Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The defendant, Sarah Taresu Olds, was charged with three misdemeanors, one of which was the offense of Habitual Offender Operating a Motor Vehicle. Olds proposed a jury instruction that the City was required to prove that she knew she was a habitual offender at the time of the traffic stop. The City argued that the offense was an absolute liability offense, meaning that they did not need to prove Olds's knowledge of her status as a habitual offender. The Municipal Court agreed with the City and Olds was found guilty.Olds appealed her conviction to the Eleventh Judicial District Court, arguing that the offense required proof of a culpable mental state. She also contended that her right to due process was violated because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on this element of the offense. The District Court affirmed Olds's conviction, concluding that the Municipal Court's interpretation of the law was correct and that the offense was an absolute liability offense.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the offense of Habitual Offender Operating a Motor Vehicle is an absolute liability offense, meaning that the City did not need to prove a culpable mental state. The court also found that Olds was not denied due process because the jury was properly instructed. The court concluded that the Municipal Court did not err in declining to give Olds's proposed jury instruction. View "City of Kalispell v. Olds" on Justia Law

The case involves a class action lawsuit brought by homeowners in the Falcon Ridge subdivision in Billings, Montana, against Buscher Construction and Development, Inc., and other related entities and individuals (collectively referred to as the "Buschers"). The homeowners alleged that the Buschers negligently designed and developed the subdivisions, failed to construct homes to mitigate against the possibility of differential settlement on hydro-collapsible soils, and failed to disclose material adverse facts known to them as the original owners of all the lots within the subdivision.The District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County, certified the class action. The Buschers appealed this decision, arguing that the proposed class did not satisfy the prerequisites for class certification under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and that the court abused its discretion by certifying the class under Rule 23(b)(3).The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the proposed class satisfied the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a). The court also found that the class action was superior to other methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy, as required by Rule 23(b)(3). The court concluded that the homeowners' claims were not dependent upon individual conduct but on the Buschers' alleged uniform negligence. The court also noted that the lower court has the discretion to revisit certification if class claims no longer predominate as the case proceeds. View "Busher v. Cook" on Justia Law

The defendant, Charles Geoffrey Santoro, was convicted of negligent homicide after a retrial. The case stemmed from an incident at a bar where Santoro and another patron, Levi, had a confrontation. Santoro claimed that Levi choked him, leading him to reverse his truck in an attempt to escape, which resulted in Levi being run over and killed.In the first trial, Santoro was convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison, with five years suspended and no parole restriction. However, this conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court of the State of Montana due to ineffective assistance of counsel.In the retrial, the District Court granted the State's motion to exclude expert testimony on the effects of strangulation, which had been admitted in the first trial. Santoro was again convicted and this time sentenced to 20 years in prison with a full 20-year parole restriction.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana found that the District Court abused its discretion by excluding the expert testimony on strangulation. The court held that this testimony was relevant and could have assisted the jury in determining whether Santoro's actions were a "gross deviation" from that of a reasonable person in Santoro's situation. The court also found that the State's enhanced sentencing recommendation after retrial was vindictive and that the District Court erred by failing to allow Santoro the opportunity to speak prior to sentencing. The court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "State v. Santoro" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Joseph Brian McElroy, who was charged with criminal possession of dangerous drugs with intent to distribute, a felony. The charge stemmed from a traffic stop initiated by Trooper Adams for speeding. During the stop, Trooper Adams noticed the smell of marijuana from the vehicle and observed signs of "hard travel." After verifying the driver's information and concluding that the driver was not under the influence, Trooper Adams questioned the occupants about the smell of marijuana. When they denied consent to search the vehicle, Trooper Adams deployed a canine for a sniff test, which led to the discovery of drugs and other items. McElroy filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the traffic stop was unlawfully extended without sufficient particularized suspicion.The District Court denied McElroy's motion to suppress the evidence. The court found that Trooper Adams had sufficient particularized suspicion to conduct the canine sniff based on the smell of marijuana, signs of hard travel, the occupants' nervousness, and their somewhat differing backstories. McElroy then entered a plea agreement, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court's decision. The court found that Trooper Adams did not have sufficient particularized suspicion to expand the traffic stop into a drug possession investigation. The court held that factors such as signs of hard travel, traveling from a known drug center in a third-party vehicle, and nervous demeanor, even when considered together, do not constitute particularized suspicion. The court also noted that the smell of marijuana itself does not constitute particularized suspicion sufficient to conclude there could be drugs in the vehicle. Therefore, the court concluded that Trooper Adams's further questioning about the marijuana smell and subsequent use of the canine sniff were unlawful. The court reversed the District Court's order denying McElroy's motion to suppress evidence and the resulting judgment of conviction and sentence. View "State v. McElroy" on Justia Law

