Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Continental Partners bought a lot with two building pads from Yellowstone Development that was part of the Yellowstone Club subdivision. The purchase and sale agreement included an assurance that the houses Continental intended to build on the lot would have ski-in and gravity ski-out access built by the Yellowstone Club. During construction, Continental sold the homes to separate buyers, including the managing member of WLW Realty Partners, LLC. Before construction on the ski-out access on the two homes had begun, the Yellowstone Club filed for bankruptcy protection. The subsequent owners of Yellowstone Club informed the new owners that ski-out access to the homes would not be constructed. WLW Realty filed this action against Continental, alleging, inter alia, negligent misrepresentation and violation of the Montana Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for WLW Realty. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by (1) imposing liability on Continental for negligent misrepresentation, as WLW Realty failed to satisfy the first and second elements of the tort; and (2) finding that Continental had violated the MCPA, as Continental did not engage in unfair or deceptive acts or practices. View "WLW Realty Partners, LLC v. Continental Partners VIII, LLC" on Justia Law

The case at issue in this proceeding was originally assigned to the Twentieth Judicial District Court Judge James Manley. Judge Deborah Christopher assumed jurisdiction after a defendant moved for substitution. At the request of Judge Christopher, Chief Justice Mike McGrath called in retired District Judge Douglas Harkin to preside over the case. The plaintiff subsequently requested substitution. In response, Judges Christopher and Manley entered an order returning jurisdiction to Judge Manley. Petitioner asked the Supreme Court to exercise supervisory control over the District Court by directing Christopher and Manley to vacate their order returning jurisdiction of the case to Judge Manley. Petitioner also asked that Chief Justice McGrath deny the motion to substitute judge filed by the plaintiff. The Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of supervisory control and ordered that Judge Manley assign a new judge to preside over the case, holding that specific assignments of retired judges under Mont. Code Ann. 19-5-103 are within the intended scope of the right to substitution under Mont. Code Ann. 3-1-804 and that the right of substitution applies. View "Cushman v. Twentieth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted deliberate homicide. Defendant appealed, raising two issues for review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s attorney was not ineffective in failing to request an accomplice instruction, as the instruction was inconsistent with Defendant’s claim of innocence; and (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss based upon the prosecution’s failure to disclose a video statement of a witness, as the late disclosure of the recording did not violate Defendant’s right to obtain exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland. View "State v. Root" on Justia Law

After Jon Cruson resigned from his position with Missoula Electric Cooperative, Inc., he filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the Montana Department of Labor and Industry’s Unemployment Insurance Division (Department). The Department ultimately granted Cruson unemployment insurance benefits beginning on the date of his resignation. The Hearings Bureau reversed, concluding that Cruson was disqualified from receiving benefits because the reason he offered for quitting did not constitute good cause attributable to his employment. The Board of Labor Appeals affirmed. The district court denied Cruson’s appeal, determining that the Board correctly applied the law to the facts when it determined that Cruson did not voluntarily leave his employment with good cause attributable to his employer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence, and its legal conclusion that “good cause attributable to the employer” had not been shown was correct. View "Cruson v. Missoula Elec. Coop." on Justia Law

