Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The district court erred when it denied the motion to quash filed by attorney Shannon Sweeney seeking to quash a subpoena compelling Sweeney to testify regarding communications she may have had with her client, Dakota McClanahan, on a bail jumping charge.The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and ordered that the subpoena compelling Sweeney to testify on the state’s behalf be quashed, holding that the district court erred in denying the motion to quash the subpoena because, under Mont. Code Ann. 26-1-803(1), an attorney cannot be examined as to any advice given to her client. View "Sweeney v. Third Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part an order of the district court revoking Appellant’s suspended sentence and committing him to the Department of Corrections for ten years for commitment to an appropriate correctional facility or program.Appellant was convicted of murder in federal court and sentenced to life in federal prison. While on federal parole, Appellant committed the offense of robbery and was sentenced to a fifteen-year commitment to the Montana Department of Corrections. After discharging the unsuspended portion of his state sentence, Appellant was transferred to federal prison until he was released on federal parole and concurrent state probation. Appellant’s state sentence was subsequently revoked, and Appellant was resentenced to serve a ten-year commitment to the Department of Corrections for placement in an appropriate correctional facility or program. The Supreme Court held (1) the district court’s failure to specify that Appellant’s new sentence ran concurrently with any other sentence he was serving resulted in the imposition of an illegal sentence; (2) the district court erroneously failed to credit Appellant for time served in federal custody after he discharged on to state probation; and (3) Appellant waived his objection to the court’s failure to state the reason for not granting street time credit. View "State v. Youpee" on Justia Law

In this case governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court to terminate Father’s rights to his minor child (Child), holding that Father’s contentions on appeal were unavailing.Specifically, the Court held (1) Montana’s Department of Public Health and Human Services provided the active efforts required under 25 U.S.C. 1912(d) to prevent the breakup of an Indian family; (2) Father did not establish that the Child was placed in a foster home in violation of the placement preferences set forth in 25 U.S.C. 1915; and (3) Father’s attorney did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel. View "In re A.L.D." on Justia Law

In this condemnation proceeding, the district court did not err in concluding that Mountain Water Company was not entitled to statutory interest pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 70-30-302(2), when read in conjunction with Mont. Code Ann. 70-30-311.Mountain Water and the City of Missoula entered into a settlement agreement providing that the City would take possession of Mountain Water’s condemned property upon the City paying Mountain Water for all assets and claims asserted in the previous condemnation action. The district court entered a final judgment in condemnation that included the agreed payment method and transfer of possession as set forth in the settlement agreement. After the district court signed the final order of condemnation, Mountain Water sought post-summons interest. The district court denied Mountain Water’s motion for statutory interest pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 70-30-302(2) and refused to grant discretionary interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Mountain Water was not entitled to statutory interest where the City did not take interlocutory possession of the condemned property prior to final conclusion of the condemnation proceedings; and (2) Mountain Water was not entitled to discretionary interest. View "Missoula v. Mountain Water Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), holding that the district court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress blood test results obtained by a search warrant because Defendant’s due process were not violated.Defendant moved to suppress blood tests obtained pursuant to a telephone search warrant, asserting a violation of due process by the officer’s failure to advise Defendant of his right to an independent blood draw. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, including that the advisory’s reading was impeded by Defendant, there was no fundamental unfairness, and the circumstances fell short of a denial of due process. View "State v. Moore" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for deliberate homicide, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial based on the State withholding exculpatory or impeachment evidence and the district court’s trial ruling allowing the State to elicit testimony of a prior bad act.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not err when it denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial based on his assertion that the State withheld evidence regarding the forensic pathologist’s expert testimony in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963), because Defendant failed to prove a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different had the evidence been disclosed ; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the State to elicit testimony of a prior bad act by Defendant to rebut the assertion that he was justified in his use of deadly force. View "State v. Reinert" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court quieting surface title and a one-half interest in a mineral estate to Mark and Jo Marie Nelson, with the remaining half interest in Anthony Palese and Mary Jo Davis.The Nelsons purchased property from Davis and Palese. The deed purported to sell the Nelsons the property in its entirety, with the exception of a portion of the mineral estate reserved in Davis and Palese. The Nelsons and Davis and Palese later leased the property for oil and gas development. In the title search, the Nelsons’ counsel uncovered possible remote heirs with an interest in the property, George and Rose Salituro. The Nelsons brought this quiet title action, and the district court ruled in their favor. The Salituros appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when Davis and Palese conveyed the property to the Nelsons, the Salituros’ interests in the property had already been extinguished. View "Nelson v. Salituro" on Justia Law

Mont. Code Ann. 39-8-207(8)(b)(i), which extends the exclusivity remedy of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) from a professional employer organization (PEO) to its client, does not violate Mont. Const. art. II, 16 by depriving an injured worker of full legal redress.PEOs hire employees and assign them to the PEO’s client businesses on an ongoing basis. Defendant entered into a contract with a licensed PEO. The PEO hired Plaintiff and assigned him to Defendant. After Plaintiff suffered an on-the-job injury, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, alleging that his injuries occurred because of Defendant’s failure to provide a safe workplace. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that Plaintiff’s claim was barred by the exclusivity provision of the WCA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that since both the PEO and Defendant were immediate employers who hired Plaintiff and provided workers’ compensation coverage, they were both entitled to the exclusive remedy of Article II, Section 16. View "Ramsbacher v. Jim Palmer Trucking" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Petitioner’s request to review the Standing Master’s order denying Petitioner relief in this dissolution proceeding on the basis that Petitioner's objections to the order lacked specificity under Mont. Code Ann. 3-5-126(2).After Petitioner’s marriage was dissolved, Petitioner moved the district court to enforce the debts and liabilities provision incorporated into the parties’ dissolution decree. The Standing Master denied relief. Petitioner filed a notice of specific objections to the Standing Master’s order and a motion requesting that the district court review it. The district court denied the request, concluding that Petitioner’s objections to the order lacked specificity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in determining that Petitioner failed specifically to object to the Standing Master’s order under section 3-5-126(2). View "In re Marriage of Scrantom" on Justia Law

Under Montana law, when a plaintiff claims he or she was injured directly by a law enforcement officer’s affirmative acts, the public duty doctrine does not exclude all duties that may arise pursuant to generally applicable principles of negligence.Plaintiff was injured in the course of a law enforcement officer’s (Officer) pursuit of a criminal suspect. Plaintiff brought a state-law negligence claim and a 42 U.S.C. 1983 violation against the Officer and the City of Billings, alleging that he was injured directly by the Officer’s affirmative acts. A federal court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants on both claims. Regarding the negligence claim, the court found that the public-duty doctrine shielded Defendants from liability because no special relationship existed. The court of appeals certified to the Supreme Court the public duty doctrine question. The Supreme Court held (1) the public-duty doctrine applies only to an officer’s duty to protect the general public and therefore does not apply to exclude the legal duty an officer may owe to a person injured directly by the officer’s affirmative actions; and (2) in this case, the Officer owed Plaintiff a legal duty to exercise the same care that a reasonable officer with similar skill, training, and experience would under the same or similar circumstances. View "Bassett v. Lamantia" on Justia Law