Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mark Runkle and TAGS Realty, LLC were the locators of several adjacent and overlapping mining claims. This case concerned a pile of mining waste that was located on both Runkle’s and TAGS’s claims. The mining waste contained gold deposits that were not economically viable at the time they were removed from an historic mine. By 2011, however, the deposits became valuable, and Runkle removed and sold all of the waste that year. Runkle also removed the waste located within TAGS’s claim. TAGS filed a complaint asserting trespass and conversion causes of action, alleging that Runkle was not entitled to remove the waste material located on TAGS’s claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Runkle. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) erred in concluding that TAGS’s mining claim was not a property interest sufficient to support TAGS’s causes of action; and (2) erred by granting summary judgment on an issue never raised, addressed, or conceded by the parties. View "TAGS Realty, LLC v. Runkle" on Justia Law

F.H. Stoltze Land & Lumber Company and Maxum Specialty Insurance Group (collectively, “Stoltze”) and Les Schlegel Enterprises (“Schlegel”) contracted for Schlegel to log Stoltze’s property. Schlegel obtained liability insurance from American States Insurance Company (ASI). Whitney Shanks, a worker for Schlegel, injured himself during logging operations on Stoltze’s property. Shanks filed a personal injury lawsuit against both Schlegel and Stoltze. Stoltze tendered defense and indemnity of Shanks’s suit to ASI. After ASI accepted the tender, the district court dismissed the case against Schlegel on the grounds that Schlegel was immune to suit under the Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusive remedy provision. ASI subsequently withdrew its defense of Stoltze, asserting that the policy covered Stoltze only to the extent that Schlegel was liable. Stoltze then filed a complaint against ASI, seeking declaratory judgment that ASI was required to defend and indemnify Stoltze against Shanks’s suit. The district court entered summary judgment for ASI, concluding that because the court in the underlying action determined that Schlegel was immune and not liable, ASI had no duty to defend or indemnify Stoltze. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that ASI’s insurance policy with Schlegel did not require ASI to defend and indemnify Stoltze in an action in which Schlegel could not be held liable. View "F.H. Stoltze Land & Lumber Co. v. Am. States Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured while working as a switchman/brakeman for BNSF Railway Company. Plaintiff later brought this action against BNSF under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) alleging negligence. The jury returned a verdict in BNSF’s favor on negligence and strict liability claims for violations of the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA). The district court subsequently denied Plaintiff’s motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a new trial, holding that the district court (1) did not err by allowing Plaintiff’s LIA claim to be considered by the jury; (2) did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of heated platforms at BNSF’s Whitefish and Essex depots; but (3) abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the specific amount of income Plaintiff made from his non-railroad employment. View "Martin v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a candidate in 2010 for the State Senate in Senate District 31, which included all of Park County and most of Sweet Grass County. The Commissioner of Political Practices filed a civil enforcement action against Plaintiff in the Lewis and Clark County District Court following an investigation of alleged violations of campaign practice and finance laws. Plaintiff initiated a declaratory action in the Sixth Judicial District Court, Park County, raising issues similar to those raised in the enforcement action. The Sixth Judicial District Court, ordered, sua sponte, that the declaratory judgment action be transferred to Lewis and Clark County. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) as to Plaintiff, the declaratory action in Park County was duplicative, and this was an appropriate basis on which to transfer the matter; but (2) the district court’s transfer of the action to a specific department and judge within the the First Judicial District was improper. View "Wagman v. Motl" on Justia Law

A licensed social worker informed the Department of Public Health and Human Services that Mother was psychologically abusing her two girls. After investigating the report, the Department removed the girls from Mother’s custody and placed them into foster care. The Department later returned the girls to Mother’s care. Mother sued the State, alleging that the Department failed adequately to investigate the social worker’s report before removing her children from her care, and as a result, she was wrongfully charged with and arrested for criminal contempt in Wisconsin, was denied custody and visitation with her children, and suffered emotional distress. The State moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was statutorily immune from suit. The district court denied the motion The district court later summary judgment for the State, concluding that the State qualified for statutory immunity. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s earlier decision and order and affirmed the district court’s later judgment in favor of the State, holding that the State was entitled as a matter of law to statutory immunity from Mother’s claims because Mother failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact to support her claim that the State employees involved in the investigation were grossly negligent or knowingly provided false information. View "Weber v. State" on Justia Law

