Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial in 1984, Defendant was convicted of deliberate homicide for a crime committed when Defendant was seventeen. The district court imposed the maximum sentence of one hundred years’ imprisonment without the possibility of parole, a sentence that was within the discretion of the district court and that was not mandated by law. Defendant attempted in numerous filings to attack his conviction and sentence, to no avail. Defendant now petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the constitutionality of his sentence under Miller v. Alabama. The Supreme Court denied the habeas petition, holding that the Miller sentencing consideration rule requiring a sentencing judge to consider a juvenile offender’s age when sentencing that offender to life without parole is not retroactive to Defendant’s claim on collateral review. View "Beach v. State" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of assault on a peace officer or judicial officer, in violation of Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-210(1)(b). Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the state was required to prove mental state as to every element of the offense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the given jury instruction was a misstatement of the law because it required the jury to find the deputies were peace officers but not that Defendant knew them to be peace officers; and (2) the error clearly prejudiced Defendant. View "State v. Carnes" on Justia Law

In 2014, the Department of Health and Human Services petitioned the district court to terminate Mother’s parental rights to her four children. After a hearing, the district court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order terminating Mother’s rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) even assuming that the treatment plan was deficient where it did not require Mother to obtain a chemical dependency evaluation and treatment, this was not sufficient to render the treatment plan inappropriate; (2) Mother’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to advocate for inclusion of a chemical dependency evaluation in the treatment plan; and (3) the district court properly exercised its discretion to deny Mother’s requests for transcripts of its in-chambers interviews with the children. View "In re T.N.-S." on Justia Law

In 2009, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Baxter v. State, in which it held that a terminally ill patient’s consent to physician aid in dying constitutes a statutory defense to a charge of homicide against the aiding physician. In 2012, the Board of Medical Examiners (Board) posted a position statement on its website explaining the effect of the baxter decision on its discipline policy for physicians participating in “aid-in-dying.” Montanans Against Assisted Suicide (MAAS) filed a petition with the Board seeking a declaratory ruling that the position statement was invalid. The Board denied the petition. MAAS then filed a petition in the district court seeking an order requiring the Board to vacate the position statement. While the matter was pending before the district court, the Board removed the position statement from its website. The district court subsequently dismissed MAAS’ petition, concluding that once the Board rescinded the position statement the case was rendered moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the matter before the district court was rendered moot when the Board rescinded the position statement. View "Montanans Against Assisted Suicide v. Bd. of Med. Examiners" on Justia Law

Kimberlee Johnson, who owned a home adjacent to a home owned by Travis and Misty Knapton, leased the downstairs portion of her home to Daniel and Cheryl Monk. At the time of the lease, Johnson knew that the Monks’ dogs of pit bull ancestry would be living with them. After the dogs bit the Knaptons’ daughter on the Knaptons’ property and later bit their other child in the Knaptons’ backyard, Travis Knapton brought this action against Johnson on behalf of E.K, alleging negligence and strict liability. Default judgment was entered against the Monks. The district court then granted summary judgment for Johnson on the ground that Johnson did not know the Monks’ dogs were vicious and that Knapton had not proved that mixed breed dogs with pit bull ancestry are inherently dangerous. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of Johnson on the negligence claim and on the strict liability claim. View "Knapton v. Monk" on Justia Law

After Karrie Lynn Serrania went to Discovery Dental Group, PLLC (DDG) for a toothache, DDG referred her account to LPH, Inc., a debt collection agency. Serrania later sued LPH and DDC, alleging, among other claims, that LPH violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). LPH and DDG counterclaimed for breach of contract. The district court (1) sanctioned Serrania’s attorney for failing to attend a pretrial conference, (2) entered summary judgment against Serrania on the contract and FDCPA claims, and (3) sanctioned Serrania and her attorney for their conduct in the course of litigation. After the district court entered judgment, Serrania underwent bankruptcy, and her dental debts and the district court’s orders were discharged. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part, holding (1) some of Serrania’s arguments on appeal are moot, but her appeal of the district court’s summary judgment order on her FDPCA claim is live, and her attorney has an interest in overturning the sanctions entered against him; (2) the district court correctly entered judgment to LPH on the FDCPA claim; and (3) the district court erred in ordering Serrania and her attorney jointly to pay $24,797 to DDG and $41,113 to LPH as sanctions. View "Serrania v. LPH, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2014, the Department of Public Health and Human Services (Department) filed a petition for termination of Father’s parental rights to his two children. After a termination hearing, the district court determined that clear and convincing evidence supported terminating Father’s parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in terminating Father’s parental rights, as the court based its decision on clear and convincing evidence and properly applied the legal standards governing termination; and (2) did not err in concluding that the Department complied with its statutory duty to provide reunification services. View "In re A.K." on Justia Law

In 2009, the Montana Department of Revenue (Department) began the process of reappraising Montana agricultural properties. In 2010, Petitioners filed a petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandate seeking a declaration that the Department improperly assessed their agricultural property for tax uses. The district court granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly interpreted the plain language of section 15-7-111 and complied with the rules of statutory construction; and (2) the Department followed the rule-making mandate of section 15-7-111(2), the Department’s application of section 15-7-111 was not unlawful, and the Department is capable of implementing the district court’s interpretations of section 15-7-111. View "Lucas Ranch, Inc. v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

In 2011, Wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. While the case was pending, the parties entered into an interim support agreement (ISA), in which the parties settled all maintenance and support issues. After a trial, the district court entered an order dissolving the marriage. In the order, the district court ordered Husband to pay child support, decided that an award of maintenance was not appropriate, terminated Husband’s temporary support obligations under the ISA, and divided the parties’ property between them. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion by (1) failing to state the net worth of the marital estate in a specific factual finding; (2) awarding Husband certain pre-marital and post-separation property; (3) denying maintenance in favor of Wife; and (4) awarding child support. View "In re Marriage of Axelberg" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender and and theft was sentenced to a net sentence of ten years in the Montana State Prison with five years suspended. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court judge was disqualified from hearing his case due to personal knowledge of facts in dispute in the sentencing proceeding and therefore should have recused himself. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant’s counsel knew of the factual basis for Defendant’s disqualification claim before sentencing but did not raise disqualification, Defendant’s claim was waived. View "State v. Dunsmore" on Justia Law