Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jerry and Karen Slack hired Jeffrey Fisher and his construction company, Fisher Builders, to build a remodeled home. During the project, the deck collapsed, and the Slacks’ construction permit was revoked. The Slacks filed a negligence action against Fisher and his company. Fisher had a commercial general liability insurance policy with Employers Mutual Casualty Company (EMC). EMC filed a declaratory action alleging that there was no coverage and that it had no duty to defend or indemnify any party in the negligence action. Fisher and Fisher Builders ultimately settled with the Slacks and assigned their rights under the EMC insurance policy to the Slacks. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of EMC, ruling that Fisher’s conduct was clearly intentional and did not fit within the meaning of “occurrence” under the policy, regardless of whether Fisher intended the consequences. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) erred by concluding that, in the context of general liability insurance, the term “occurrence,” defined by the policy as “an accident,” categorically precludes coverage for any intentional conduct on the part of the insured with unintended results; and (2) erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of EMC, as issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. Remanded. View "Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Slack" on Justia Law

For more than a century, Asarco LLC and its predecessors operated a lead smelting facility (the Site). For almost fifty years, Atlantic Richfield Company’s predecessor operated a zinc fuming plant on land leased from Asarco at the Site. Atlantic Richfield subsequently sold the plant and related property to Asarco. Due to extensive contamination at the Site, the Environmental Protection Agency determined that Asarco was obligated to fund cleanup efforts at the Site. After conducting extensive remediation at the Site, Asarco filed a complaint seeking contribution pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) from Atlantic Richfield, asserting that Atlantic Richfield was liable under CERCLA for its equitable share of costs related to the Site’s cleanup. The federal district court granted summary judgment for Atlantic Richfield, concluding that Asarco’s claims were untimely under CERCLA’s statute of limitations. Asarco then commenced the present action against Atlantic Richfield alleging several state-law claims. The district court granted Atlantic Richfield’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the doctrine of claim preclusion barred Asarco’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that claim preclusion barred Asarco’s action because Asarco could have brought its state-law claims before the federal district court in Asarco I. View "Asarco LLC v. Atlantic Richfield Co." on Justia Law

For more than a century, Asarco LLC and its predecessors operated a lead smelting facility (the Site). For almost fifty years, Atlantic Richfield Company’s predecessor operated a zinc fuming plant on land leased from Asarco at the Site. Atlantic Richfield subsequently sold the plant and related property to Asarco. Due to extensive contamination at the Site, the Environmental Protection Agency determined that Asarco was obligated to fund cleanup efforts at the Site. After conducting extensive remediation at the Site, Asarco filed a complaint seeking contribution pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) from Atlantic Richfield, asserting that Atlantic Richfield was liable under CERCLA for its equitable share of costs related to the Site’s cleanup. The federal district court granted summary judgment for Atlantic Richfield, concluding that Asarco’s claims were untimely under CERCLA’s statute of limitations. Asarco then commenced the present action against Atlantic Richfield alleging several state-law claims. The district court granted Atlantic Richfield’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the doctrine of claim preclusion barred Asarco’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that claim preclusion barred Asarco’s action because Asarco could have brought its state-law claims before the federal district court in Asarco I. View "Asarco LLC v. Atlantic Richfield Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs worked within the Child Support Enforcement Division of the Department of Public Health and Human Services and constituted the majority of Compliance Specialists, Pay Band 6, employed by the State. Plaintiffs, who belonged to a Union, filed a grievance with the Board of Personnel Appeals (BOPA) alleging that their pay was not “internally equitable” in comparison with Pay Band 6 Compliance Specialists in other state agencies. A Hearing Officer issued a recommended order holding that Plaintiffs were aggrieved and awarded damages. BOPA, however, rejected the recommended order and dismissed the grievance, concluding that Plaintiffs had no independent right to internally equitable pay with other Pay Band 6 Compliance Specialists, but, instead, internal equity was a factor to be considered during the collective bargaining process. The district court vacated and reversed BOPA’s final order, agreeing with the Hearing Officer that Plaintiffs had a right to pay that was internally equitable with other Pay Band 6 Compliance Specialists. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order and reinstated BOPA’s final order, holding that the statutory factor of “internal equity” is not a stand-alone right that may be pursued independently and in preemption of the work of the collective bargaining process. View "Mashek v. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

