Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a dispute over a Major Land Use Permit issued to Susan Dietz, individually and as Trustee of G&M Trust (G&M), by Flathead County, Montana. G&M had purchased two adjacent 11.5-acre tracts on the shore of Lake Five and began several remodeling, demolition, and construction projects on both tracts. G&M received notices of multiple violations from both the Department of Environmental Quality and Flathead County, advising that these new structures violated local zoning regulations. G&M then submitted an application proposing new structures for short-term/vacation nightly rentals. The application was initially accepted by the County, who issued a Major Land Use Permit, later voided by the District Court.The District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, voided the Major Land Use Permit issued to G&M, permanently enjoined all future construction or expansion of use or conversion of G&M’s property to any commercial use without first obtaining legal access and complying with all State and local statutes and regulations, ordered restoration of G&M’s property to its previously unaltered condition, and awarded attorney fees and costs to Friends of Lake Five, Inc. (FLF).The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the District Court's decision to void the Major Land Use Permit and its award of attorney fees and grant of permanent injunction. However, it reversed the District Court's requirement that G&M restore the property to its previous unaltered condition outside of the lakeshore zone. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Friends of Lake 5 v. County Commission" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between the City of Great Falls and the Board of Commissioners of Cascade County, Montana, over the interpretation of a 1975 interlocal agreement that established a consolidated City-County Health Board. The disagreement arose after the Montana Legislature enacted new laws in 2021 that changed the governance of local health boards. The County argued that the new laws required the County Commission to be the governing body of the Health Board, while the City maintained that the 1975 agreement allowed the City mayor to be a full voting member of the Health Board.The District Court of the Eighth Judicial District ruled in favor of the City, finding that the 1975 agreement allowed the City mayor to be a full voting member of the Health Board and that the Health Board was the "local governing body" referenced in the new laws. The County appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana.The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decision. It held that the District Court did not adjudicate a non-justiciable political question and correctly interpreted the 1975 agreement and the new laws. The Supreme Court found that the 1975 agreement allowed the City mayor to be a full voting member of the Health Board and that the Health Board was the "local governing body" referenced in the new laws. The Court also held that the new laws did not moot the issues at stake in the case. View "City of Great Falls v. Cascade County Commissioners" on Justia Law

The case involves Clark Ryan Ramsey, an attorney who represented Justin Kalina in a felony assault case. Jessica Foote, a witness in the assault case, was investigated for alleged theft from Kalina's Uber Eats account, but no charges were brought against her. Ramsey sought information from the prosecutor in the assault case that had been gathered in the theft investigation, which he believed could be used to impeach Foote. He submitted a modified form to the Yellowstone County Sheriff’s Office (YCSO) requesting copies of the Confidential Criminal Justice Information (CCJI) in the theft case, noting he sought copies of CCJI regarding Foote. The YCSO disseminated the CCJI to Ramsey.The State filed a motion in the Justice Court, seeking to charge Ramsey with misdemeanor forgery and misdemeanor solicitation of the misuse of confidential criminal justice information, stemming from Ramsey’s submission of the form to the YCSO and subsequent receipt of CCJI from that agency. Ramsey filed a Motion to Dismiss, asserting the matter must be dismissed due to a lack of probable cause because, as a matter of law, the State could not prove the elements of forgery or solicitation. The Justice Court denied Ramsey’s motion to dismiss.Ramsey then petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Montana for a writ of supervisory control directing the Yellowstone County Justice Court to reverse its order denying Ramsey’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court found that there was not probable cause to believe Ramsey committed either offense charged in this case and the Justice Court should not have granted the State’s motion for leave to file a complaint. The Supreme Court accepted and granted Ramsey’s petition, reversed the Justice Court’s finding of probable cause and accompanying order allowing filing of amended complaint, and remanded the matter to the Justice Court with instructions to dismiss. View "Ramsey v. Yellowstone County Justice Court" on Justia Law

