Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2015, the district court issued an order dissolving the marriage of Herb Paschen and Anne Paschen. Herb appealed, arguing that the district court erred in the amount of income it imputed to him for the purpose of setting monthly child support and maintenance payments and erred in apportioning the marital real estate. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s imputation of Herb’s earning capacity at $100,000; but (2) reversed and remanded the district court’s inclusion of Herb’s mother’s monetary gifts into Herb’s annual resources for purposes of child support and spousal maintenance calculation, holding that Herb’s mother’s gifts to Herb were not to be considered as income. View "In re Marriage of Paschen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff underwent foot surgery in 2010. Following the surgery, Defendant, who performed the surgery, placed Plaintiff in an othotic boot and instructed him to return for post-operative care. After two post-operative appointments, Plaintiff did not return to Defendant’s office for a third appointment and continued wearing the boot for almost three years. Consequently, Plaintiff experienced foot, leg and back pain, and difficulty walking. Plaintiff sued Defendant for medical malpractice and violations of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), among other claims. After a jury trial, judgment was entered for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion by excluding Plaintiff’s proposed expert witness on the grounds that the expert witness was statutorily qualified to offer negligence or standard of care testimony against Defendants in this case; and (2) did not err in granting Defendants summary judgment on Plaintiff’s CPA claims. View "Hastie v. Alpine" on Justia Law

M.H. was the biological mother of J.B., now age ten. N.L., M.H.’s longtime boyfriend, acted as a father and raised J.B. from from eight months old, at seven years old, J.B. was removed from his home by the Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS). M.H. and N.L.’s two biological children were removed at the same time. Prior to DPHHS’s involvement with the family, N.L. and M.H.’s relationship ended. After J.B.’s half-siblings were returned to N.L.’s care, M.H. moved the district court to dismiss N.L. as a party to J.B.’s case. The district court ordered N.L. dismissed as a party, concluding that N.L. was not entitled to continued notice or the right to appear in any subsequent proceedings relating to J.B. because N.L. did not satisfy the definition of an “interested person.” The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the district court did not err in dismissing N.L. as a party to J.B.’s proceeding, but (2) under Mont. Code Ann. 41-3-422(9)(a), N.L. is a person interested in J.B.’s cause and has a right to appear at hearings pertaining to J.B. Remanded. View "In re J.B." on Justia Law

In 1982, Teton Co-Operative Canal Company (Teton Canal) filed a statement of claim for existing water rights for the Eureka Reservoir. Teton Cooperative Reservoir Company (Teton Reservoir) objected to Teton Canal’s claims. The Water Master held a hearing in 2012 and, in 2015, adjudicated Teton Canal’s claims. Teton Reservoir appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the Water Court’s order regarding Teton Canal’s water right claims to the Eureka Reservoir, holding that the Water Court erred in determining that off-stream water storage in the Eureka Reservoir was included as part of Teton Canal’s April 18, 1890 Notice of Appropriation. Remanded to the Water Court to assign a new priority date to Teton Canal’s rights to the Eureka Reservoir and for further proceedings. View "Teton Co-op Canal Co. v. Teton Coop Reservoir Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial at which Defendant represented himself, Defendant was found guilty of the felony offense of assault with a weapon. The district court sentenced Defendant to a twenty-year prison sentence with ten years suspended. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant later filed a petition for postconviction relief. The district court dismissed the petition, concluding that Defendant’s trial-related claims were procedurally barred because they could have been brought on direct appeal and that Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims were without merit. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court correctly determined that Defendant’s trial-related claims were procedurally barred; (2) the district court correctly dismissed most of Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims because they lacked merit; but (3) one of Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims could not be resolved, as neither the record nor the district court’s order is sufficient to review for correctness the district court’s general conclusions. Remanded. View "Chyatte v. State" on Justia Law

After a hearing, the district court entered an order for Appellant's involuntary commitment, not to exceed ninety days, initially to Montana State Hospital. Appellant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the district court’s verbal and written order lacked sufficient factual detail to satisfy statutory requirements for an order of commitment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court’s findings were sufficient to satisfy Mont. Code Ann. 53-21-127(8)(a); and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that, as a result of his mental disorder, Appellant required an order of involuntary commitment. View "In re B.D." on Justia Law

David Kulko, Ilsa Kaye, and Michael Horn were the sole shareholders, directors, and officers of Davail, Inc. Kulko sued Kaye, Horn, and Davail for dissolution of Davail, shareholder oppression, fraudulent conduct, and breach of fiduciary duties. Eventually, the parties agreed to dissolution of Davail. The district court entered an order granting dissolution and appointed a receiver. The court then dismissed Kulko’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that dissolution is an exclusive remedy and that dissolution of Davail eliminated the case or controversy. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the case, holding that the district court (1) erred when it concluded that Kulko could not pursue punitive or compensatory damage claims against Davail’s other shareholders because he already sought and obtained dissolution of Davail; and (2) erred in dismissing Kulko’s claim because the court did not lose subject matter jurisdiction over the case upon entering the dissolution order. View "Kulko v. Davail" on Justia Law

While institutionalized at the Montana State Hospital, Defendant assaulted and injured a nurse. Defendant was charged with felony aggravated assault and was transferred to Montana State Prison, where he remained until the district court ordered that he be transferred back to the Hospital. The Hospital was statutorily required to submit a fitness-to-proceed evaluation report to the district court within ninety days of commitment but untimely submitted its report. Defendant moved to dismiss his assault charge on the grounds that the fitness evaluation report had not been timely submitted. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that by agreeing to a continuing course of treatment at the Hospital after the initial report was submitted to the district court, Defendant waived his objection to the timeliness of that report. Remanded. View "State v. Robertson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of felony driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Defendant appealed, contending that the prosecution’s comments suggesting that she could have proven her innocence by providing a breath test to law enforcement constituted prosecutorial misconduct and impermissibly asserted that Defendant was responsible for establishing her innocence, thereby denying Defendant her due process right to a fair and impartial trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant did not properly preserve her allegations of prosecutorial misconduct for appeal; and (2) the prosecutor’s remarks were improper but did not rise to a level sufficient to find plain error. View "State v. Favel" on Justia Law

In 2014, the district court found Respondent to be suffering from a mental disorder requiring commitment. The court involuntarily committed Respondent to the Montana State Hospital (MSH). On June 2, 2014, the district court issued an order of commitment summarizing the commitment. On June 5, 2014, the district court filed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order supporting the June 2 order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court’s June 2 order of commitment was deficient due and failed to comply with Mont. Code Ann. 53-21-127(8)(a) because it did not contain a detailed statement of the facts as required by section 53-21-127(8)(a); (2) the district court’s June 5 order was not procedurally invalid; and (3) the district court’s findings in the June 5 order were supported by substantial evidence, sufficient to support the decision to commit Respondent to the MSH. View "In re M.P.-L." on Justia Law