When Child was just over a year old, Mother executed a power of attorney in favor of Appellant to allow her to care for Child. Mother later recovered physical custody of Child and moved with Child and her new husband to Oklahoma. Appellant commenced the present case by filing a petition for parental interest determination. The district court referred the case to its standing master. The standing master concluded that the district court had jurisdiction to determine Mother’s parental interest petition because Child lived in Montana at the time it was filed and had lived in Montana for two years before that. The district court reversed on the issue of jurisdiction, determining that Montana was an inconvenient forum and should decline to exercise jurisdiction over the matter. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the best forum to resolve Child’s future was not in Montana. View "In re Parenting of M.M.K." on Justia Law

Julia Fenwick and the State, Department of Military Affairs and Emergency Services Division (Department) executed a Severance Agreement whereby the Department agreed to lay off Fenwick, as opposed to discharging her, in exchange for Fenwick releasing any claims she had against the Department. Fenwick later filed this action alleging that the Severance Agreement should be rescinded for several reasons. The district court concluded as a matter of law that the Severance Agreement could not be rescinded. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) ruling that the Severance Agreement was lawful; and (2) ruling that the undisputed facts established that the Department’s consideration for the Severance Agreement did not fail. Remanded with instructions to proceed on Fenwick’s remaining claims. View "Fenwick v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was seriously injured while working for Employer. Plaintiff’s injury was caused by the use of her personal vehicle. Plaintiff was able to recover benefits under her auto insurance policy but also sought benefits under Employer’s commercial auto policy. Employer’s insurer (Insurer) denied coverage. Plaintiff brought a claim for coverage, arguing that she was a named insured under Employer’s policy and that she was occupying a temporary substitute for an insured vehicle at the time of her injury. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Insurer. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the issue of whether Plaintiff was a named insured under Employer’s commercial auto policy; but (2) reversed the district court’s order granting Insurer’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether Plaintiff’s pickup was a temporary substitute for a covered auto and directed the district court to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff on her coverage claim, as the evidence was sufficient to establish that Plaintiff’s pickup was a temporary substitute for an insured vehicle, entitling her to judgment on her coverage claim.. View "Stonehocker v. Gulf Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The parties to this appeal were Gene Curry, Cheryl Curry, and Curry Cattle Co. (collectively, Curry) and Pondera County Canal & Reservoir Company (Pondera). Both Curry and Pondera owned rights to divert waters from Birch Creek. Curry filed a complaint alleging interference with his water rights by Pondera. The Montana Water Court determined that Pondera was entitled to claim beneficial use based on the maximum number of shares authorized by the Montana Carey Land Board, a service area for Pondera’s place of use, the extent of the acreage included in the service area, the adjustment of the flow rate for two claims, and the reversal of the dismissal of a third claim. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the Water Court (1) did not err when it determined that Pondera’s rights were not limited by the actual acreage historically irrigated by its shareholders; (2) did not err in concluding that Pondera was entitled to a service area; (3) erred when it determined the acreage included in the service area; (4) applied the appropriate standard of review and did not misapprehend the effect of the evidence; and (5) did not err in tabulating two of the claims at issue. View "Curry v. Pondera County Canal & Reservoir Co." on Justia Law

The Department of Public Health and Human Services filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights to K.B. Father opposed his termination but did not argue that he should be given custody of K.B. After a termination hearing, the district court terminated Father’s rights, concluding that Father had not been successful in his treatment plan and that the condition rendering Father unfit was unlikely to change within a reasonable amount of time. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that it had subject matter jurisdiction over K.B.’s child abuse and neglect proceeding and authority to terminate Father’s parental rights; and (2) Father did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. View "In re K.B." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of arson, a felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded no contest to arson. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his no contest plea, asserting that the district court did not comply with the statutory procedures for rejecting plea agreements. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea, concluding that Defendant entered the plea voluntarily and knowingly. The district court then sentenced Defendant to ten years’ imprisonment with five years suspended. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions for the district court to conduct another sentencing hearing, holding that the plea agreement in this case should be construed as a Mont. Code Ann. 46-12-211(1)(b) agreement and that the district court erred by not following the required procedures for rejecting the parties’ plea agreement. View "State v. Langley" on Justia Law