Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

O.F. Mossberg & Sons, Inc., and Burns Auction & Appraisal, LLC (collectively “Mossberg”), appealed a District Court order granting Luke and Stephanie Keuffers’ motion to disqualify Mossberg’s counsel. The District Court disqualified Mossberg’s out-of-state counsel, Renzulli Law Firm, and its local counsel, Tarlow & Stonecipher, pursuant to Rule 1.20(c) of the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct. The basis for the court’s disqualification order was a prospective client consultation that Luke Keuffer had with an attorney from Tarlow & Stonecipher, which was later used in a deposition of Stephanie Keuffer by John Renzulli of the Renzulli Law Firm. The court found that the continued involvement in the case by Mossberg’s counsel gave the Keuffers reason to question whether their case could proceed fairly and cause to question what they may have disclosed in the consultation to Tarlow & Stonecipher that may later be used against them in the current litigation. The court also found that Mossberg’s counsel’s actions undermine the public’s trust in the legal profession. Finding no reversible error in the District Court's disqualification order, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. View "Keuffers v. O.F. Mossberg & Sons" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, plaintiffs Robert Nelson and Kelli Tyrrell (Tyrrell), as Special Administrator of the Estate of Brent Tyrrell, pled violations of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) for injuries allegedly sustained while Nelson and Brent were employed by BNSF Railway Company in states other than Montana. BNSF moved to dismiss both plaintiffs’ claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. The motion in Nelson's case was granted; the motion in Tyrrell's case was denied. The issue on appeal was whether Montana courts had personal jurisdiction over BNSF under FELA and Montana law. After review, the Montana Supreme Court concluded that Montana courts had personal jurisdiction over BNSF under FELA and Montana Law. The order denying BNSF's motion to dismiss Tyrrell's case was affirmed, and the motion in Nelson's case was reversed. View "Tyrrell v. BNSF" on Justia Law

The Denturist Association of Montana (Association), on behalf of denturist Carl Brisendine, filed suit against the Board of Dentistry, challenging the validity of A.R.M. 24.138.2302(1)(j) (Rule J), the latest in a long line of legal disputes between the two. "Wiser v. Montana," (129 P.3d 133 (Wiser I)) and "Wiser v. Board of Dentistry," (Wiser II)) either implicitly or explicitly claimed that the Board's promulgation of Rule J was invalid because it conflicted with statute. The Wiser I plaintiffs (comprised of every denturist in Montana) made their claims "on behalf of the profession of denturitry." Wiser I plaintiffs lost their challenge to the Board's authority. The Wiser II plaintiffs, comprised of a smaller group of denturists, attempted to distinguish themselves from the Wiser I plaintiffs, but the Court saw no distinction in their capacity to challenge the Board’s promulgation of Rule J as individuals rather than as representatives of a group. The Court barred the Wiser II plaintiffs’ claims on res judicata grounds. In this case, Brisendine’s complaint contains three counts: Count 1 Rule J was discriminatory and restrained trade, and that the Board violated Montana law by discriminatorily applying its disciplinary rules: being unduly harsh on denturists while giving leniency to dentists. Counts II and III alleged Rule J was invalid because it conflicted with various statutes. Brisendine moved for summary judgment on Count II, and the Board filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on all counts. The District Court, citing Wiser I and II, held Brisendine’s claims were barred by res judicata as a matter of law. Brisendine appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that privity existed between the litigants in the Wiser cases and Brisendine. Because privity exists and the other elements of claim preclusion were not contested with respect to Counts II and III, the Court affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the Board on those claims on res judicata grounds. Brisendine's claim in Count I was an entirely different claim than those made in the Wiser cases, and the District Court erred when it granted summary judgment to the Board on this claim. View "Denturist Assoc. v Montana DOL" on Justia Law

Ray Ramberg appealed the dismissal of his motion to modify the parenting plan regarding his child (“C.M.R.”) with Amber Massey, and the denial of his motion to change venue from Toole to Hill County. Ramberg and Massey were never married but they lived together in Toole County, until May 2010 when they separated. Massey was the primary care provider for C.M.R. Since early 2011, Ramberg and Massey litigated the terms of parenting plans to accommodate for the different needs of C.M.R. as the child grew older. After several changes requiring mediation and litigation in 2011, 2012, and 2014, Ramberg and Massey signed a the parenting plan at issue here on February 17, 2015. C.M.R. had lived his entire life in Toole County, but in April 2015, Massey accepted a job in Havre, Hill County, which was closer to Ramberg’s current residence in Chinook. Massey moved to Havre with C.M.R. The move facilitated Ramberg’s contact with C.M.R. However, shortly thereafter, Massey received another job offer that was more lucrative from her former employer in Shelby. Thus, Massey and C.M.R. moved back to Shelby at the end of August 2015 after living in Havre for three and one-half months. Upon learning about Massey’s plan to move back to Shelby, Ramberg petitioned to modify the mediated Parenting Plan. Ramberg also filed a motion to change venue to Hill County, which was denied. The petition for modification of the Parenting Plan was dismissed without a hearing. Ramberg raised three issues in his appeal to the Supreme Court, but finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decisions. View "Parenting of C.M.R." on Justia Law