Esandro Rodriguez was convicted by a jury of aggravated kidnapping, accountability for aggravated burglary, and two separate counts of accountability for assault with a weapon. The charges stemmed from an incident where Rodriguez, along with Jesse Daniels and Lauren Aviles, sought to collect money from Michael Crawford for a past drug transaction. During the incident, Rodriguez and Daniels held Amanda and Junior, Michael's girlfriend and mother's partner respectively, at gunpoint and forced them into a car. They then drove to Michael's mobile home, where they confronted Michael's mother, Leah. Daniels entered the home with a gun, causing chaos and fear among the occupants. Rodriguez was later charged with several offenses related to the incident.The District Court of the Eighth Judicial District convicted Rodriguez on four of the six counts he was charged with, including aggravated kidnapping of Amanda, accountability for assault with a deadly weapon against Junior, accountability for aggravated burglary, and accountability for assault with a weapon against Leah. Rodriguez appealed his convictions, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of aggravated burglary by accountability and that his convictions for aggravated burglary by accountability and assault with a weapon by accountability violated the multiple conviction statute.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed Rodriguez's conviction for aggravated burglary by accountability, finding that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Daniels committed assault with a weapon inside the home, thus supporting Rodriguez's conviction for aggravated burglary by accountability. However, the court reversed Rodriguez's conviction for assault with a weapon by accountability against Leah, ruling that the State had prosecuted the aggravated burglary charge in a manner that required proof that Daniels committed the assault inside the home. As such, the assault with a weapon charge merged, as a predicate offense, with aggravated burglary, and Rodriguez's conviction of both violated the multiple conviction statute. The court remanded the case for entry of an amended judgment consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The case involves Donald Aaron Hesser, who was charged with felony driving under the influence (DUI) after a motorcycle accident. Hesser was found unconscious at the scene and was taken to the hospital for treatment. Upon learning of Hesser's four previous DUI convictions, Montana State Trooper Daniel Arnold requested that the hospital retain a blood sample taken from Hesser. An investigative subpoena was later issued for Hesser's medical records and blood sample, which revealed a blood alcohol content of .208. Hesser pleaded guilty but reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the blood sample evidence.The District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County, denied Hesser's motion to suppress the blood sample evidence. Hesser argued that Trooper Arnold lacked the authority to apply for an investigative subpoena, as only a prosecutor could do so under § 46-4-301(3), MCA. He also contended that there was insufficient probable cause for the subpoena. The District Court found that a prosecutor had sought the subpoena and that it was supported by probable cause, given Hesser's serious accident, the unexplained nature of the accident, and his prior DUI convictions.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that there was sufficient probable cause for the issuance of the investigative subpoena. The court also determined that Trooper Arnold was authorized to request a blood draw under § 61-8-402(2)(a), MCA (2019), as Hesser, being unconscious, was considered statutorily not to have withdrawn his consent under § 61-8-402(3), MCA (2019). View "State v. Hesser" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Neil Lanchantin, who was charged with felony DUI and four misdemeanor offenses after being pursued and arrested by a Montana Highway Patrol Trooper on private property. The property, where Lanchantin was residing with his girlfriend, was marked with a "No Trespassing" sign. Lanchantin appealed the First Judicial District Court's order denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained when law enforcement officers entered the private property without a warrant.The District Court denied Lanchantin's motion to suppress on the basis that he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy at the location of the stop. Lanchantin pled guilty to the DUI charge but reserved his right to appeal the District Court’s order. The State argued that Lanchantin had no privacy interest in the property because he did not live there, and that the "No Trespassing" signs were inadequate to convey an expectation of privacy because they were tacked to trees along the side of the road.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court's decision, holding that Lanchantin had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the driveway of the property where he was residing with his girlfriend. The court found that the "No Trespassing" signs were sufficient to manifest an actual expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable. The court concluded that law enforcement cannot enter onto private property without a warrant, even in the case of a misdemeanant fleeing, unless there are exigent circumstances. