Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Plaintiff’s employment with Butte-Silver Bow County was terminated, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the County alleging several counts. The district court granted summary judgment to the County on most of Plaintiff’s claims. The court, however, denied summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s claim that the County violated Mont. Code Ann. 39-2-904(1)(b), holding that factual questions remained as to whether the County had good cause for Plaintiff’s termination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) granting summary judgment in the County’s favor with respect to Plaintiff’s claims that the County violated Montana’s open meeting laws and public participation laws; (2) granting summary judgment in the County’s favor with respect to Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim; (3) ruling that the County did not discharge Plaintiff in violation of its own policies or for refusing to violate public policy; and (4) concluding that Plaintiff was entitled to a trial on her claim that the County terminated her employment without good cause. View "Moe v. Butte-Silver Bow Co." on Justia Law

In 2012, Montana voters passed Legislative Referendum 121 (LR 121). The referendum denied certain state services to “illegal aliens.” Before the law went into effect, Montana Immigrant Justice Alliance (MIJA) filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from LR 121, arguing that the referendum violated certain constitutional rights and was preempted by federal law. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction as to the majority of LR 121 but enjoined the use of the definition of “illegal alien” so as to preclude the State from using an individual’s unlawful entry into the United States as a factor in determining that individual’s entitlement to state benefits. The district court subsequently concluded that LR 121 was preempted by federal law. The court then awarded MIJA attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in concluding that MIJA has associational standing to challenge LR 121; (2) did not err in concluding that LR 121 is preempted by federal law; and (3) erred in awarding “supplemental relief” to MIJA in the form of attorney fees. View "Montana Immigrant Justice Alliance v. Bullock" on Justia Law

Property owners (Petitioners) appealed the Department of Revenue’s valuation of their residential lot for the tax year 2012. The Flathead County Tax Appeal Board (County Board) reduced the value of the land and the value of the improvements. Petitioners appealed, arguing that the appraised value was still too high. The State Tax Appeal Board (STAB) upheld the County Board’s determination of the value of the property. The district court reversed, concluding that the County Board property value upheld by STAB was clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court reversed the district court and reinstated the STAB decision, holding that the district court erred in reversing STAB’s order concerning the valuation of the property. View "Peretti v. State, Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Wayne S. Hansen Trust acquired tax deeds to three tracts of real property previously owned by Douglas Johnson. The Trust filed three quiet title actions for the respective properties. Johnson responded by filing his own quiet title actions on the properties. The district court granted summary judgment to Johnson, finding that the Trust failed to comply with the tax deed process, and declared the tax deeds void. The district court then ruled that no additional redemption amount was owing to the Trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err by granting summary judgment to Johnson and declaring the tax deeds void; and (2) the district court did not err in determining the final amount due to the Trust as purchaser of the tax liens. View "Johnson v. Wayne S. Hansen Trust" on Justia Law

Sometime after loan servicing duties on Robin and Kathleen Jacobsens’ loan was transferred to Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, Bayview initiated foreclosure proceedings. The Jacobsens filed this action to enjoin the sale of their house at a trustee’s sale. The district court canceled the trustee’s sale, and the Jacobsens amended their complaint to add Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA) and Montana Consumer Protection Act (MCPA) claims against Bayview. The trial court awarded money damages to the Jacobsens under the FDCPA and the MCPA. After the trial, the court imposed an additional amount in damages, finding that Bayview was in violation of the FDCPA, the MCPA, and the district court’s order in the case prohibiting debt collection by bay view during the pendency of the action. Thereafter, the district court concluded that Bayview committed a second violation of the order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it determined that Bayview violated the FDCPA and the MCPA; (2) the district court properly determined damages incurred by the Jacobsens as a result of Bayview’s actions and supported those conclusions with substantial evidence; and (3) the Jacobsens were entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal. View "Jacobson v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

Roger and Carrie Peters and Daggin’ Y Cattle Company (collectively, Peters) filed a complaint against Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C. and Larry Addink (collectively, Junkermeir) alleging multiple counts stemming from tax services Junkermier performed for Peters. New York Marine, which insured Junkermier under a professional liability policy, defended Junkermeir subject to a reservation of rights. Peters and Junkermeir eventually entered into a settlement agreement and stipulation for entry of judgment without New York Marine’s participation, and the district court scheduled a hearing on the stipulated settlement’s reasonableness. The district court allowed New York Marine to intervene. After a hearing, the district court found that the stipulated settlement amount was reasonable, entered judgment in Peters’s favor, and ordered that Junkermier was not liable for the stipulated settlement. New York Marine appealed, asserting for the first time that the district court judge erred by not disclosing an apparent conflict of interest. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice pending referral to a district judge for hearing on New York Martine’s request for disqualification for cause, holding (1) New York Marine did not waive its disqualification claim; and (2) the presiding judge should have disclosed circumstances that could potentially cause the judge’s impartiality reasonably to be questioned. View "Draggin’ Y Cattle Co. v. Addink" on Justia Law

Jerry Ray filed suit against Martin Connell alleging defamation. Defendant sought punitive damages, general damages based on a lost real estate commission, damages for tortious interference with business interests, and general damages for mental anguish and suffering. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Connell. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Connell was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on (1) Ray’s defamation claim based on a conversation between Connell and Jim Ronquillo; (2) Ray’s defamation claim based on comments Connell made at two Billings City Council meetings; and (3) Ray’s claims claims of tortious interference with business interests and general damages for mental anguish and suffering based on Connell’s alleged defamation of Ray’s character. View "Ray v. Connell" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of criminal possession. The district court sentenced him as a persistent felony offender to a term of twenty years, with ten of those years suspended. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of methamphetamine that law enforcement officers found on Defendant’s person after conducting a search incident to his lawful arrest for violating the terms of his parole; (2) Defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law following the evidence hearing relating to his suppression motion; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s third discovery request; (4) the district court did not err by denying Defendant’s post trial motion to dismiss based upon the Court’s failure to arraign him on the second amended information; and (5) the district court conducted an “adequate initial inquiry” into Defendant’s complaints concerning his assigned counsel. View "State v. Crawford" on Justia Law

This case was the second segment of Water Court Case 41O-129. Case 41O-129A was limited to the issues involving the use of the Bateman Ditch. Here, the Supreme Court reviewed the parties’ appeals of the Water Court’s determination of the remaining aspects of the case, styled as Water Court Case 41O-129B. The Water Master issued a report with his findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding each of Eldorado Coop Canal Company’s four claimed water rights to water from the Teton River. The Montana Water Court entered an order amending and adopting the master’s report. Eldorado, the Lower Teton Joint Objectors (LTJO), and Teton Coop Reservoir Co. (TCRC) appealed the Water Court’s order. The Supreme Court affirmed the Water Court’s order regarding Case 41O-129B, holding that the Water Court’s factual findings produced the proper result, the Water Court did not err when it assigned one volume maximum for all four of Eldorado’s named rights, and the Water Court applied the appropriate standard of review to the Master’s factual findings. View "Eldorado Coop Canal Co. v. Teton Coop Reservoir Co" on Justia Law

Mother and Father, who never lived together, had a child together. After the child’s birth, Father filed a petition for establishment of an interim parenting plan and then a petition for an “emergency de facto” parenting plan. Mother subsequently filed a proposed final parenting plan and a notice of intent to relocate. The district court largely adopted Mother’s proposed parenting plan. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order adopting the final parenting plan, holding that the district court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, and the court’s conclusions of law were correct. View "In re Parenting of C.J." on Justia Law