Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sought disclosure of a settlement agreement entered into by a Cascade County detention officer, Cascade County, and the officer’s collective bargaining unit (the Union). The only barrier to disclosure of the settlement agreement was the resistance of the Union. The district court ultimately granted Plaintiff’s motion and ordered the County to disclose the settlement agreement. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for an award of costs and attorney fees under Mont. Code Ann. 2-3-221. The request was directed solely against the Union. The district court awarded Plaintiff his costs but denied his request for attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees because the sole entity from which the fees were sought - the Union - is not a public or governmental body subject to Mont. Const. art. II, 9. View "Shockley v. Cascade County" on Justia Law

JAS, Inc. purchased certain property at a trustee’s sale. JAS later filed a quiet title action, naming several defendants, including Mortgage Electronic Systems, Inc. (MERS), Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., and OneWest Bank, FSB. Bank of America, N.A. (BOA), the successor to Countrywide, later intervened. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of BOA, concluding that the trustee’s sale of the property was void ab initio for failure to strictly follow Montana’s foreclosure laws. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly voided the sale on the basis of failure of strict compliance with the Small Tract Financing Act of Montana; and (2) the issue of JAS’s recovery of the funds it paid to OneWest Bank at the trustee’s sale was not properly before the Court. View "JAS, Inc. v. Eisele" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of criminal possession of dangerous drugs. Defendant was sentenced to five years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence and to dismiss the case for lack of evidence, arguing that the arresting police officer did not have particularized suspicion to conduct a stop of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly denied Defendant’s motions to suppress and to dismiss, as, based on the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, the police officer had particularized suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of Defendant. View "State v. Ballinger" on Justia Law

In 1999, the Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) entered an order requiring Samuel Shelhamer to pay Tamara Hodges $74 per month in child support. In 2014, CSED modified the order and established Shelhamer’s monthly support obligation at $743 per month. Shelhamer, a warrant officer in the United States Marine Corps, requested an administrative hearing. After a hearing, CSED issued its final administrative order setting Shelhamer’s support obligation at $935 per month. The final decision included Shelhamer’s non-taxable basic housing allowance and non-taxable basic subsistence allowance in Shelhamer's actual income to calculate his child support obligation. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a parent’s military housing and subsistence allowances should be included as part of the parent’s actual income when calculating child support obligations. View "Shelhamer v. Hodges" on Justia Law

Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendant alleging that Defendant defrauded her out of $100,000. Plaintiff alleged claims of unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and fraud. The district court ultimately granted default judgment in favor of Plaintiff after Plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions requesting a default judgment against Defendant as a sanction for violating a district court scheduling order requiring mediation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing default judgment for Defendant’s failure to comply with the court ordered mediation; and (2) the district court did not err in awarding prejudgment interest. View "Stafford v. Fockaert" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS) filed a petition seeking emergency protective authority, adjudication of Father’s three minor children as youth in need of care, and temporary legal custody. The district court adjudicated all children as youths in need of care and granted temporary legal custody to DPHHS. In 2015, upon a petition filed by DPHHS and after a hearing, the district court terminated Father’s rights to his three minor children, concluding that Father’s condition that led to the children’s removal was unlikely to change within a reasonable time and that continuation of the parental relationship would likely result in continued abuse or neglect of the children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in terminating Father’s parental rights. View "In re K.A." on Justia Law

This was the third of three lawsuits arising from the development of condominiums at Lakeside Village on Hauser Lake in Lewis and Clark County. Cherrad, LLC (Cherrad) was the project’s developer and Mountain West Bank (Bank) was its lender. Craig Kinnaman was the general contractor on the project but died in 2007. In this third suit, the estate of Kinnaman (the Estate) brought eight claims against the Bank. The Bank moved for summary judgment on all the Estate’s claims on the grounds that the claims were barred by the compulsory counterclaim rule or the doctrine of claim preclusion. The district court granted summary judgment on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion (1) in granting the Bank’s motion to change venue; (2) in granting summary judgment in favor of the Bank on all claims; (3) by taking judicial notice of the record in previous actions; and (4) by denying the Estate’s motion for relief from judgment under Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). View "Kinnaman v. Mountain West Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Morgen Farm and Ranch, Inc., which owned surface rights to certain property, leased oil and gas rights on a portion of its property to a corporation. The corporation later assigned its interest in the lease to Interstate Explorations, LLC, which drilled and completed a well on the Morgen property. Interstate later filed suit against Morgen requesting a declaration that Morgen had wrongfully denied an easement necessary for installing a power line to operate the well. Morgen counterclaimed that Interstate had damaged the surface of the property by spilling hydrocarbons. Interstate moved to dismiss Morgen’s counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that Morgen had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before initiating legal action for damages. The district court denied Interstate’s motion to dismiss, concluding that a surface owner is not required to exhaust an administrative remedy under the Surface Damage Act before litigating a damage claim in the courts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly denied Interstate’s motion to dismiss Morgen’s counterclaims. View "Interstate Explorations, LLC v. Morgen Farm & Ranch, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged by information with driving under the influence of alcohol fourth or subsequent offense (DUI). The information provided that Defendant had been convicted of DUI on three previous occasions, including once in 1999. Defendant moved to dismiss the 1999 DUI conviction, alleging that his constitutional right to counsel was violated in that proceeding. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Defendant pleaded guilty, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to satisfy his burden of proving that his 1999 conviction was constitutionally infirm; and (2) the district court erred by stating in the judgment that Defendant was convicted of a DUI rather than a DUI per se. Remanded. View "State v. Hancock" on Justia Law

Father and Mother were the biological parents of three minor children. Mother and Grandfather filed a joint petition for termination of Father’s parental rights and for Grandfather to adopt the children. When Father could not be found, the district court clerk of court entered an order directing that service of the summons be made upon Father by publication in the Billings Times newspaper. Father did not respond to the summons, and the clerk of court entered default against Father. After a hearing, the district court terminated Father’s parental rights and granted decrees of adoption for each of the children. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Father was not properly served by publication because the clerk of court, not the district court, entered the order directing service by publication; and (2) the district court erred in making no findings of fact on Grandfather’s standing under either Mont. Code Ann. 42-1-106 or 42-4-302(2). View "Jardine v. Schwartz" on Justia Law