Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Bridgett Noland suffered severe injuries in an accident in Utah when the bicycle she was riding collided with a truck. Bridgett’s parents, the Nolands, owned Flathead Janitorial & Rug Services, Inc. Flathead Janitorial was the named insured under a corporate policy issued by American States Insurance for the time period in which the accident occurred. Bridgett was listed as a driver in a piece of correspondence from American States. The Nolands sought underinsured motorist (UIM) and medical payment (MP) benefits under the American States commercial automobile policy issued to Flathead Janitorial. American States denied coverage and sought a declaratory judgment that Bridgett was not covered under the UIM or MP sections of the policy. The district court ruled in favor of American States, concluding that because Bridgett was not occupying a vehicle owned by Flathead Janitorial and covered by the policy when she was injured, she did not qualify for coverage under the policy as a matter of law. The Supree Court affirmed, holding that Bridgett was not entitled to coverage because the policy was a corporate policy clearly identifying the named insured as Flathead Janitorial and because, at the time of the accident, Bridgett was not occupying a covered auto. View "Am. States Ins. Co. v. Flathead Janitorial & Rug Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

After a hearing, the district court terminated Mother’s parental rights to her child, finding that Mother had subjected the child to aggravated circumstances and that Mother had failed to comply with her treatment plan, and the condition rendering Mother unfit was unlikely to change in a reasonable time. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err when it determined that the Department of Public Health and Human Services had made reasonable efforts to provide reunification services; and (2) did not abuse its discretion when it terminated Mother’s parental rights. View "In re J.O." on Justia Law

Father and Mother, who were never married, had a daughter. Following the end of their relationship, the parties co-parented the child for a period of time before executing a stipulated final parenting plan and formalizing their custody agreement. The parties subsequently each filed a proposed amended parenting plan requesting primary custody of the child. The district court concluded that Mother had been the primary parent of the child and should be allowed to relocate to Elko, Nevada with Mother. The court then approved a final parenting plan that limited Father to one long weekend of visitation per month. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in determining that it would be in the child’s best interests to relocate with Mother to Elko; (2) did not err by limiting Father’s visitations with the child while she resides in Nevada; and (3) did not err by denying Father’s motion for relief from the judgment and request for a new hearing. View "In re Parenting of S.E.L." on Justia Law

Mother and Father were the biological parents of two minor children. After the parents were divorced in Colorado, Mother moved to Montana with the children and registered the Colorado judgment in a Montana district court. Mother subsequently married Husband. Mother and Husband petitioned the district court to terminate Father’s parental rights and to allow Husband to adopt the children. The district court granted the petition, and adoption of the children by Husband became final. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in terminating Father’s parental rights; and (2) did not err in conducting the termination proceedings in the absence of legal representation for Father. View "In re J.W.M." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant, a corporation, alleging wrongful discharge, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and defamation after his employment was terminated. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, determining that Ohio law governed Plaintiff’s claims. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded for consideration of whether dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens was appropriate, holding (1) the district court did not err in considering evidence outside the pleadings in disposing of Defendant’s motion to dismiss; but (2) the district court was incorrect to conclude that the application of Ohio law to Plaintiff’s claims requires dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Harrington v. Energy West, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged in municipal court with misdemeanor cruelty to animals. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty. The district court affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the district court erred when it affirmed the municipal court decision allowing a witness to testify via Skype. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation was not violated under the circumstances of this case by the district court’s decision to allow the Skype testimony; and (2) the district court erred in concluding that Mont. R. Evid. 611(e) was “generally applicable to civil actions and not criminal cases,” but the error was harmless. View "City of Missoula v. Duane" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with failure to give notice of change of home residence as a registered sex offender. Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Defendant pleaded nolo contendere to the charge. Thereafter, Defendant was arrested for a subsequent offense. Because Defendant breached the plea agreement by being arrested, the district court allowed the State to deviate from its sentencing recommendation. Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea, arguing that the plea agreement was null and void. The district court denied the motion to withdraw and sentenced Defendant to five years at Montana State Prison. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, where Defendant’s plea was entered voluntarily, with knowledge that the district court could impose the sentence he ultimately received, good cause to allow withdrawal of Defendant’s plea of nolo contendere was not shown. View "State v. Warner" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of criminal endangerment and one count of assaulting a peace officer. Before the sentencing hearing, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Defendant to a total of thirty years with five years suspended. Defendant appealed, arguing that his right to a speedy trial was violated by pre-trial and pre-sentencing delays. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because this case was pending on direct review when State v. Betterman was decided, the holding in Betterman retroactively applies; (2) Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated as a result of excessive pre-trial delays caused by the State; and (3) Defendant’s right to due process was not violated as a result of post-conviction, pre-sentencing delays caused by the State. View "State v. Maloney" on Justia Law

In 2014, the Montana Commissioner of Political Practices (COPP) issued a decision finding sufficient evidence that Terry Bannan had violated Montana’s campaign practices laws during the 2010 primary election and that civil adjudication of the violations was warranted. The COPP forwarded the sufficiency decision to the Lewis and Clark County Attorney for consideration. Bannan filed an action for declaratory relief in the Gallatin County District Court alleging that the COPP acted unlawfully by referring its sufficiency findings to the Lewis and Clark County Attorney rather than the Gallatin County Attorney. The Lewis and Clark County Attorney waived his right to participate in the action, citing Mont. Code Ann. 13-37-124(2). Thereafter, the COPP filed an enforcement action against Bannan in the Lewis and Clark County District Court. Bannan filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the COPP was obligated to assert its claims in the Gallatin County declaratory judgment action. The district court in Lewis and Clark County denied Bannan’s motion to dismiss. Bannan appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed Bannan’s appeal as premature, holding that Bannan’s appeal must be characterized as one seeking relief from the denial of a motion to dismiss, and orders denying motions to dismiss are not appealable. View "Motl v. Bannan" on Justia Law

In 2009, Carol McClue was involved in a serious car accident. At the time of the accident, Carol had underinsured motorist (UIM) insurance coverage through Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois. In 2011, Carol was diagnosed with bulbar ALS. In 2013, Carol died from the illness. After the diagnosis, Dan McClue, Carol’s husband, submitted claims to Safeco for UIM benefits for damages associated with Carol’s ALS. Safeco denied the claims. Dan subsequently filed suit against Safeco, asserting that Safeco breached the insurance contract by failing to provide UIM benefits for Carol’s ALS. Before trial, the district court granted Safeco’s motions in limine to exclude expert testimony from two doctors - Dr. John Sabow and Dr. Decontee Jimmeh-Fletcher. The district court subsequently granted summary judgment to Safeco on the grounds that, without the expert testimony, Dan did not have admissible evidence to establish that the car accident caused Carol’s ALS. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s ruling barring Dan from using Dr. Jimmeh-Fletcher’s testimony to establish causation in this case; but (2) reversed the district court’s ruling that Dr. Sabow was not qualified to present expert testimony during trial. View "McClue v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill." on Justia Law