Defendant, a resident of Idaho, was charged with driving under the influence (DUI), fourth or subsequent offense. Defendant moved to dismiss the felony DUI charge, arguing that Idaho’s reduction, pursuant to a plea agreement, of his third DUI conviction to a second DUI, precluded Montana from charging him as a fourth DUI for sentencing purposes. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Defendant had three prior convictions for DUI and that the label Idaho placed on the convictions was immaterial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that all of Defendant’s DUI convictions should be considered for purposes of sentencing, as Montana law requires all prior DUI convictions to be counted when determining whether felony enhancement is appropriate, and Montana has given full faith and credit to each conviction rendered by Idaho. View "State v. Barrett" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was involved in a vehicle collision with another driver, who admitted fault. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff’s vehicle was insured with Farmers Insurance Exchange under a policy that included underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. After Plaintiff received medical treatment, Plaintiff filed a complaint requesting “all sums due and owing” under her insurance policy with Farmers. During the course of the litigation, Farmers extended settlement offers to Plaintiff, but the case did not settle. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. Thereafter, Plaintiff moved for attorney fees and nontaxable costs under the insurance exception to the American Rule. The district court denied Plaintiff’s motion, concluding that the insurance exception did not apply to Plaintiff’s attorney fees and related costs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court incorrectly interpreted Montana law when it relied on only the circumstances surrounding the filing of Plaintiff’s complaint to conclude that Plaintiff did not meet the insurance exception. Remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Farmers forced Plaintiff to assume the burden of legal action to obtain the full benefit of her UIM policy, thus entitling her to attorney fees under the insurance exception. View "Mlekush v. Farmers Inc." on Justia Law

After a bench trial in the justice court, which is not a court of record, Defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration in excess of 0.08. Defendant appealed to the district court and moved to suppress the results of two separate blood alcohol concentration (BAC) tests. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress, holding that there was insufficient evidence to determine whether the release of the first test violated HIPAA, but any defect was harmless error, and that the second test, drawn more than eight hours after the act of driving, was taken within a reasonable time. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the second test was taken within a reasonable time under the circumstances; and (2) because the district court’s ruling on the first issue is affirmed, the Court declines to reach the issues Defendant raised regarding the first test results. View "State v. Hala" on Justia Law

Scott Bardsley owned a parcel of residential property where he resided with Dora Cichantek (together, Plaintiffs). Earnest Anderson and Lizann Pluger (together, Defendants) resided on the adjacent property. When relations between Scott and Lizann soured, Lizann sought an order of protection against Scott. The district court granted Lizann’s petition for a permanent order of protection against Scott. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint against Defendants alleging that Plaintiffs’ property enjoyed an express easement over the property on which Defendants resided with regard to “Pluger Way.” The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants and amended its order of protection by prohibiting Dora from using Pluger Way. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s amended order of protection and affirmed the district court in all other respects, holding that the district court (1) abused its discretion by failing to conduct a hearing before expanding the order of protection to include Dora; and (2) did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint, granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and awarding Defendants attorney’s fees. View "Bardsley v. Pluger" on Justia Law

In 2000, Defendant purchased 4,900 acres of property in Teton County known as Boadle Ranch. Thereafter, Defendant prohibited public use of the two main roads transecting the ranch. Public Lands/Water Access Association (PLWA), a Montana non-profit membership organization dedicated to promoting access to public-owned lands, successfully sought in the courts to regain access to these roads for public use. Defendant, however, had not yet removed the gates barricading entrance to the property. Here Defendant appealed the district court’s grant of supplementary declaratory relief to PLWA. PLWA cross-appealed the portion of the judgment denying its motion for reasonable attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in awarding money damages as supplemental declaratory relief under Mont. Code Ann. 27-8-313; (2) did not fail to consider ownership of Defendant’s railroad car and its suitability as a bridge in fashioning relief, in accordance with PLWA IV; and (3) erred by not awarding PLWA reasonable attorney fees and costs. View "Public Land/Water Access Ass’n, Inc. v. Jones" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with a number of offenses under Mont. Code Ann. Title 87. Defendant moved to dismiss two of the counts for unlawful possession of wildlife on the grounds that the statute of limitations barred prosecution. The district court dismissed the two counts, concluding that the limitations period for unlawful possession of wildlife begins on the date a person takes possession of the unlawfully taken wildlife. The State then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of supervisory control presenting the legal question of whether a violation of Mont. Code Ann. 87-6-202(1) is continuous conduct for statute of limitations purposes. The Supreme Court granted the State’s petition and exercised supervisory control, holding that a person stops violating section 87-6-202(1) - and the limitation period begins to run - only when he or she ceases to possess illegally taken wildlife. View "State v. Krueger" on Justia Law