Fay Posnien, an exclusive agent for Allstate incorporated as Posnien Inc. sold the agency to Baird 7. Baird 7 subsequently executed an exclusive agency agreement with Allstate. The agency was successful following the transfer until Baird’s termination as an agent. Baird 7 chose to receive a termination payment from Allstate rather than transfer its economic interest to an approved buyer. Allstate withheld its disbursement of the funds and filed a complaint in interpleader to determine whose lien had priority to the termination payment. Posnien counterclaimed against Allstate, alleging conversion. At issue in this case was the scope of the security interest that Posnien was granted when it sold its economic interest in the agency book of business to Baird 7. The district court concluded that Posnien lacked rights in the collateral of the economic interest in the Allstate agency sold to Baird 7 and therefore could not sustain a claim for conversion against Allstate. The Supreme Court reversed the entry of judgment in favor of Allstate and remanded for entry of partial summary judgment on liability in favor of Posnien, holding that Posnien held an economic interest in the book of business, which satisfied the liability elements of conversion. View "Allstate v. Posnien" on Justia Law

Cody McDonald was injured while working on the construction of a building. RTK Construction, Inc. hired Ponderosa Enterprises Inc. to frame the building, and Ponderosa hired McDonald as an independent contractor to assist with the framing. McDonald brought suit against Ponderosa and RTK, alleging, inter alia, negligence and violation of the Montana Occupational Safety and Health Act (MOSHA). The district court granted partial summary judgment on the MOSHA claims, concluding that because McDonald was an independent contractor at the time of his injury, Ponderosa and RTK did not owe him any duties of safety under MOSHA. RTK was subsequently dismissed from the case, and a jury found that Ponderosa was not negligent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that MOSHA does not create a duty for employers to meet certain safety guidelines with respect to independent contractors. View "McDonald v. Ponderosa Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant failed to yield while making a left turn and collided with a motorcycle. The driver of the motorcycle and his passenger (together, the Boots) suffered injuries as result of the accident. Defendant pleaded guilty to negligent vehicular assault. After a sentencing hearing, the district court issued a judgment and sentence ordering Defendant to pay restitution to the Boots and to the Crime Victim Compensation Program for a total restitution amount of $618,816. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in ordering him to pay restitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in awarding restitution. View "State v. Passwater" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s position of employment with the Emergency Services Division of the State of Montana Department of Military Affairs was eliminated during implementation of the Division’s reduction-in-force policy. After her position was eliminated, Plaintiff filed a grievance with the Department of Labor and Industry Hearings Bureau alleging that the Division terminated her in retaliation for her complaint that sexual favoritism had occurred within the Division. The Bureau dismissed the complaint, and Plaintiff chose not to appeal. Instead, Plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint with the Montana Human Rights Bureau of the Department of Labor and Industry, restating her claims. The Department dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff later filed the present complaint in the district court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that Plaintiff’s claims were time-barred under the Montana Human Rights Act (MHRA). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by holding that Plaintiff’s claims were subject to the procedures set forth in the MHRA, and as a result were time-barred. View "Lay v. Dep’t of Military Affairs" on Justia Law

After he crashed a truck into a light post Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI). Defendant consented to a blood draw for toxicological testing, which revealed that his blood contained 6.2 mcg/ml of 1,1-difluoroethane (DFE), a chemical found in dust-remover. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the DUI charge, arguing that DFE does not fit within the statutory definition of “drug.” The district court denied the motion to dismiss. Defendant subsequently entered into a plea agreement, and the court accepted his guilty plea. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it did not apply the pharmacy definition of “drug” and instead used a commonly understood plain meaning definition; and (2) under that definition, DFE could be considered a drug, and driving while under the influence of DFE a violation of the DUI statute. View "State v. Pinder" on Justia Law