Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Zabrocki began receiving Teachers Retirement System (TRS) retirement benefits in 2007. In 2012 TRS notified Zabrocki that he did not qualify for those benefits and was liable to reimburse TRS for the amounts it paid. Zabrocki requested administrative review. The TRS Board affirmed. Zabrocki requested a contested case hearing. TRS appointed a hearing examiner who issued a proposed order granting TRS's motion for summary judgment. Zabrocki filed exceptions. The Board heard argument on February 21, 2014; the chair stated that a final decision would be adopted at a subsequent meeting. On May 16, the Board issued its order, finding disputes as to material facts precluding summary judgment, and remanded to the hearing examiner. Zabrocki sought judicial review, contending that TRS violated MCA 2-4-623(1)(a), which requires that a final decision in a contested case be issued within “90 days after a contested case is considered to be submitted for a final decision.” The district court agreed that the May 16 order was not a final order, noted that a denial of summary judgment is not a final decision for purposes of appeal, and determined that on May 16 the Board decided “the issues raised on summary judgment” and not the entire dispute, so that “there is more to be done at the agency level.” The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, in favor of TRS. The Board did not violate the final agency decision requirement of MCA 2-4-623(1)(a). View "Zabrocki v. Teachers Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

The Water Court is adjudicating the existing water right claims of all appropriators in the Teton River Basin and issued a temporary preliminary decree for Basin 41O. Eldorado, which distributes water to shareholders from the Teton River northwest of Choteau, owns water rights that historically have been administered under the 1908 Perry Decree by a water commissioner (MCA 85-5-101). In 2014, the Water Court addressed objections to Eldorado’s existing water right claims as established under the temporary preliminary decree. The Montana Supreme Court, in Eldorado I, upheld the Water Court’s determinations that Eldorado’s claims required a volume quantification and that Eldorado historically put to beneficial use 15,000 acre-feet of water under its existing rights. The Joint Objectors later informed the water commissioner that Eldorado was approaching the volumetric quantification established by that order and requested that he cap the distribution of Eldorado’s water. Eldorado petitioned the Water Court to stay the volume quantification order pending the Eldorado I appeal. The Water Court denied Eldorado’s request and the commissioner ceased delivering water to Eldorado. Eldorado filed a dissatisfied water user complaint (MCA 85-5-301). The Montana Supreme Court affirmed denial of that complaint. Eldorado participated in every step of the process that resulted in the establishment of its rights under the modified temporary preliminary decree. View "Eldorado Coop Canal Co. v. Hoge" on Justia Law

Maggie Petaja was terminated from her position with Lewis and Clark County when she was age fifty-nine. After unsuccessfully pursuing relief on the administrative level, Petaja, a member of a collective bargaining unit represented by the Montana Public Employees’ Association (MPEA), filed a discrimination claim against the County. Petaja also filed suit against MPEA, alleging breach of the duty of fair representation. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the County on the discrimination claim and against MPEA on the breach of the duty of fair representation claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the jury verdict finding MPEA breached its duty of fair representation; (2) the jury verdict was not contrary to the instructions and law; and (3) the district court correctly found that it had no legal authority to award attorney fees. View "Petaja v. Mont. Pub. Employees’ Ass’n" on Justia Law

Appellants (“the Silvertip Landowners”) were a group of private landowners in Carbon County who initiated a petition to establish a “Part 1” zoning district pursuant to 76-2-101, MCA, et seq. Appellees were the Board of County Commissioners of Carbon County (“the Commissioners”), and a group of private landowners in Carbon County who opposed the proposed zoning district (“the Neighbors”). At at hearing on the petition, the Commissioners reported that landowners holding 60.7% of the total acreage in the proposed district had submitted protests opposing the zoning district. The Commissioners rescinded their resolution of intent, and voted to deny creation of the zoning district as proposed, citing as the reason for doing so the formal protests lodged. The Silvertip Landowners filed suit at the district court, arguing: (1) reliance on an unconstitutional protest provision in 76-2-101(5), MCA; (2) arbitrary and capricious reversal of the Commissioners’ own finding of public interest; and (3) unconstitutional deprivation of the Silvertip Landowners’ right to a clean and healthful environment as guaranteed by the Montana Constitution. For relief, the Silvertip Landowners asked the District Court to: (1) declare 76-2-101(5), MCA, unconstitutional and therefore void; (2) declare the Commissioners’ decisions to withdraw the resolution of intent to create the zoning district and to deny the Silvertip Landowners’ petition as arbitrary and capricious; and therefore void; and (3) declare the Commissioners’ decisions to withdraw the resolution of intent and to deny the petition as violative of the Montana Constitutional environmental protections. The Commissioners and the Neighbors both moved to dismiss, and their motion was granted. Finding no reversible error, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal. View "Martinell v. Carbon Co. Comm." on Justia Law

S.H. appealed a court order committing her to the Montana State Hospital. In late 2014, S.H. sought help from the emergency department at the Billings Clinic. S.H. complained she was suffering from food poisoning, that there were snakes in her stomach, black bugs in the toilet, and the voices of God and Satan were arguing in her head. A psychiatrist at the Clinic examined S.H. and, upon his recommendation, the State filed a petition to involuntarily commit S.H. on November 12, 2014. The petition notified S.H. of her rights—including her “right to refuse any but lifesaving medication for up to 24 hours prior to any hearing held pursuant to [§ 53-21-115(11), MCA].” The District Court ordered S.H. detained at the Billings Clinic pending resolution of the petition. The District Court then appointed counsel to represent S.H., held an initial hearing, and ordered an evaluation. At the conclusion of the hearing, the District Court found that the State proved to a reasonable medical certainty that S.H. suffers from the mental disorder of bipolar disorder and that S.H. “is in a manic state, delusional, agitated and paranoid.” S.H. challenged the evidence presented against her as insufficient to support the order committing her to hospital care. The Supreme Court reviewed the District Court record, found sufficient evidence, and affirmed the District Court's decision. View "Matter of S.H." on Justia Law

