendant, the attorney who defended him during his criminal trial, claiming that Defendant failed to meet the appropriate standard of care for legal representation by failing to secure certain testimony at trial. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, concluding that Plaintiff’s claim was time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Defendant on the grounds that Plaintiff’s claim was time barred by Mont. Code Ann. 27-2-206. View "Passmore v. Watson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of sexual assault. Appellant moved that the district court sentence him to the misdemeanor penalty of a first conviction of sexual assault under Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-502(2)(a) rather than the felony penalty in section 45-5-502(3). The district court granted the motion, concluding that the misdemeanor penalty provided by section 45-5-502(2)(a) was the maximum sentence that could be imposed. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the facts found by the jury constituted felony sexual assault under section 45-5-502(3), and therefore, the district court may proceed to sentencing under that provision. View "State v. Ghostbear" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who operated a nail salon, used a liquid acrylic nail product repackaged and distributed by Premium Nail Concepts, Inc. (PNC). After Plaintiff was diagnosed with a sensitization to ethyl methacrylate, a chemical ingredient contained in the PNC nail product Plaintiff used, Plaintiff filed a products liability claim against PNC. The jury ruled in favor of PNC, determining that PNC’s nail product was not in a defective condition because of a manufacturing defect, design defect, or inadequate warning. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in (1) allowing PNC to present expert testimony that its product was “safe as used” when skin contact is avoided; (2) denying Plaintiff the right to cross-examine the expert witness who proffered this evidence; (3) instructing the jury on the meaning of “safe as used”; and (4) refusing to instruct the jury that skin contact with the PNC product is common in the nail industry. View "Kenser v. Premium Nail Concepts, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Carri Robertson and Joseph Robertson were found guilty of criminal trespass and theft. The Supreme Court affirmed the theft convictions, vacated the trespass convictions, and remanded the written judgments to the district court for amendment, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to convict the Robertsons of theft, but there was insufficient evidence to support the trespass convictions; (2) the Robertsons’ failure to preserve certain issues with a timely objection at trial was fatal to their claims; and (3) the written judgments did not conform to the oral pronouncement of sentences. View "State v. Robertson" on Justia Law

Appellant petitioned for release of certain documents under the Right to Know provision of Mont. Const. art. II, 9 from the Cascade County Attorney relating to the termination of a county detention officer, Jason Carroll. The district court granted summary judgment against Appellant. Appellant moved for reconsideration in light of the recently decided Schoof v. Nesbit. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Appellant's situation was distinguishable from Schoof because Appellant, who was neither a resident nor subject to the jurisdiction of Cascade County, lacked standing to request the documents. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Article II, Section 9 grants a right to judicial relief to a Montana citizen alleging denial of access to a document of a Montana public body; and (2) as a Montana citizen, Appellant had standing to bring his claim. View "Shockley v. Cascade County" on Justia Law

After Senate Bill 140 was enacted in 2011, Billings Yellow Cab, LLC applied to the Public Service Commission (PSC) for issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity (PCN certificate) as a grandfathered entity. The PSC denied the application. Yellow Cab subsequently filed a second application for a PCN certificate as a Class B carrier. After a hearing, the PSC issued a final order denying the application, concluding that Yellow Cab failed to demonstrate that public convenience and necessity required authorization of the proposed service. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) concluding that Yellow Cab’s claims that the PSC’s denial of a PCN certificate constituted an unconstitutional taking and violated equal protection were procedurally barred; (2) affirming the PSC’s denial of Yellow Cab’s application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity; and (3) affirming the PSC’s exclusion of Yellow Cab’s Exhibit 2. View "Billings Yellow Cab, LLC v. State ex rel. Pub. Serv. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. Defendant appealed, arguing that the municipal court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an investigative stop. Specifically, Defendant claimed that the ordinances of the City of Missoula that impose a $500 fine for refusing to give a breath sample were invalid and that the arresting officer unlawfully administered a breath test despite her initial refusal. The district court affirmed the decision of the municipal court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Missoula has authority to enact ordinances creating a misdemeanor penalty for the refusal to submit to a requested breath test; (2) the arresting officer did not violate statutory procedures by administering a post-arrest breath test with Defendant’s consent; and (3) the Missoula ordinances criminalizing the refusal to submit to a breath test do not unconstitutionally impair Defendant’s freedom of speech. View "City of Missoula v. Armitage" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of sexual intercourse without consent and sexual assault. Appellant moved for a new trial and acquittal, arguing, among other things, that testimony at trial failed to bear out the prosecution’s theory that a newspaper article reporting that Appellant had been accused of molesting a five-year-old boy prompted the complainant’s disclosure, and that the unfair prejudice caused by testimony about the newspaper article outweighed its probative value. The district court vacated the sexual assault conviction and denied the motion with respect to the remaining issues. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the probative value of the evidence regarding the newspaper article was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and should have been excluded. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Franks" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Lower Teton Joint Objectors, water users who hold appropriation rights from the lower Teton River in Chouteau County, commenced an action claiming that the Water Commissioners’ practice of diverting water out of the natural channel of the Teton River and into the Bateman Ditch harmed their appropriation rights by depriving the Teton River aquifer of recharge water. The Water Master issued a report regarding the Bateman Ditch, and the Water Judge issued an “Order Amending Master’s Report and Adopting as Amended.” The Objectors and intervenor Patrick Saylor appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Water Court erred by concluding that the Bateman Ditch diversion to supply water to Choteau Cattle Company is a private right held by Saylor; and (2) the Water Court acted properly in listing the water rights that can be diverted through the Bateman Ditch. View "Eldorado Co-op Canal Co., Lower Teton Joint Objectors" on Justia Law