Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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Jason Talbot was seriously injured in Montana when he was struck by a vehicle driven by an employee of WMK-Davis, LLC. At the time of the accident, Talbot was employed by Cudd Pressure Control, Inc. Talbot, who was a resident of Oklahoma, filed a workers’ compensation claim in Oklahoma. Talbot then filed a complaint in Yellowstone County against WMK-Davis’s employee. Cudd, in turn, successfully moved to intervene in order to assert a workers’ compensation subrogation lien against Talbot’s potential tort recovery. Such an action is allowable under Oklahoma law, but Oklahoma law directly conflicts with Montana’s rule that a party may not subrogate until the injured worker has been whole. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Talbot, concluding that Montana applied and Cudd was prohibited from asserting a workers’ compensation subrogation lien in the underlying action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in determining that Montana courts will not conduct a choice of law analysis when determining the validity of a workers’ compensation subrogation lien; and (2) because the Montana Constitution applies in this case, and Cudd stipulated that Talbot will not be made whole under Montana law, Talbot was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. View "Talbot v. Cudd" on Justia Law

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This case concerned three retirement plans established by the Montana Legislature under the Montana Public Employee Retirement System (PERS). Plaintiffs, who elected to participate in the Defined Contribution Retirement Plan (DC Plan) and Montana University System Retirement Plan (University Plan), filed suit against the State and PERS, alleging that they were treated unequally from similarly-situated participants in the Defined Benefit Retirement Plan (DB Plan) and that requiring State employers of DC and University Plan participants to contribute to the trust that funds the retirement benefits of all DB Plan participants (DB Trust) violates Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, concluding (1) participants in the DB Plan, DC Plan, and University Plan are not members of similarly situated classes under an equal protection analysis, and (2) employer contributions to the DB Trust that are calculated based on the salaries of DC and University Plan participants do not violate substantive due process. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its judgment. View "Wrzesien v. Mont. Pub. Employee Ret. Admin." on Justia Law

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This matter involved a challenge to the final order of the Montana Public Service Commission disallowing $1,419,427 in claimed excess electric regulation costs and adjusted energy efficiency savings calculations. NorthWestern Corporation - doing business as NorthWestern Energy, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and Human Resources Council, District XI appealed the Commission’s decision. The district court affirmed the Commission’s final order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission used the correct legal standard in reviewing NorthWestern’s claim for excess outage costs; and (2) the “free ridership” and “spillover” calculations adopted by the Commission were supported by substantial evidence. View "Northwestern Corp. v. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation" on Justia Law

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Carbon County Resource Council and Northern Plains Resources Council (collectively, Resource Councils) challenged the Montana Board of Oil and Gas Conservation’s (the Board) approval of well stimulation activities at an exploratory gas well in Carbon County. Specifically, Resource Councils claimed that the Board’s permitting process violated their constitutional right to meaningfully participate in government decisions. The district court concluded that Resource Councils’ constitutional challenge was not ripe for judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the Board. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Resource Councils’ claims are ripe for judicial review; but (2) the Board did not violate Resource Councils’ right to participate in its consideration of the permit at issue in this case. View "Carbon County Res. Council v. Bd. of Oil & Gas Conservation" on Justia Law

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David and Alana Folsom filed a complaint against Eagle’s Rest, LLC and the City of Livingston claiming breach of contract, negligence, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit. After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment specifying that plaintiffs recovered nothing from Eagle’s Rest but awarding damages as to Livingston. The court also awarded attorney fees to the Folsoms as the prevailing party. The Folsoms appealed, and Livingston cross-appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the district court (1) did not err by excluding expert testimony of a professional appraiser; (2) did not err in excluding David Folsom’s expert testimony at trial; (3) properly instructed the jury regarding unjust enrichment; (4) erred by awarding negligence damages to the Folsoms; and (5) abused its discretion by awarding essentially all of the attorney fees incurred by the Folsoms. View "Folsom v. Livingston" on Justia Law

Posted in: Contracts, Injury Law
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Defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary, elder abuse, and failure to comply with licensing requirements. Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison for aggravated burglary, ten years in prison for elder abuse, and six months in jail for the licensing violation. All sentences were to run concurrently. Defendant appealed, arguing that receiving multiple convictions for elder abuse and aggravated burglary violated Mont. Code Ann. 46-11-410(2)(d) and that her counsel’s failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that elder abuse and aggravated burglary do not constitute multiple convictions for the same offense and do not violate section 46-11-410(2)(d), and therefore, Defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail. View "State v. Hooper" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of six felony offenses of incest, sexual intercourse without consent, and sexual assault. During closing argument by Defendant’s attorney, an audience member interrupted and said, “Well I’d like to say that God is faithful and just to those who confess their sins.” On appeal, Defendant argued that the spectator’s remark deprived him of a fair trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, while the spectator’s comment was improper, it was not so serious that it caused a manifest miscarriage of justice, and the district court did not commit reversible error in addressing the improper remark. View "State v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Sean Melton purchased four parcels of property from Len Wallace. Lee Foss represented Wallace. The parties contractually agreed that Melton would pay Foss $112,000 in commission. Foss later filed suit against Melton for the unpaid balance of the commission. Melton moved for summary judgment, arguing that Foss had not exhausted his available remedies pursuant to the “exhaustion of remedies” clause in the contract. Foss also moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Foss and awarded attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Foss because, while Foss did not fail to exhaust available remedies, it was inappropriate for the court to decide certain factual questions on summary judgment; and (2) erred in awarding attorney’s fees to Foss. View "Foss v. Melton" on Justia Law

Posted in: Contracts
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Jon Krakauer, a journalist and resident of Colorado, published a book chronicling instances of alleged sexual misconduct on or near the Missoula campus of the University of Montana. This case involved Krakauer’s request for release of certain student records related to one instance of allegations of sexual assault. The Commissioner of Higher Education denied Krakauer’s request, and Krakauer filed a petition in the district court citing the right to know under the Montana Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment to Krakauer and ordered the Commissioner to make available for inspection the requested records. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA) and state statute provide an exception for release of information pursuant to a lawfully issued court order; and (2) the records at issue in this case appear to fall under the “personally identifiable information” protection granted by FERPA. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Krakauer v. Comm’n of Higher Educ." on Justia Law

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The Water Use Act permits certain groundwater appropriations to be exempt from the permitting process. An exception to one exemption is when a “combined appropriation” from the same source by two or more wells or springs exceeds a certain amount per year. At issue in this case was the definition of the term “combined appropriation.” After an adverse ruling from the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) hearing examiner, a group of senior water users (the Coalition) challenged the validity of Admin. R. M. 36.12.101(13), which states that the term “combined appropriation” means “groundwater developments that are physically manifold into the same system.” The district court invalidated Admin. R. M. 36.12.101(13), reinstated Admin. R. M. 36.12.101(7), which provided that “[g]roundwater developments need not be physically connected nor have a common distribution system to be considered a ‘combined appropriation’” and directed the DNRC to formulate a new administrative rule consistent with the court’s order. The Supreme Court affirmed, with the exception of the requirement that the DNRC initiate rulemaking, holding (1) the district court did not err by invalidating the newer administrative rule and reinstating the older rule; and (2) it was the DNRC’s decision whether to initiate rulemaking to change the reinstated rule. View "Clark Fork Coalition v. Montana Well Drillers Ass’n" on Justia Law