Jeffry Weber appealed after a jury convicted him of felony theft. Weber was a janitor at Sidney High School. A Thermal Dynamics Cutmaster 82 plasma cutter, a tool used to cut metal and steel, went missing from the high school shop classroom on a night Weber was working. The high school principal later identified Weber as the person on surveillance video in the shop the night the plasma cutter disappeared. After an investigation, the State charged Weber by information with theft of property in excess of $1,500 for stealing the plasma cutter from the high school. At issue during trial was the admission into evidence an inventory list that was prepared by a former shop teacher. Defense counsel sought to admit the inventory to challenge the value of the missing cutter. If the value was less than $1,500, the Weber could have been charged with a misdemeanor. Witnesses testified that the cutter was not new, therefore, $1,500 represented a "new" value, and that replacement cost was not the correct basis for determining the cutter's value. Weber was convicted nonetheless. On appeal, Weber argued the trial court's rulings with regard to the inventory were made in error, and his defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance, thus warranting him a new trial. The Supreme Court concluded that Weber demonstrated a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. "Weber has shown there is a probability that, given the benefit of the lesser valuation of the plasma cutter, Weber may have been convicted of a lesser crime of misdemeanor theft, rather than the felony conviction he received under trial counsel’s deficient performance." The case was remanded for a new trial. View "Montana v. Weber" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, plaintiffs Robert Nelson and Kelli Tyrrell, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Brent Tyrrell (Brent), pled violations of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), for injuries allegedly sustained while Nelson and Brent were employed by BNSF Railway Company in states other than Montana. BNSF moved to dismiss both plaintiffs’ claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. In Tyrrell's case, the court denied BNSF's motion to dismiss. In Nelson's case, the court granted BNSF's motion. The issues on appeal centered on personal jurisdiction over BNSF: whether Montana courts had jurisdiction under FELA or Montana law. After review, the Montana Supreme Court held that Montana courts had general personal jurisdiction over BNSF under the FELA and Montana law. Both cases were remanded for further proceedings. View "Tyrrell v. BNSF" on Justia Law

Anne Hislop appealed the denial of a motion to dismiss an aggravated DUI charge. In 2007, Hislop’s license was suspended because she declined to submit to the preliminary alcohol screening test after being arrested for DUI. Ultimately, she was acquitted of the criminal charge after trial. In 2013, Hislop was arrested for DUI. Hislop did not provide a breath or blood sample as required under 61-8-402, MCA. Hislop was charged with aggravated DUI based on her 2007 refusal to submit a breath or blood test. In 2011, the Montana Legislature enacted 61-8-465, MCA, the aggravated DUI statute. A person commits aggravated DUI if the person operates a vehicle under the influence of alcohol and refuses to provide a breath or blood sample as required under 61-8-402, MCA, the implied consent law, and has had his or her license suspended for a prior refusal to provide a breath or blood sample under 61-8-402, MCA, within ten years of the current offense. Hislop filed a motion to dismiss the charge on the ground it violated the prohibition on ex post facto laws. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, finding that 61-8-465(1)(d) only took into consideration Hislop's 2007 behavior while punishing her 2013 conduct, and was not ex post facto legislation. View "Montana v. Hislop" on Justia Law

Christopher Brunette appealed an order denying his petition for reinstatement of his driver’s license. Brunette argued the arresting officer lacked probable cause for a stop of his vehicle, and therefore the ensuing revocation of his license was predicated on an illegal stop. The Supreme Court found the evidence supported a finding of probable cause, and resulting proceedings against Brunette. The Court therefore affirmed denial of Brunette's motion to reinstate his driver's license. View "Brunette v. Montana" on Justia Law

The State appealed an order granting Daniel Colvin's motion to dismiss. In 2014, the State charged Colvin by information with attempted deliberate homicide in the September 4, 2014 shooting of Michael Aja. At the time of the incident Aja was sitting in his Jeep vehicle. Colvin claimed that he was holding the pistol inside the driver’s side window when it accidentally fired and hit Aja. On the same day as the shooting, law enforcement officers seized and impounded the Jeep as evidence. As the case developed, the position of the pistol and its distance from the victim when fired became important issues to the prosecution and the defense. The State’s theory was that the pistol shot came from several feet outside the vehicle, while Colvin’s theory was that it came from very near or inside the window. Colvin also contends that each eyewitness to the incident, including the victim, supports his theory that the shot was fired from near or inside the vehicle window. The District Court entered an order granting a defense discovery motion, requiring disclosure of “all materials known or discovered . . . pertinent to this case.” That same day the State filed a motion for leave to return a wallet and keys to Michael Aja. A few days later, the State returned the vehicle to Aja. The State did not notify the defense or the District Court that it intended to release the vehicle and did not seek leave of the District Court to do so. The District Court determined that after release of the vehicle and Aja’s daily use, the defense had no means to obtain evidence as it existed at the time the State’s expert gathered his evidence. The District Court concluded that the State’s “negligent” release of the impounded vehicle in the face of an order requiring disclosure “deprived the defense of the opportunity to investigate and prove their theory of the case. This is a fundamental violation of due process.” Finding no reversible error in the District Court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed granting Colvin's motion to dismiss. View "Montana v. Colvin" on Justia Law