Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father to their children, holding that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the parents’ respective drug test results at the termination hearing, but the error was harmless.At the termination hearing, the district court admitted each parent’s drug testing results through the children’s court appointed special advocate (CASA) worker. The district court subsequently terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to their children, finding that the parents each failed to complete several aspects of their respective treatment plans. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the plain language and legislative history of Mont. Code Ann. 41-3-112(4), the district court erred in admitting the parents’ drug test results at the hearing, but the error did not result in substantial prejudice to the parents and did not warrant reversal. View "In re I.M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Mother’s motion to amend parenting plan on the basis that Mother failed to establish a changed circumstance and granting Father’s motion for child support calculation and motion for attorney fees. The Court held (1) the district court erred in concluding that there was no change in circumstance pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 40-4-219(1) that would require a hearing, and this case must be remanded for a hearing and determination of whether amendment of the parenting plan was in the child’s best interests; (2) because reversal on the above issue was required, the court’s award to Father of attorneys’ fees and costs must be vacated; and (3) because this case had been remanded, it was appropriate to vacate the monthly child support calculated by the district court and remand for calculation of child support consistent with this opinion. View "In re Marriage of Schilling" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to the Wolf Point School District Board of Trustees (Board) on Plaintiff’s claim that the Board unlawfully terminated her employment in violation of the open meeting law, Mont. Code Ann. 2-3-203, and Mont. Const. art. II, 9.Plaintiff appeared before the Board for a hearing regarding the termination of her employment. The Board closed the meeting to the public and then re-opened the meeting to the public, at which time a trustee made a motion, seconded by another, for the Board to terminate Plaintiff’s employment. The meeting was then closed again to everyone except the Board and the superintendent to allow the Board to discuss unspecified litigation strategy at an “executive session” with the Board’s lawyer. When Plaintiff was allowed back into the room the Board voted to terminate Plaintiff’s contract. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Board, holding that the district court (1) erred in granting summary judgment that the Board lawfully closed the hearing portion of the meeting based on third-party privacy rights; and (2) erred in granting summary judgment that the Board lawfully excluded Plaintiff from its “executive session” under the litigation strategy exception of section 2-3-203(4). View "Raap v. Board of Trustees, Wolf Point School District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court terminating Mother’s parental rights to her minor child, L.D., holding that the court erred in proceeding with termination of parental rights in the absence of a conclusive tribal determination regarding L.D.’s status as an Indian child as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).In its order terminating Mother’s parental rights to L.D., the district court noted that the State and Mother agreed that ICWA did not apply because L.D. was not an Indian child as defined by the ICWA. The Supreme Court held that the district court abused its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights to L.D. without a conclusive tribal determination of tribal membership status and enrollment eligibility. The court remanded the case for a determination of whether L.D. was an Indian child based on a conclusive tribal determination of tribal membership and eligibility. View "In re L.D." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part a district court order granting in part and denying in part judicial review of the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS) fair hearing proposed decision that DPHHS overpaid IMS under the Medicaid program and was entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $670,152 from Independence Medical Supply, Inc. (IMS). IMS appealed, and DPHHS cross appealed the district court’s order. The Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by affirming the hearing officer’s determination that physician affidavits introduced by IMS did not cure technical violations of the supply orders submitted to DPHHS; and (2) the district court erred in holding that a letter sent by DPHHS on January 8, 2014 commenced an action for recovery of the overpayment because DPHHS did not commence an action within the meaning of Mont. Code Ann. 27-2-102(1)(b) and Mont. R. Civ. P. 3. View "Independence Medical Supply, Inc. v. Montana Department of Public Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of deliberate homicide committed with a dangerous weapon, holding that the district court made numerous erroneous rulings amounting to cumulative error and requiring reversal. Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court erred by excluding statements the victim made to Defendant as hearsay; (2) the district court erred by prohibiting a limited inquiry into the State’s expert witness’s credibility; (3) the district court acted within its discretion in resolving the jury’s concern about media publicity; and (4) the cumulative effect of the first two errors denied Defendant of his right to a fair trial. View "State v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights to her son after holding a termination hearing. The Court held (1) based on the competent substantial evidence presented at the hearing, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Mother’s chemical dependence, which rendered her unfit to parent, was unlikely to change within a reasonable time; (2) Mother was not entitled to a new hearing on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel or plain error; and (3) the district court properly gave priority to the child’s best interests and did not abuse its discretion in ordering termination of Mother’s parental rights. View "In re J.E.L. III" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of aggravated assault and reversed his conviction for violating a no-contact order. The Court held (1) the State did not present sufficient evidence for the jury to find Defendant guilty of violating a no-contact order; and (2) the prosecutor’s comment during rebuttal closing argument that the jury’s “job” was to ensure the alleged victim’s safety was improper, and the nature of the remark implicated Defendant’s right to a fair trial, but this isolated incident of alleged misconduct did not result in a miscarriage of justice or compromise the integrity of Defendant’s trial. View "State v. Ritesman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court sentencing Defendant to the Department of Corrections (DOC) for five years and imposing financial obligations on Defendant, including public defender fees, supervision fees, presentence investigation report fees and surcharges.Defendant pled guilty to felony possession of dangerous drugs. The district court sentenced Defendant as a persistent felony offender and prescribed the minimum sentence thereunder. Defendant appealed his sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court appropriately considered alternatives to imprisonment; and (2) Defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were more appropriate for presentation through a petition for postconviction relief. View "State v. Hinshaw" on Justia Law

The district court erred by imposing a restriction upon Defendant’s release from incarceration while committing him to the Department of Corrections (DOC).Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted prostitution. The district court committed Defendant to the DOC and ordered that he could not be released from incarceration until he had completed sexual offender treatment. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for resentencing, holding that, under statute, a sentence cannot include both a placement to the DOC while also imposing incarceration by way of a restriction on release until the defendant completes sex offender treatment. View "State v. Day" on Justia Law