Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Water Court denying Little Big Warm Ranch, LLC’s (LBWR) motion to reopen proceedings and its request to substitute as an objector, holding that the Water Court did not err when it denied LBWR’s motion to reopen cases 40M-171 and 40M-238 and when it denied LBWR’s request for substitution in those cases.At issue was two water rights from Big Warm Springs Creek and Little Warm Springs Creek - one claim for stock water and the other claim for irrigation. The Water Court in this case determined that LBWR was not entitled to substitute itself as an objector to Claimants’ water rights in Cases 40M-171 and 40 M-238 and denied LBWR’s request for substitution and its motion to reopen. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Water Court did not err. View "Little Big Warm Ranch, LLC v. Doll" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s denial of Heather Remitz’s Mont. R. Civ. P. 60 motion for relief from judgment and remanded the matter to the district court to conduct limited discovery, holding that the Rule 60 motion should be decided on the merits.A standing master entered a final decree of dissolution dissolving the marriage of Heather and Rick Remitz. The district court ordered the parties’ business asset to be equally divided between Heather and Rick. Less than one month after the decree was finalized, Rick sold the business for allegedly ten times the district court’s valuation. Heather filed her Rule 60 motion alleging that the property terms of the divorce decree should be vacated and the matter reopened to allow inquiry into the sale process, the cause of the disparity between Rick’s valuation and the actual sale price, and whether it would be fair that Heather share in the increased value. The motion was deemed denied by the passage of time. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances, the Rule 60 motion should be decided on the merits. View "In re Marriage of Remitz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting Victory Insurance Company’s (Victory) motion to change venue, holding that the specific venue provision in Mont. Code Ann. 33-2-1118 controlled over the general venue provision in Mont. Code Ann. 25-2-124.Appellant Matthew Rosendale filed a complaint against Victory, a Montana workers’ compensation insurance company with its principal office located in Custer County, Victory’s president, and a living trust formed under the laws of South Dakota and a Victory shareholder, seeking statutory fines and to enjoin Victory pursuant to alleged violations of Montana’s Holding Company Act. Appellant filed the complaint in the First Judicial District Court in Lewis and Clark County. Victory filed a motion to change venue to Custer County. The district court granted the motion on the basis that section 33-2-1118 controlled and that venue was proper in Custer County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that venue was proper in Custer County for all defendants. View "Rosendale v. Victory Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that the contract between Tim and Kiri Jorgensen and Trademark Woodworks, LLC had been rescinded and awarding the Jorgensens damages and attorney’s fees, holding that the district court did not commit clear error or abuse its discretion.Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court did not commit clear error when it found that the agreement had been rescinded; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees to the Jorgensens because, as the prevailing party, the Jorgensens were contractually entitled to attorney’s fees. View "Jorgensen v. Trademark Woodworks, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court sentencing Defendant to the Montana State prison for thirty years with ten years suspended and ordering various probation conditions, holding that Defendant waived his right to challenge the constitutionality of a probation condition by failing previously to object.Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of sexual intercourse without consent. Included in Defendant’s probation conditions was condition forty-five, which barred him from possessing any device with photo, video, or Internet capabilities. Defendant did not object to the condition at or before sentencing. On appeal, Defendant argued that condition forty-five was an overly-broad restriction on his First Amendment freedom of speech. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant waived his right to appeal condition forty-five and that plain error review was not warranted in this case. View "State v. Coleman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court sentencing Defendant to five years in the Montana State Prison, holding that Defendant’s attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel and that Defendant was prejudiced as a result.Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of dangerous drugs, criminal possession of drug paraphernalia, and obstructing a peace officer. The district court sentenced Defendant to five years in the Montana State Prison for criminal possession of dangerous drugs. On appeal, Defendant argued that his defense counsel’s failure to cite Mont. Code Ann. 45-9-202 and its application in State v. Brendal, 213 P.3d 448 (Mont. 2009), amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel that prejudiced the result of his sentencing hearing. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that Defendant’s attorney provided ineffective assistance by filing to cite section 45-9-202 and Brendal, resulting in prejudice to Defendant. The Court remanded the cause for resentencing. View "State v. Walter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court order modifying Dennis Simpson’s and Larissa Simpson’s property settlement agreement and order awarding attorney fees, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion.On appeal, Larissa argued that the district court abused its discretion when it modified the agreement, terminating monthly payments to her, and when it limited the amount of her attorney fees to those incurred during contempt proceedings. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that continued imposition and enforcement of the parties’ agreement was unconscionable; (2) the district court’s modification of the agreement based on the parties circumstances was appropriate; and (3) the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting Larissa’s attorney fees. View "In re Marriage of Simpson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of speeding, holding that the State’s comment to the jury that Defendant had already been convicted of the charge in the justice court required reversal.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of speeding, in violation of Mont. Code Ann. 61-8-303(1)(b). On appeal, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not err when it did not dismiss the case for lack of particularized suspicion and for lack of corroborating evidence; (2) Defendant was entitled to a new trial because the State’s comment that Defendant was previously convicted of speeding presented prejudicial facts not before the jury’s consideration and implicated the fundamental fairness of the proceedings; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it did not allow Defendant to argue his theory of law to the jury that multiple witnesses are required for a conviction. View "State v. French" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order entered by the district court committing B.H. to the Montana State Hospital (MSH), holding that the district court did not commit plain error regarding the procedural safeguards in Mont. Code Ann. 53-21-122(2)(a) necessitating appellate review.After the district court committed B.H. to the MSH for a period not to exceed ninety days, B.H. appealed, arguing that the district court erred by failing to advise him of his constitutional and statutory rights during his initial appearance, as required in civil commitment proceedings under section 53-21-122(2)(a). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that while the district court did not provide a complete advisory of rights to B.H., B.H. failed to establish that the error resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice, implicated the fundamental fairness of the proceedings, or comprised the dignity of the judicial prejudice. Therefore, any error in the manner in which this proceeding was conduct did not result in substantial prejudice. View "In re B.H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Nan Stevenson’s motion to amend her answer, third-party complaint, and counterclaim and entering judgment in favor of the third-party defendant, Big Sky RV, holding that the district court abused its discretion by denying Stevenson leave to amend her pleadings and erred by entering judgment in favor of Big Sky RV.In denying Stevenson leave to amend the district court concluded that the proposed amendment unduly prejudiced the parties and that the amendment was futile. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) amendment would not have prejudiced the parties, and there was no support for the district court’s conclusion that the proposed amendment was futile; and (2) where Big Sky RV did not file a motion for summary judgment, the district court erroneously entered a judgment in Big Sky RV’s favor. View "Ally Financial, Inc. v. Stevenson" on Justia Law