Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of sexual intercourse without consent. Based upon the post-trial statements of the alleged victim, Defendant filed a request for a new trial. The district court denied the request, concluding that the motion was time-barred and that no exception to the time bar applied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion when, in considering whether Defendant was entitled to a new trial, it failed to apply State v. Clark (Clark I) factors and instead directed Defendant to pursue postconviction relief to address the alleged victim’s post-trial statements; and (2) after applying the Clark I factors to the alleged victim’s post-trial statements in this case, it is clear the district court abused its discretion in denying a new trial. View "State v. Morse" on Justia Law

Don O’Mailia was hired by to install a water heater on the premises of a newly-constructed Famous Dave’s barbecue restaurant. At the time, O’Mailia was covered by a commercial general liability policy issued by Truck Insurance Exchange (TIE). Three years after the water heater was installed, the restaurant’s opening manager noticed a burning smell in the mechanical room. Diamond Plumbing & Heating (Diamond) was called to examine the water heater. A fire subsequently broke out in the restaurant. Famous Dave’s sued Diamond. Diamond sought indemnification from O’Mailia, alleging that the fire was caused by defective installation. O’Mailia asked TIE to provide a defense against the suit. TIE filed a petition for declaratory relief asking the district court to declare that O’Mailia’s policy offered no coverage for claims arising from the fire. The district court granted summary judgment for TIE, concluding that no property damage occurred during the policy period, and therefore, there was no coverage under the policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that O’Mailia’s TIE policy was inapplicable to the present claims resulting from the Famous Dave’s fire. View "Truck Ins. Exch. v. O’Mailia" on Justia Law

I.T., an infant, was adjudged a youth in need of care and was placed in foster care. The district court ordered that the Department of Public Health and Human Services did not need to provide preservation or reunification services for Mother on the grounds that Mother’s parental rights to I.T.’s siblings were involuntarily terminated and that the conditions rendering Mother unfit in that termination proceeding were unlikely to change. Thereafter, the court terminated Mother’s parental rights to I.T. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in terminating Mother’s parental rights. View "In re I.T." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to criminal trespass and theft. The district court revoked a suspended sentence Defendant had received from an earlier conviction and committed him to the Department of Corrections for five years, with two years suspended. The court ordered that the sentence run consecutive to another sentence Defendant was serving. Defendant did not challenge the legality of his sentence through a direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Instead, Defendant filed a Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from the judgment. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant did not perfect his appeal within the relevant timeframe, he was precluded from challenging his sentence with the Supreme Court. View "State v. Osborn" on Justia Law

On December 24, 2013, the State filed a petition for commitment against B.O.T. After a hearing, the district court ordered B.O.T. committed to the Montana State Hospital for ninety days and that medication could be involuntarily administered, concluding that B.O.T. was unable to care for his basic needs, admitted to having a serious mental illness, and was unable to demonstrate how he would care himself to protect himself from harm if released from inpatient treatment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the judgment and order of the district court finding that B.O.T. suffered from a mental disorder that prevented him from taking care of his basic needs was supported by substantial evidence, and the findings of the district court were not clearly erroneous. View "In re B.O.T." on Justia Law

During a highway paving project a storm caused recently applied primer to emulsify in rainwater. The oil splashed onto passing vehicles, causing damage. The vehicle owners brought claims against the State, which the State paid. A.M. Welles, Inc. (Welles), the general contractor on the job, reimbursed the State for what it paid to the vehicle owners. The State then sued Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. (Liberty), the insurer for the job, seeking indemnification for the costs that Welles did not cover. Welles, in turn, sued the subcontractors for the project, Montana Materials, Inc., RSJ, Inc., and GLJ, Inc. (collectively, “Jensen”), seeking indemnification under the subcontract. The district court granted summary judgment for Jensen on Welles’s indemnification claim and dismissed the State’s action against Liberty for failure to prosecute. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that the district court (1) erred in denying Welles’s motion for summary judgment, as Welles was entitled to indemnification under the subcontract; and (2) abused its discretion by dismissing the State’s action against Liberty for failure to prosecute. Remanded. View "A.M. Welles, Inc. v. Mont. Materials, Inc." on Justia Law

The Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services filed a petition for emergency protective services for seven-year-old H.T., alleging drug use by Mother and domestic violence between Mother and her boyfriend. The petition stated that H.T. “may be an Indian Child for the purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).” The district court granted the motion for emergency protective services. The district court subsequently held a hearing that adjudicated H.T. a youth in need of care. The Department then filed a petition for permanent legal custody and termination of parental rights. The district court held a termination hearing and adopted and approved the termination petition. Mother appealed, asserting that the district court failed to comply with state and federal statutory requirements for terminating parental rights to an Indian child. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) Mother received fundamentally fair procedures prior to the termination of her parental rights; but (2) because the district court applied the wrong statutory standards in its final order, its judgment is vacated. Remanded for entry of a new order on the issue of whether Mother’s parental rights should be terminated. View "In re H.T." on Justia Law

Lisa Bailey, a fifty-one-year old who was considered morbidly obese, requested, through her physician, Medicaid authorization for gastric bypass surgery. The Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (Department) denied the request because gastric bypass surgery is a non-covered service under Department administrative rules. A hearing officer upheld the Department’s determination, and the Board of Public Assistance adopted the decision of the hearing officer. The district court affirmed. Bailey appealed, asking that the Department be required to conduct a determination of medical necessity for the procedure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Department’s rule excluding coverage for all invasive procedures undertaken for the purpose of weight reduction, including gastric bypass surgery, is not unreasonable or contrary to federal law. View "Bailey v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

On March 5, 2012, Appellant was charged with bail jumping. On April 19, 2012, Appellant pleaded guilty to the offense. On June 27, 2013, Appellant was sentenced for bail jumping. Appellant appealed the judgment of conviction and sentence, arguing that the fourteen-month delay between entry of his guilty plea and sentencing violated his speedy trial rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the constitutional right to a speedy trial does not extend from conviction to sentencing, but a criminal defendant does have a constitutional and statutory due process right to have sentence imposed in a timely manner; (2) because Appellant failed to assert a statutory claim, only his constitutional violation would be considered; and (3) although the delay in Appellant’s sentencing was unacceptable, Appellant’s prejudice from the delay was neither substantial nor demonstrable, and therefore, the unacceptable delay did not warrant finding a constitutional due process violation. View "State v. Betterman" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs here challenged the constitutionality of two laws: a 2011 law requiring a parental notification before a minor may obtain an abortion, and a 2013 law requiring parental consent before a minor may obtain an abortion. In 1999, a district court held unconstitutional a similar 1995 law requiring parental notification before a minor may obtain an abortion. Plaintiffs claimed that the 1999 district court order prevented the State from defending the constitutionality of the laws at issue in the current challenge on grounds of issue preclusion. The Supreme Court held that because the laws that were the subject of the current challenge differed from the 1995 law in substantive respects, issue preclusion did not apply in this case. View "Planned Parenthood of Mont. v. State" on Justia Law