Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court terminating Mother’s parental rights to G.W., holding that the district court did not clearly err in adjudicating the child a youth in need of care (YINC).After adjudicating G.W. a YINC, the district court adopted a treatment plan for Mother. Mother failed to complete her treatment plan, and the district court terminated her parental relationship with G.W. Mother appealed, arguing that the district court erred by adjudicating G.W. a YINC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not violate Mother’s due process rights by limiting the adjudicatory hearing to three hours; and (2) sufficient evidence supported the court’s finding that G.W. suffered psychological abuse or was at risk of suffering psychological abuse. View "In re G.W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of ALPS Property & Casualty Insurance Company (ALPS) in this declaratory action, holding that the district court erred when it determined that ALPS properly rescinded an insurance policy, which the court rendered void from the inception of the coverage period for Michael McLean and McLean & McLean, PLLP (M&M), but the court did not err in concluding that no coverage existed as to third-party claimants Miantae McConnell and Joseph and Marilyn Micheletti.Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court erred in concluding that Mont. Code Ann. 33-15-403 provided for a right to rescind the policy; and (2) the district court did not err when it concluded that the third-party claims were barred because they were lodged after ALPS had cancelled the policy or were excluded from coverage under other policy provisions. View "ALPS Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. McLean & McLean" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court clarified in this case its jurisprudence regarding jurisdiction and venue in criminal cases, holding (1) a defendant waives his or her right to object to the county in which a charge is filed if he or she fails to object before the first witness is sworn at trial; and (2) the prosecution must prove proper jurisdiction at trial.The Supreme Court reversed one of Defendant’s convictions for partner or family member assault (PFMA) and affirmed his second PFMA conviction, holding (1) Defendant waived his venue objection because he did not object before his trial began to the county in which the PFMA charges were filed; but (2) the prosecution failed to present any evidence regarding where the second PFMA charge occurred and therefore did not meet its burden of proving jurisdiction. View "City of Helena v. Frankforter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Appellant’s petition for a writ of mandate requesting that the court compel the Flathead County Treasurer to issue him a tax deed or appear and show cause why it should not do so, holding that a writ of mandate was inappropriate because Appellant had an adequate remedy at law.Flathead County purchased a tax lien on certain property after the property taxes became delinquent. When the owner and occupant did not redeem the property within the redemption period the County assigned the tax lien to a limited liability company (LLC), of which Appellant was a member. The Flathead County Treasurer subsequently allowed the owner to redeem the property. When the County Treasurer declined to issue a tax deed to the LLC, Appellant filed his petition for a writ of mandate arguing that the County Treasurer had a statutory duty to issue the tax deed. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that Appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandate because a quiet title action provided Appellant with an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. View "O'Brien v. Krantz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, rendered after a jury trial, convicting Defendant of one count of sexual intercourse without consent. In affirming, the Court held (1) the district court did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial when it allowed the victim’s mother to provide testimony about Defendant’s prior assault against the victim’s brother; and (2) the district court did not commit plain error when it sent the victim’s forensic interview video into the jury room during deliberations, and trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object. View "State v. Clemans" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Vincent Toenjes’ (Vince) motion to modify his maintenance obligation to Joni Hardy (Joni), his former wife, and requiring him to pay Joni’s attorney fees and granted Joni attorney fees on appeal, holding that there was no error in the district court’s judgment.The district court concluded that, even where Vince had lost his job, the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement relating to maintenance had not become unconscionable under the facts of this case. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the district court (1) correctly interpreted the maintenance provisions of the parties’ marital and property settlement agreement; (2) did not abuse its discretion in determining that the changed circumstances did not make the agreement unconscionable; and (3) properly granted attorney fees to Joni based on the terms of the settlement agreement. Further, Joni was entitled to attorney fees on appeal under the same provision of the settlement agreement. View "In re Marriage of Toenjes" on Justia Law

In this workers’ compensation case, the Supreme Court held that the Workers’ Compensation Court (WCC) erred in holding that Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-407(14) did not apply for purposes of determining liability for the exacerbation of Kim Wiard’s occupational disease (OD).Wiard was an employee at Tricon Timber, LLC. Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation accepted liability for Wiard’s bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) as an OD. Liberty later ceased providing workers’ compensation insurance for Tricon, and State Fund became Triton’s workers’ compensation insurance provider. When Wiard filed an OD claim for left CTS with State Fund, State Fund denied the claim on the basis that Wiard’s OD diagnosis preceded State Fund’s coverage. Liberty also denied liability. The insurers filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the WCC on the issue of liability. The WCC granted summary judgment in favor of Liberty, concluding that Wiard had reached maximum medical improvement for her earlier CTS diagnosis and that her later job duties materially aggravated her OD. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the WCC erred when it held that section 39-71-407(14) did not apply in this case; and (2) under the statute, liability for the OD diagnosis remained with the insurer providing coverage at the time the OD was first diagnosed. View "Montana State Fund v. Liberty Northwest Insurance Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for attempted deliberate homicide and aggravated assault, holding (1) the district court erred by instructing the jury using conduct-based definitions of purposely and knowingly, but the error was harmless; and (2) the district court did not err by determining that Defendant had not proven that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).Specifically, the Court held (1) Defendant’s substantial rights were not affected by the district court’s error in instructing the jury on the definitions of knowingly and purposely, and therefore, reversal was not required; and (2) there was no Brady violation because had the evidence challenged by Defendant been disclosed, there was no reasonable probability the outcome would have been different. View "State v. Ilk" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in this dispute between Associated Management Services, Inc. (AMS) and Daniel R. Ruff and Ruff Software, Inc. (collectively, Ruff) over the parties’ relative rights regarding the web-based payroll processing software, TimeTracker, developed by Ruff and licensed to AMS.The district court granted summary judgment to Ruff on AMS’s claims and granted summary judgment to AMS on Ruff’s counterclaims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in ruling that the 2008 licensing agreement was valid and enforceable and that AMS had no right to TimeTracker other than as provided under the terms of the agreement; (2) correctly granted summary judgment on the Ruff counterclaims for breach of the licensing agreement, tortious conversion, contract and tortious misappropriation of intellectual property, violation of the Montana Uniform Trade Secrets Act, tortious interference with business relations or prospective economic advantage, and unjust enrichment; and (3) did not abuse its discretion in denying Ruff’s second motion to compel or claim for attorney fees. View "Associated Management Services, Inc. v. Ruff" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s orders dismissing ECI Credit, LLC’s case against Diamond S. Inc. under Mont. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and denying its motion for relief from that dismissal under Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(b), holding the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed ECI’s complaint for failure to prosecute.In deciding whether the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the underlying action for failure to prosecute, the Supreme Court considered the four factors set forth in Becky v. Norwest Bank Dillon, N.A., 798 P.2d 1011, 1015 (Mont. 1990). Noting that ECI’s case was unusual because ECI initially invested considerable time and effort and received a favorable ruling before it allowed this case to languish, the Supreme Court held that the district court did not commit a clear error in weighing the Becky factors and dismissing ECI’s claims. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying ECI’s motion for relief under Rule 60(b). View "ECI Credit, LLC v. Diamond S Inc." on Justia Law