John David Panasuk was pulled over by Officer Riediger and Lieutenant Frank Martell for towing a trailer without trailer plates. After Panasuk was unable to initially provide his license, registration, and proof of insurance, Riediger asked him to exit his vehicle. The other occupants, Camilla TalksDifferent and Dustin Hickman, were also asked to exit. Riediger and Martell knew TalksDifferent as a drug user, but they did not know Panasuk or Hickman. When Hickman produced a North Dakota driver’s license, Riediger contacted the Williams County Task Force in North Dakota and was told Hickman had a history of being a drug dealer and user. Riediger also recalled a previous incident where Panasuk was suspected of selling methamphetamine. TalksDifferent gave consent to search her purse, where Riediger found two syringes. She also told Riediger there was methamphetamine in Panasuk’s vehicle. Riediger seized the vehicle and applied for a search warrant. Law enforcement recovered 6.4 grams of methamphetamine from the vehicle’s center console after searching the vehicle. Panasuk was charged with criminal possession of dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia.The District Court denied Panasuk’s motion to suppress the evidence, noting Panasuk’s previous incident and that TalksDifferent had said there was methamphetamine in the vehicle. The court found that law enforcement had sufficient particularized suspicion to expand the scope of a traffic stop to a drug investigation.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the initial detention was unconstitutionally extended beyond what was necessary to effectuate the initial purpose of the stop. The court concluded that there were no articulable facts, other than prior suspected criminal histories, which were offered as justification to expand the search into a drug investigation. The court held that knowledge of a person’s prior criminal involvement is alone insufficient to give rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion. The court remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Panasuk" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a child, R.N., who was removed from his mother's care and placed in foster care with Ben and Charissa Wagner. The Wagners had previously adopted two of the mother's other children. The Department of Public Health and Human Services was granted temporary legal custody of R.N. and ordered the mother to complete a treatment plan. The Department later filed a petition to terminate the mother's parental rights due to her failure to complete the treatment plan and alleged abandonment of R.N. However, the mother began to engage with the Department and made positive changes, leading to the Department's shift from termination to reunification.The Wagners, unhappy with the Department's change of stance, filed a motion to intervene, asserting that it was appropriate under M. R. Civ. P. 24 and § 41-3-422(9)(b), MCA. The District Court granted the Wagners' intervention motion, despite objections from the mother, the Department, and the guardian ad litem. The Wagners then filed a motion seeking an order for R.N. to be immediately placed in their care and for the Department to pursue termination of the mother's parental rights. The District Court did not set a hearing or issue a determination on the Wagners' motion. The Department filed a motion to dismiss the case, which the District Court granted.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision to dismiss the case. The Supreme Court found that the District Court had misinterpreted the law when it allowed the Wagners to intervene. The court also ruled that the Wagners did not have a fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of R.N. because the mother's rights had not been terminated. Furthermore, the court held that neither the District Court nor the Supreme Court had the authority to order or compel the Department to refile and prosecute its petition for termination. View "In re R.N." on Justia Law

The case involves Neldia Marie Puccinelli, who was accused of embezzling funds from her employer, ProMark, between 2006 and 2009. After her employment was terminated, ProMark filed a civil suit against her, which was settled with an agreement that Puccinelli would transfer certain personal property to ProMark and make 84 monthly payments of $350. In 2011, the State filed criminal charges against Puccinelli for theft by embezzlement. She entered a plea agreement, which consolidated the three counts into one and recommended a fully suspended sentence with restitution consistent with the civil settlement agreement.The District Court rejected the plea agreement, speculating that Puccinelli would stop paying restitution if given a probationary sentence. The court imposed a 10-year commitment to the Montana Women’s Prison, with 5 years suspended, and ordered Puccinelli to pay $67,235 in restitution. Puccinelli's disability payments were suspended during her incarceration, which led to financial instability for her household. Upon release, Puccinelli resumed making regular payments towards restitution.In 2022, five months before Puccinelli was set to discharge her probation, the State filed a Petition for Revocation of Suspended Sentence, alleging Puccinelli violated the restitution conditions of her sentence. The District Court determined Puccinelli had violated the terms and conditions of her suspended sentence as she had not “completely paid restitution.” The court revoked her suspended sentence and committed her to the Department of Corrections for five years, all suspended, with “the same conditions and restitution requirements as was in the original Judgment with no credit for street time.”The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court's decision, finding that the lower court had abused its discretion when it revoked Puccinelli’s suspended sentence based on her failure to pay full restitution. The Supreme Court concluded that the violation should have been characterized as a compliance violation, which should have been excused pursuant to § 46-18-203(6)(b), MCA. The case was remanded to the District Court to vacate the August 25, 2022 Judgment on Revocation of Suspended Sentence and dismiss the petition for revocation. View "State v. Puccinelli" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the defendant, Johnathan James, who was convicted of felony Driving Under the Influence (DUI) and Driving While Suspended. The charges stemmed from an incident where James was found asleep in his running vehicle at a gas station, surrounded by empty alcohol containers. The arresting officer, Deputy Sheriff Derek Breiland, testified that James exhibited signs of intoxication, such as bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and inability to maintain balance during a field sobriety test. James' blood alcohol concentration was later determined to be 0.322 percent.Prior to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the case was heard in the District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District, Lincoln County. During the trial, the defense counsel questioned the arresting officer's observations and suggested that James could have started drinking after he had safely parked his vehicle. The defense also objected to the officer's testimony that James was in "actual physical control" of his vehicle, arguing that it was a legal conclusion that invaded the province of the jury. The District Court overruled the objection, and the jury convicted James on both charges.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the arresting officer's testimony was admissible as lay opinion testimony under Montana Rule of Evidence 701. The court reasoned that the officer's testimony was based on his perception and was helpful to the jury in determining a fact in issue. The court also noted that the defense had opened the door for clarification about what factors constitute "actual physical control" under State v. Sommers, thus making the officer's testimony properly admitted lay opinion testimony. The court concluded that it was not an abuse of discretion to allow the officer to testify that James was in "actual physical control" of his vehicle. View "State v. James" on Justia Law