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "State v. Lanchantin" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a fire that caused significant damage to Jamie Norris's mobile home. Norris had called A&O Sheet Metal, a business owned by Rick L. Olsen, to fix a malfunctioning water heater and furnace in his mobile home. After the A&O employees left, Norris's home caught fire. Norris filed a lawsuit against A&O alleging two counts: a claim under the Montana Consumer Protection Act (MCPA) and a claim of negligence. He argued that A&O acted deceptively in its advertising and representations and that their negligence in performing work below industry standards was a direct and proximate cause of the fire.The District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, Beaverhead County, granted summary judgment in favor of A&O. The court denied A&O’s motion to exclude Norris’s expert witnesses but concluded that Norris could not prove causation, as the reasoning was speculative, and the expert report did not sufficiently establish that the fire was caused by any of A&O’s actions or inactions.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court found that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether A&O was the cause-in-fact of the fire that destroyed Norris’s home. Therefore, the District Court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of A&O. Regarding A&O’s motion to exclude Norris’s experts, the Supreme Court found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that exclusion of Norris’s retained experts would be an inequitably harsh sanction. View "Norris v. Olson" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Lori Lundeen, a property developer, and Lake County, Montana. Lundeen planned to develop a 60-lot subdivision, Wild Horse RV Resort, on her property in Lake County. She intended to use roads through the Big Arm townsite for access to her development. The Board of Lake County Commissioners granted conditional approval for the development. However, the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes contested the County’s ownership, regulatory authority, and right to use the access routes. Lundeen alleges that she relied on Lake County and the Lake County Attorney to research her access issue. After an eight-month moratorium on Lundeen’s development application, the Board conditionally approved an amended road layout for the development. Lundeen claims the Lake County Attorney represented to her that the Tribes’ claim was baseless and that she could proceed with the development.The District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District, Lake County, granted Lake County’s motion to dismiss Lundeen's lawsuit for failure to state a claim. The court reasoned that Lundeen was on inquiry notice of the negligent misrepresentation when she became aware the Tribes had blocked off her property. The court also determined the discovery and accrual rules for the statute of limitations were satisfied no later than when the Tribes blocked Lundeen’s access. Based on the applicable three-year statute of limitations, the court found Lundeen’s claims filed were time-barred.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court found that Lundeen had sufficiently asserted facts that, if accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to her, establish a basis for the claims asserted in her complaint. Therefore, the court concluded that the District Court erred by granting Lake County’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. View "Lundeen v. Lake County" on Justia Law

The case involves the Gardiner-Park County Water and Sewer District (District) and the Knight family (Knights). The Knights own a property in Gardiner, Montana, under which the District has a prescriptive easement for a sewer line. In 2016, a survey revealed that part of the Knights' house and porch was built within the easement and over the sewer line. The District requested the Knights to remedy the easement violation, but the parties failed to reach an agreement. Consequently, the District filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the Knights violated the District’s easements and caused damage to a retaining wall. The Knights counterclaimed, alleging that the District's Board Members had not taken and filed an oath of office, thus rendering any action they took invalid.The District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Park County, granted a declaratory judgment in favor of the District and summary judgment in favor of the individual Board Members. The court held that the District’s Board Members were not legally required to file oaths of office and were immune from personal liability for any actions taken related to the Knights. The court also held a joint hearing on the District’s Motion for Declaratory Judgment and the individual Board Members’ Motion for Summary Judgment.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The court concluded that there was no requirement for board members of a local water and sewer district to take and file an oath of office as they were not public officers of the state, nor members of the legislature or executive. The court also held that the Board Members were immune from suit in an action against the governmental entity for the same subject matter, even when oppression, fraud, or malice had been alleged. The court found no violation of the Knights' due process rights when the District Court entertained oral argument on a summary judgment motion and a declaratory judgment action at the same hearing. The case was remanded for the District Court to consider an award of attorney fees, if any, under the Declaratory Judgments Act. View "Gardiner-Park v. Knight" on Justia Law