Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

John Stokes appealed the judgment against him in a defamation case and retained attorney Greg Duncan to advise him on how to maintain his appeal while discharging his obligation in bankruptcy. After Duncan filed a bankruptcy petition on Stokes’ behalf, the bankruptcy court granted Duncan’s motion to withdraw. While the bankruptcy action was pending, Stokes filed the present action in state court against Duncan and his paralegal (collectively, Duncan) seeking damages for legal malpractice. The bankruptcy trustee intervened in the malpractice action, arguing that the action was an asset of the bankruptcy estate. The district court stayed all proceedings in the malpractice action. The bankruptcy court concluded that the malpractice action was an asset of the bankruptcy estate and subsequently sold the action to Duncan. After Stokes’ bankruptcy proceeding was discharged, the bankruptcy court entered an order concluding that Stokes’ claims against Duncan were property of the bankruptcy estate that had been purchased by Duncan. The state district court subsequently lifted the stay and granted Duncan’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Stokes’ malpractice claims were property of the bankruptcy estate and had been purchased by Duncan. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Stokes’ claims were part of the bankruptcy estate. View "Stokes v. Duncan" on Justia Law

In 2000, the marriage of Brenda Cadena and Kevin Fries was dissolved. The order approved a settlement agreement that Cadena and Fries had previously entered into that provided that Fries’ Western Conference of Teamsters pension would be equally divided between the parties. In 2013, Cadena filed a proposed qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) proposing her method of dividing the pension. Fries objected to Cadena’s proposed QDRO and submitted a proposed order of his own. The district court issued a QDRO identical to Cadena’s proposed order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Cadena’s proposed method of distributing the pension accurately reflected the division required by the settlement agreement; (2) the district court was correct not to award attorney fees in favor of Fries; and (3) Cadena was entitled to reasonable attorney fees on appeal. View "In re Marriage of Fries" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted in justice court of misdemeanor driving under the influence, first offense. Defendant appealed to the district court and moved to exclude the results of his breath sample taken using an Intoxilyzer 8000 machine, arguing that they were obtained in violation of the machine’s checklist. The district court denied the motion. Defendant then pled guilty, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to exclude. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant’s motion because, while the officers who took Defendant’s breath sample with the Intoxilyzer 8000 machine were not required to do so under the current administrative rule, ample evidence supported the conclusion that the officers complied with the breath analysis device’s operational checklist. View "State v. Levanger" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Montana corporation, sells workers’ compensation insurance to employers without the use of insurance agencies. Defendant Montana State Fund sells workers’ compensation insurance through in-house and out-of-house agents. The remaining defendants also sell workers’ compensation insurance, including State Fund policies. In 2011, Plaintiff brought this of action against Defendants, alleging violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA) and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. The district court (1) dismissed Plaintiff’s UTPA claim on the grounds that the UTPA does not create a private right of action by one insurance company against another; and (2) granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment with respect to interference with prospective economic advantage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s inability to establish damages was fatal to its intentional interference claim and would be fatal as well to any UTPA-related claim. View "Victory Ins. Co. v. Mont. State Fund" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant for negligence after the parties were involved in a car crash. During discovery, Plaintiff asked Defendant to admit violating certain traffic laws on the day of the crash. Defendant denied the request. The district court eventually granted summary judgment on the issue of Defendant’s negligence but denied Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions for Defendant’s failure to admit violating traffic laws. After a jury trial on damages, the jury awarded Plaintiff some, but not all, of the damages she sought in her negligence action. Plaintiff appealed. Defendant moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that Plaintiff waived her right to appeal by accepting the benefits of the judgment. The Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal and affirmed the district court’s decision not to sanction Defendant’s discovery conduct, holding (1) Plaintiff waived her right to appeal the district court’s evidentiary rulings when she accepted the judgment entered on the jury’s verdict; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Defendant’s conduct did not warrant discovery sanctions. View "Tempel v. Benson" on Justia Law

In 2008, Allen Ginn was injured while delivering a truck load of logs to a mill owned by Smurfit Stone Container Enterprises, Inc. In 2009, Smurfit filed voluntary petitions for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 11. In 2011, Ginn and his wife (the Ginns) and Smurfit stipulated an agreement in which Smurfit agreed not to enforce the claim bar date set by the bankruptcy court. The Ginns subsequently served Smurfit with a complaint, summons, and related document. When the Ginns received no reply or acknowledgement of service, they requested entry of default from the district court. The district court entered default against Smurfit. Smurfit filed a motion to vacate the entry of default. The court concluded that the default would stand with regard to Smurfit’s liability but that a jury would be allowed to consider the issues of causation and damages. Thereafter, a jury awarded Allen Ginn $3,470,899 in damages plus an additional $500,000 to his wife. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion, even slightly, in denying Smurfit’s motion to vacate the entry of default, as good cause did not exist to vacate the entry of default. View "Ginn v. Smurfit Stone Container Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Jeff Shannon’s use of an easement crossing the northwest corner of property owned by Walter and Nereida Woods. When Shannon informed the Woodses that he intended to construct a driveway on the easement, the Woodses petitioned for injunctive relief, claiming that the easement was created by necessity and should be extinguished because it was no longer necessary. The district court granted Shannon’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, finding that the easement was created by an express grant, the terms of which were clear and unambiguous. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the easement was an express grant, and the Woodses failed to allege any facts that would entitle them to relief. View "Woods v. Shannon" on Justia Law

After a hearing held on the second petition filed by the Department of Public Health and Human Services for termination of Mother’s parental rights, the district court terminated Mother’s parental rights to her three children on the grounds that Mother had not successfully completed her treatment plan and the condition rendering her unfit to parent was unlikely to change within a reasonable time. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) despite delays in holding the show cause, adjudicatory, and dispositional hearings, Mother’s due process rights were not violated by the efforts of the Department and court to provide her with services, a treatment plan, and time to work toward reunification with her children; and (2) the district court did not err when it found that Mother failed to complete her treatment plan and the condition rendering her unfit to parent was unlikely to change within a reasonable time. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

This action involved a dispute arising from the construction of a large house. Interstate Mechanical, Inc. initiated an arbitration action to recover payments it claimed as a result of its work on the house project. Abbey/Land LLC and Glacier Construction Partners LLC (collectively, Plaintiffs) then filed suit against Interstate in Montana District Court in Flathead County. Thereafter, Glacier asserted counterclaims in the Interstate arbitration proceeding and obtained a positive arbitration award against Interstate. Abbey/Land subsequently filed an amended complaint dismissing Glacier as a plaintiff and naming it as a defendant. Glacier tendered the Abbey/Land claims to its insurer, James River Insurance Company. James River refused to provide defense or indemnity. Glacier and Abbey/Land settled the Flathead County action as between themselves. James River moved to intervene in the Flathead County action to challenge the reasonableness of the confessed judgment against Glacier. Meanwhile, Abbey/Land and Glacier entered settlements with all other parties. The district court never ruled on James River’s motion to intervene and entered final judgment against Glacier. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in entering judgment without considering either its motion to intervene or the reasonableness of the confessed judgment. View "Abbey/Land LLC v. Interstate Mechanical, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to the charge of possession of dangerous drugs with intent to distribute, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress and from the final judgment ordering him to pay the cost of his interpreter and imposing a ten-percent administration fee. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that the arresting officer had particularized suspicion to stop Defendant’s vehicle; (2) erred by ordering Defendant to pay the costs of his interpreter; and (3) erred when it imposed the ten-percent administration fee on Defendant. View "State v. Duong" on Justia Law