Robert Michael Arellano was charged with multiple counts of sexual intercourse without consent, sexual abuse of children, and tampering with a witness, all involving a minor under 12 years of age. The State and Arellano entered into a plea agreement, which the District Court later deemed illegal. Arellano was subsequently tried by a jury and convicted on all counts, receiving a total sentence of 210 years, with 100 years suspended.The District Court initially accepted a plea agreement between Arellano and the State. However, the court later determined the agreement to be illegal due to the proposed sentence not being authorized by law. The State had incorrectly advised the penalty for the charges, leading to the plea agreement proposing a sentence not in line with the statutory requirements for the offenses committed. When the court pointed out the discrepancy, the State withdrew from the plea agreement and the case proceeded to trial.In the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, Arellano appealed the District Court's denial of his motion for specific performance of his plea agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, stating that the plea agreement was unlawful. The court found that the plea agreement proposed a penalty not authorized by law and also proposed that Arellano plead to a fictitious offense not recognized under Montana law. The court concluded that Arellano was not entitled to the enforcement of a plea agreement which proposed a penalty not authorized by law and proposed a plea to a fictitious offense. View "State v. Arellano" on Justia Law

The case involves Jeffrey Allen Westfall, who pleaded guilty to attempted sexual assault and aggravated assault. The incident occurred at a motel in Lakeside, Montana, where Westfall assaulted a 69-year-old woman, F.C., who operated the motel with her husband. Westfall was later identified and apprehended. He was charged with attempted sexual intercourse without consent and aggravated assault. During the trial, Westfall exhibited disruptive behavior, repeatedly interrupting proceedings, arguing with his attorney, and expressing a desire to represent himself. His attorney requested a fitness evaluation to determine Westfall's ability to stand trial, but the court denied the request, viewing it as a delay tactic.The trial court proceedings were marked by Westfall's disruptive behavior, including interruptions, arguments with his attorney, and requests to represent himself. His attorney requested a fitness evaluation to assess Westfall's ability to stand trial, but the court denied the request, viewing it as a delay tactic. After the victim's testimony and the presentation of surveillance footage, Westfall and the prosecution reached a plea agreement. Westfall pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and attempted sexual assault in exchange for a recommended 50-year sentence with a 15-year parole restriction. The court sentenced Westfall to 20 years for aggravated assault and 50 years for attempted sexual assault, to run concurrently.In the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, Westfall appealed, raising three issues: whether he waived his claim challenging the trial court's failure to order a fitness evaluation when he pleaded guilty, whether his convictions for aggravated assault and attempted sexual assault violated double jeopardy, and whether the trial court erred in ordering him to pay trial costs and a presentence investigation report fee without inquiring about his ability to pay. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision on the first two issues, finding that Westfall had waived his right to appeal the denial of a fitness evaluation by pleading guilty and that his convictions did not violate double jeopardy. However, the court reversed the decision on the third issue, ruling that the trial court had failed to assess Westfall's ability to pay before imposing financial obligations. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this issue. View "State v. Westfall" on Justia Law

The defendant, William Jerome Carnes, was arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. He was charged with felony DUI for a fourth or subsequent offense, misdemeanor resisting arrest, and misdemeanor driving without a valid liability insurance policy in effect. Carnes failed to appear for his final pretrial conference, leading to an arrest warrant being issued. He was later arrested in Nevada for fleeing the scene of an accident and was sentenced to 24 to 72 months in the Nevada Department of Corrections.Carnes filed a pro se motion for a speedy trial or dismissal for lack of speedy trial and timely prosecution, citing the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Nevada Revised Statutes. The State argued that Carnes did not follow procedure as contemplated by statute to make a request for final disposition. The District Court agreed with the State and denied Carnes’s motion. Carnes then filed a motion to dismiss the case for the State’s failure to comply with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, which was also denied by the District Court.In the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, Carnes appealed the order denying his motion to dismiss and the subsequent judgment on his plea of guilty to an amended charge of criminal endangerment pursuant to a plea agreement with the State. The court concluded that Carnes failed to preserve his right to appeal the District Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss. The court held that a defendant who voluntarily and knowingly pleads guilty to an offense waives all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses, including claims of constitutional rights violations which occurred prior to the plea. The court found that Carnes’s plea agreement contained no language reserving the right to appeal after his guilty plea and he did not comply with the statutory requirements to reserve the right to appellate review of the adverse pretrial ruling. Therefore, the judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "State v. Carnes" on Justia Law