Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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Defendant pleaded not guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol, obstructing a peace officer, and driving while license suspended. Defendant filed two motions to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, contending that the City had not diligently prosecuted the case. The municipal court denied both motions, concluding that Defendant’s conduct had caused the delay. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of obstructing a police officer and driving while license suspended. The district court affirmed the municipal court’s orders. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the municipal court did not err in denying Defendant’s motions to dismiss, as Defendant’s rights to a speedy trial were not violated. View "City of Kalispell v. Gabbert" on Justia Law

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The Northland Royalty Corporation purchased mineral rights from the personal representative of two estates and subsequently brought a quiet title action naming certain beneficiaries (“Devisees”) as defendants. The district court quieted title in favor of Devisees, but the Supreme Court remanded to consider the applicability of Mont. Code Ann. 72-3-618. On remand, Northland moved for summary judgment, arguing that section 72-3-618 offered Northland protection against Devisees’ claims to the minerals. The district court denied summary judgment on the basis that Northland failed to act in good faith as required by the statute. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order denying summary judgment and remanded for entry of judgment in Northland’s favor, holding that section 72-3-618 protected Northland’s purchase. View "Northland Royalty Corp. v. Engel" on Justia Law

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In 2013, the district court entered a decree of dissolution dissolving the marriage of Wife and Husband. The district court incorporated a property settlement agreement as part of the decree. Approximately one year later, Wife sought relief from the final decree, claiming that the property settlement was unconscionable and that the district court should modify the dissolution decree. The district court denied Wife’s request, finding that there was no basis in fact or law to re-open and modify the decree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Wife did not present any substantial reason that her agreement to the settlement should be overturned or that the dissolution decree should be modified. View "In re Marriage of Tanascu" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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Defendant was charged with misdemeanor DUI in city court. After the prosecution discovered Defendant had three prior DUIs, the city court transferred the case to the district court but failed to dismiss the misdemeanor. Thereafter, Defendant moved to dismiss on the basis that the misdemeanor was not brought to trial within six months of arraignment. The city court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that there was no speedy trial violation because the case had been transferred to the district court. The State subsequently charged Defendant with felony DUI, and the city court dismissed the misdemeanor charge. Defendant argued that the city court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss. The district court agreed that the prosecution failed to follow the proper procedure when it transferred the case from city court to district court but concluded that the procedural flaw did not affect Defendant’s rights. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding that Defendant suffered no violation of his right to a trial within six months of arraignment because he moved for a postponement of the original trial date. View "State v. Christensen" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The paternal grandmother (Grandmother) of two minor children petitioned the district court for grandparent-grandchild contact. After a hearing, the district court granted Grandmother weekly phone contact, occasional weekend visits in Billings, Montana, and two weeks during the summer at Grandmother’s home in Washington. The natural mother of the children (Mother) appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court with the exception of the provisions regarding extended visits in Washington state, holding that the district court correctly interpreted and applied the grandparent-grandchild contact statute, with the exception of the out-of-state visitation provisions adopted over Mother’s objections. View "Gardner v. Gardner" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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The district court entered a temporary injunction preventing Linda St. Peter, acting in her capacity as the trustee of the Osorio Irrevocable Trust, from selling a property held by the trust. Linda filed a motion for relief from the temporary injunction. After a hearing, the district court dissolved the temporary injunction. The property was then sold to a third party. Karlene Khor, Linda’s sister, appealed, arguing that the district court manifestly abused its discretion when it dissolved the temporary injunction. The Supreme Court did not address the merits of the issue because the property had been sold and the issue was therefore moot. View "Matter of Osorio Irrevocable Trust" on Justia Law

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In 2012, L.S.P. filed a petition in Flathead County seeking appointment as the guardian and conservator of her father, H.O., who was a resident of Flathead County at the time of the petition. H.O. subsequently moved to an assisted living facility in Missoula County. The district court appointed L.S.P. and her brother, J.O., temporary guardians and conservators of H.O. In 2014, L.S.P. filed a motion to transfer venue to Missoula County. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the order transferring venue to Missoula County was a final order and was reviewable by the Court; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering that venue be transferred to Missoula County. View "In re Guardianship of H.O." on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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In 2012, Defendant pleaded guilty to bad check and bail jumping charges. The State thereafter charged Defendant with two new offenses of bail jumping for failing to appear at two sentencing proceedings in 2010 and 2011. Defendant moved to dismiss the new charges, alleging that they constituted vindictive prosecution. The district court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that the subsequent bail jumping offenses, which had been discussed in prior plea negotiations, fell within the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Defendant pled guilty to the new bail jumping charges but reserved his right to appeal the vindictive prosecution issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no support for a finding of vindictive prosecution. View "State v. Ridge" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In 2007, Plaintiff was convicted of several sex-related crimes. In 2008, Plaintiff was sentenced to thirty-five years imprisonment. In 2013, Plaintiff filed a pro se claim against Defendant, the attorney who defended him during his criminal trial, claiming that Defendant failed to meet the appropriate standard of care for legal representation by failing to secure certain testimony at trial. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, concluding that Plaintiff’s claim was time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Defendant on the grounds that Plaintiff’s claim was time barred by Mont. Code Ann. 27-2-206. View "Passmore v. Watson" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of sexual assault. Appellant moved that the district court sentence him to the misdemeanor penalty of a first conviction of sexual assault under Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-502(2)(a) rather than the felony penalty in section 45-5-502(3). The district court granted the motion, concluding that the misdemeanor penalty provided by section 45-5-502(2)(a) was the maximum sentence that could be imposed. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the facts found by the jury constituted felony sexual assault under section 45-5-502(3), and therefore, the district court may proceed to sentencing under that provision. View "State v. Ghostbear" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law