This case arose out of claims asserted by multiple people against Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana, now known as Caring for Montanans, Inc. (CFM) and Montana Comprehensive Health Association (MCHA). The claimants asserted that while they were insured by CFM or MCHA, they submitted claims that the insurers denied based upon exclusions contained in their health insurance policies. These exclusions generally provided that the insurer would not pay for health care costs of the injured insureds if the insureds received, or were entitled to receive, benefits from any automobile liability policy. These exclusions were subsequently disapproved by the Montana Commissioner of Insurance, and the insureds sought the previously-denied benefits. The district court certified a class of claimants for settlement purposes only. The court then held a fairness hearing on a proposed settlement agreement and approved the settlement. Several class members objected to the settlement and appealed to the Montana Supreme Court, arguing they should have been allowed to conduct further discovery to ascertain the fairness of the settlement agreement. The Supreme Court agreed with the objectors and remanded the case to the district court for further discovery and a second fairness hearing. The district court allowed further discovery, held a second fairness hearing, and determined that the same settlement agreement was fair, reasonable, and adequate. The Objectors again appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pallister v. BCBS" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs (the Friedmans) purchased a professional archery retail sporting goods business owned by Aaron and Constance Lasco. The Lascos entered a covenant not to compete with the Friedmans that was incorporated into the purchase and sale agreement. After the sale was final, Aaron Lasco went to work at Sportsman & Ski Haus (Sportsman). Sportsman subsequently expended its business to include a new archery department. Thereafter, the Friedmans filed several breach of contract claims against the Lascos, including breach of the covenant not to compete. The Friedmans also requested a preliminary injunction to stop Aaron Lasco from further employment at Sportsman until their claims were resolved. The district court found the covenant not to compete was valid and granted the Friedmans’ preliminary injunction request. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision to grant a preliminary injunction to the Friedmans, holding that the Friedmans demonstrated that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims against the Lascos. View "Friedman v. Lasco" on Justia Law

In the underlying litigation, the Estate of Ronny Groff filed suit against Jake Weitzel alleging that Weitzel wrongful absconded with Ronny’s property and assets, causing economic loss to the Estate. Weitzel tendered this litigation to Fire Insurance Exchange (FIE) under a homeowner’s insurance policy covering claims for personal and bodily injury and property damage. FIE accepted responsibility for the litigation under a reservation of rights. FIE then filed suit in district court seeking declaratory relief, claiming that it owed no duty to defend Weitzel against the Estate under the terms of the policy. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Weitzel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by concluding that FIE had a duty to defend Weitzel under the terms of the insurance policy. View "Fire Ins. Exchange v. Weitzel" on Justia Law

Pacific Steel & Recycling entered into a contract with Emineth Custom Homes to build four duplex apartment units. The contract specified that Pacific would advance a $474,625 down payment to Emineth upon execution of the contract. After canceling the contract for the duplexes Pacific brought an action against Emineth seeking recovery of the down payment made to Emineth under the contract. Emineth counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract and other claims. A jury determined that Emineth did not breach the contract with Pacific but that Pacific breached the contract with Emineth. The jury awarded $238,241 in Emineth’s favor. The district court entered judgment on the verdict in favor of Emineth but ordered that Emineth’s jury award in its favor become a judgment against Emineth and in favor of Pacific for $236,189. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the jury’s verdict with regard to the finding that Pacific breached the contract with Emineth stands; but (2) the district court in rendering the judgment made a factual determination contrary to the verdict returned by the jury. Remanded for entry of a judgment of $238,241 against Pacific and in favor of Emineth. View "Pacific Hide & Fur Depot v. Emineth Custom Homes, Inc." on Justia Law

Mark Ibsen, Inc., the owner and operator of the Urgent Care Plus medical clinic in Helena, purchased health insurance coverage for its employees from Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana (BCBSMT) through a Chamber of Commerce program. Health Care Corporation (Health Care) subsequently acquired BCBSMT’s health insurance business and changed its name to Caring for Montanans, Inc. (Caring). Less than one year later, Ibsen filed a complaint and class action against Caring and Health Care claiming that they had violated the Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA). Health Care filed a motion to dismiss and Caring filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions, concluding that the legislature did not provide private citizens with the right to bring a cause of action to enforce the UTPA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Ibsen may not maintain a private right of action for violation of Mont. Code Ann. 33-18-208 and -212 of the UTPA; and (2) in the alternative, Ibsen’s claims cannot be sustained as common law claims. View "Mark Ibsen, Inc. v. Caring for Montanans, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of driving under the influence, second offense. Defendant appealed, demanding a trial de novo. Defendant also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that his constitutional rights had been violated by his trial being conducted by a non-lawyer judge in a court of record without trial de novo. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s trial before a non-lawyer justice of the peace, even where a trial de novo was not available on appeal, did not violate his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel or to due process. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law