Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Lance Christopher Pavlik was convicted for criminal offenses and sentenced to a Department of Corrections (DOC) commitment. Sandy VanSkyock, a DOC probation officer, requested that DOC override its usual preliminary screening process and, instead, place Pavlik directly at the Montana State Prison. The override request was approved. Pavlik later moved the district court to hold VanSkyock in contempt and sanction her in her individual capacity on the ground that she requested the DOC preliminary placement screening override based on falsified information. VanSkyock moved to dismiss the proceedings based on lack of jurisdiction, the statute of limitations, and because she cannot be held in contempt for DOC’s valid placement decision. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. Upon VanSkyock’s request that the Supreme Court intervene via supervisory control the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Pavlik’s motion failed to state a cognizable claim for criminal contempt as a matter of law. Remanded for denial of Pavlik’s contempt motion. View "Vanskyock v. Twentieth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that “devisees” are “interested persons” under Mont. Code Ann. 72-1-103(12) and (25) and Mont. Code Ann. 72-5-413 without possessing any other right or claim, and therefore, Petitioners had standing to bring their petition to remove Respondent as conservator for Gregory Engellant. Section 72-5-413 allows a “person interested in the welfare” of a conserved person to petition for an order removing the conservator. The district court concluded that Petitioners were not interested persons because they were only devisees under Gregory’s will and therefore had only an expectancy interest that was insufficient to grant them standing. The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion limited to the issue of standing, holding that the term “interested person” defined in section 72-1-103(25) includes Petitioners. View "In re Estate of Gregory Engellant" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the district court did not err by determining that Appellant’s Texas convictions for driving under the influence (DUI) constituted prior convictions for purposes of sentencing on his current Montana DUI conviction. Appellant pled guilty to the DUI but challenged the use of his prior DUI convictions, concluding that he was convicted in Texas under a lower standard than Montana law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Texas DUI statutes were similar to Montana’s laws in effect at that time, rendering Appellant’s Texas convictions as prior convictions for purposes of Mont. Code Ann. 61-8-734(1)(a). View "State v. Olson" on Justia Law

In 2009, Appellant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and sexual intercourse without consent. In 2011, Appellant filed a complaint against certain participants in his 2009 criminal trial, alleging that the victim unlawfully taped a conversation between the victim and Appellant, and the taping and subsequent use of the taped conversation by Defendants violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment and the federal wiretap statute. The federal magistrate dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. A federal district court judge affirmed. Appellant then filed a complaint in a Montana district court, alleging that the victim had recorded their telephone conversation and Defendants had used the taped conversation in violation of Montana’s privacy in communications state and his state and federal constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, concluding that Appellant’s case was barred by the statute of limitations and the doctrine of res judicata. The court also declared Appellant a vexatious litigant and imposed a pre-filing order on him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) properly applied the statute of limitations and doctrine of res judicata, and (2) did not abuse its discretion in finding Appellant to be a vexatious litigant and imposing a pre-filing order. View "Belanus v. Potter" on Justia Law

In 2010, Helen Edwards executed a will and created a trust leaving the majority of her estate to her niece, G.G. Verone. In 2014, Edwards executed a new will and amended her trust by leaving much of her estate to her handyman, Paul Degel, and to her housekeeper, Nancy Schulz. After Edwards died, Schulz petitioned for probate of the 2012 will. Verone cross-petitioned for probate of the 2010 will and for validation of the 2010 trust. A jury found in a special verdict that Degel or Schulz procured the 2012 will and 2012 trust by undue influence, fraud, or duress. The trial court, however, denied Verone’s requests to admit the 2010 will to probate, to validate the 2010 trust, and for attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) substantial credible evidence existed to support the jury’s findings that the 2012 will and the 2012 trust were procured by undue influence, fraud, or duress; (2) the district court erred in refusing to admit the 2010 will to probate or to enforce the 2010 trust following the jury’s special verdict; and (3) the district court erred in refusing to award Verone attorney fees and certain costs. View "In re Estate of Edwards" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to the possession of dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia. Defendant preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during the warrantless search of the vehicle he was driving. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court made sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law in its order denying Defendant’s motion to suppress to allow informed appellate review; and (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress, as the police did not need to obtain Defendant’s consent to search the vehicle and its internal compartments. View "State v. Baty" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal endangerment, DUI, failure to carry proof of insurance, and driving without a valid driver’s license. Instead of a three-year deferred sentence recommended in the plea agreement, the district court sentenced Defendant on her criminal endangerment charge to five years with the Department of Corrections with three years suspended. The district court also imposed four court information technology surcharges for each count totaling $40. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the State did not breach the term of the plea agreement that it recommend a deferred sentence on the criminal endangerment charge; and (2) the district court erred in imposing the court information technology user surcharge per count and not per user. Remanded to modify the imposition of the surcharge to a per user basis for a total of one $10 surcharge. View "State v. Ellison" on Justia Law

The marriage of Darin and Deborah Brockington was dissolved in 2007. In 2008, an order establishing parenting plan was entered providing that the parties’ child would reside primarily with Deborah and that Darin would have parenting time both in Montana and his place of residence. In 2014, Deborah filed a motion to amend the 2008 parenting plan based on the child’s desire to stay in Montana over the summers. The district court amended the parenting plan and ordered that Darin was to have parenting time in Virginia, his place of residence, with the child during the month of July for the next three years. When the child did not travel to Virginia, Darin filed a motion for show cause and for contempt against Deborah. The court held Deborah in contempt and assessed costs and attorney’s fees for the contempt proceedings against her. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s order amending the parenting plan, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the amended parenting plan was in the child’s best interests; and (2) dismissed, without prejudice, Deborah’s appeal of the contempt order, holding that the order was not a final judgment because it lacked the court’s decision regarding the amount of attorney’s fees and costs. View "In re Marriage of Brockington" on Justia Law

Allen Longsoldier, Jr., an eighteen-year-old Native American, died as a result of alcohol withdrawal while in custody at the Hill County Detention Center after he was arrested by Blaine County authorities. Longsoldier’s estate filed a claim against Blaine and Hill Counties with the Montana Human Rights Bureau alleging that the Counties discriminated against Longsoldier because of his race and his disability - alcoholism. A hearing officer concluded that the Counties had not illegally discriminated against Longsoldier. The Human Rights Commission found clear error in the hearing officer’s findings of fact and concluded that the Counties had discriminated against Longsoldier. Presiding Judge Jeffrey Sherlock with the district court reversed the Commission’s decision and reinstated the hearing officer’s order as the final agency decision. On the Estate’s motion to alter or amend, Judge James Reynolds, who had assumed jurisdiction of the case, found that Judge Sherlock had committed a “manifest error of law” by fashioning an improper remedy. The Supreme Court affirmed Judge Sherlock’s order and reversed Judge Reynold’s order, holding (1) Judge Sherlock correctly concluded that the Commission improperly modified the Hearing Officer’s findings; and (2) Judge Reynolds incorrectly concluded that Judge Sherlock erred as a matter of law by reinstating the hearing officer’s decision as the final agency decision. View "Blaine County v. Stricker" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with criminal mischief, a felony, and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, a misdemeanor. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled nolo contendere to the offenses charged in the information. The district court imposed a six-year sentence on the criminal mischief conviction and a concurrent six-month sentence for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. The court suspended both sentences. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss based upon denial of a speedy trial. View "State v. Brekke" on Justia Law