Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After she was arrested for driving under the influence, Defendant was transported to the hospital for a blood draw. When her handcuffs were removed to facilitate the blood draw, Defendant fled. The State charged Defendant with tampering with or fabricating physical evidence based on Defendant’s leaving the hospital and preventing a blood sample from being drawn. Defendant moved to dismiss the tampering charge, arguing that blood is not evidence until it is removed from the body. The district court denied Defendant’s motion. The jury then found Defendant guilty. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that State v. Peplow is dispositive in this case and that physical evidence of Defendant’s alcohol content is limited to that which is collected for analysis of her blood or breath. View "State v. Harrison" on Justia Law

Joseph Forsythe was charged with partner/family member assault (PFMA) for his physical altercation with his wife, Giana. While confined and under a no contact order, Forsythe sent letters to Giana telling her to provide false testimony regarding the incident. After Giana gave the letters to the authorities, the State charged Forsythe with felony tampering with a witness. Forsythe was found guilty of both PFMA and tampering. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the district court (1) did not err in determining that the letters Forsythe sent to Giana were not protected by spousal privilege; (2) erred in allowing a lay witness to testify regarding handwriting samples, but the error was harmless; and (3) imposed an illegal sentence by ordering Forsythe to pay a $20 information technology surcharge rather than a $10 surcharge as authorized by statute. View "State v. Forsythe" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of negligent endangerment, leaving the scene of an injury accident, and failing to give notice of an accident. The municipal court included six conditions to Defendant’s suspended sentence for negligent endangerment, four of which pertained to alcohol use. Defendant appealed, arguing that the municipal court did not establish a sufficient nexus between his criminal history and the conditions imposed on his sentence that related to alcohol. The district court upheld the municipal court’s alcohol-related conditions on Defendant’s sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the municipal court’s alcohol-related conditions were both legal and reasonable and had a sufficient nexus to Defendant’s history of alcohol abuse and reckless driving. View "City of Billings v. Barth" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to DUI per se. Defendant appealed the municipal court’s denial of her motion to suppress blood test results on the ground that, by remaining silent, she did not voluntarily consent to the blood test. The district court affirmed, ruling that Defendant consented to the blood draw pursuant to Montana’s implied consent law, Mont. Code Ann. 61-8-402(1), and that the municipal court did not err by finding that she did not withdraw that consent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s passive compliance to the blood test was insufficient to constitute a withdrawal of her implied consent; and (2) therefore, the municipal court correctly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress her blood test results. View "City of Great Falls v. Allderdice" on Justia Law

In 2009, Atkins-Swanson applied and qualified for participation in the Self-Directed Personal Assistance Service Program, a government-sponsored program that allowed Atkins-Swanson to direct health-related tasks. Consumer Direct was Atkins-Swanson’s provider agency and provided administrative services to Atkins-Swanson during the course of her participation in the program. In 2013, Atkins-Swanson succumbed to a fatal overdose of buspirone. Lee Swanson, on his own behalf and on behalf of Atkins-Swanson’s estate, filed this action against Consumer Direct, alleging wrongful death, survivorship, and breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment for Consumer Direct, concluding that Consumer Direct was statutorily immune from liability because it was not directing the personal-care services. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly granted Consumer Direct’s motion for summary judgment and did not err by denying Swanson’s motion to alter or amend the judgment on the ground that the claims were foreclosed under Mont. Code Ann. 53-6-145. View "Swanson v. Consumer Direct" on Justia Law

After responding to a 911 call, a police officer spoke to Bridge Rogers, who told the officer that Rick Strobel, her husband, hit her in the face and tried to force her into a pickup truck. The City of Helena charged Strobel with partner or family member assault (PFMA). At trial, Rogers recanted her prior statement to the police. The municipal court denied Strobel’s motion to dismiss the charges for insufficient evidence and convicted him. The district court affirmed the conviction, concluding that sufficient evidence existed to support a finding that Strobel was guilty of PFMA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the municipal court reasonably could have found every element of the crime of PFMA beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore, the district court did not err in affirming Strobel’s conviction. View "City of Helena v. Strobel" on Justia Law

The State charged twelve-year-old K.J.R. with seven felony and misdemeanor offenses. The district youth court subsequently adjudicated K.J.R. to be a delinquent youth. The youth court committed K.J.R. to the supervision of the youth court until age eighteen, or sooner released, for placement at a specific therapeutic group home. Over the next three years, the juvenile probation officer moved K.J.R. in and out of a sequence of juvenile facilities and foster care homes. When K.J.R. was fifteen years old, the State filed a petition to revoke his youth court probation. After a dispositional hearing, the youth court revoked K.J.R.’s original commitment to the youth court and committed K.J.R. to the supervision of the Montana Department of Corrections (DOC) at a state youth correctional facility until age eighteen or sooner released. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court did not err when it revoked K.J.R.’s original youth court commitment and recommitted him to DOC for placement at a state youth correction facility; and (2) K.J.R.’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the delinquency proceedings was without merit. View "State v. K.J.R." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with sexual abuse of children and sexual assault. The jury found Defendant guilty of sexual abuse of children but hung on the charge of sexual assault. At a second trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of the sexual assault charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by denying Defendant’s requests for substitution of counsel; (2) did not violate Defendant’s confrontation rights by excluding evidence pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-511(2); (3) did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Juror No. 5 in the second trial; and (4) properly instructed the jury when it utilized the pattern unanimity instruction from the Montana Pattern Jury Instructions. View "State v. Aguado" on Justia Law

A rockfall damaged the residence of Jane Deschner and Jon Lodge (together, Plaintiffs) near the Billings Rimrocks (Rims). The City of Billings owned the property from which the slab fell, and the State maintained a highway that ran on top of the Rims north of Plaintiffs’ property. In 1963, the State improved the highway, rerouting it and installing culverts underneath the new roadway to facilitate water runoff. As relevant to this appeal, Plaintiffs sued the State, claiming inverse condemnation. At trial, Plaintiffs argued that the State’s construction and placement of the highway and a culvert caused an unnatural increase in the amount of water that ran off the highway onto the rockfall site, ultimately causing the slab to fall onto their home. The jury returned a special verdict finding that the State was not negligent, that Plaintiffs’ negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about their own damages, and that the State did not inversely condemn Plaintiffs’ property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court’s instruction on inverse condemnation was not erroneous. View "Deschner v. State, Department of Highways" on Justia Law

Thomas Cherewick and Ronald Henry and Landowners all owned property in Remington Ranch, a real estate development comprising several subdivisions. Landowners filed a complaint against Cherewick, Henry, and the development’s property owner’s association, alleging, as relevant to this appeal, that Henry and Cherewick took actions that were either unauthorized or exceeded their authority as directors and officers of the association. Henry and his company, Western Investments, Inc., brought several counterclaims against Landowners, including defamation and tortious interference with business relations and prospective economic opportunity. The district court granted summary judgment against all parties on their respective claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in granting Landowners summary judgment on Henry’s and Western Investment’s counterclaims for conspiracy and other alleged tortious conduct; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying Henry’s and Cherewick’s motion for attorney fees after they prevailed on Plaintiff’s claims against them. View "Henry v. Sullivan" on Justia Law