Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order and decree of adoption issued by the district court terminating Father’s parental rights and ordering the adoption of his minor daughter, L.F.R., by her stepfather, K.J.D., holding that the district court’s failure to notify Father of his right to counsel violated his constitutional rights.During a hearing on the petition for termination of Father’s parental rights, Father appeared but was not represented by counsel. On appeal, Father argued that the district court’s failure to notify him of his right to counsel during the proceeding violated his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that Father did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. The Court remanded the cause for a new hearing. View "In re Adoption of L.F.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court amending the parenting plan of Mother and Father, holding that the district court did not err in amending the parties’ parenting plan.On appeal, Mother argued that the district court made several errors when it amended the parties’ initial parenting plan. Primarily, Mother argued that the district court erred in its application of Mont. Code Ann. 40-4-219(1), the statute controlling parenting plan amendments. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) amending a parenting plan pursuant to a periodic-review provision exists as an alternative to amending a parenting plan pursuant to section 40-4-219(1); and (2) the district court properly amended the initial parenting plan and did not abuse its discretion in determining that an amendment was in the child’s best interest. View "Sinram v. Berube" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial and admitting Defendant’s blood alcohol concentration into evidence, holding that the district court did not err.Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss because his speedy trial rights had been violated and that the circumstances of his blood draw for the DUI investigation violated Montana law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial; and (2) the blood draw comported with Montana law. View "State v. Heath" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court terminating Mother’s parental rights to her two children, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it continued with child custody proceedings before conclusively determining the children’s Indian status.After Mother’s children were adjudicated as youths in need of care the district court terminated Mother’s parental rights. The order stated that the children were not Indian children subject to the provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). On appeal, Mother argued that the district court erred in categorizing the children outside the scope of ICWA without first making a conclusive determination that the children were not Indian children pursuant to ICWA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it applied the non-ICWA statutory standards because the court had neither a reason to believe nor a reason to know that the children were Indian children subject to ICWA. View "In re J.J.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of two counts of incest and two counts of sexual assault, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded polygraph evidence or evidence pertaining to Defendant’s psychosexual profile and correctly applied Montana’s Rape Shield Law, Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-511(2), to exclude evidence of the victim’s alleged prior sexual conduct.Specifically, the Court held that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in excluding Defendant’s polygraph evidence pursuant to Mont. R. Evid. 702, as there was no basis to depart from precedent that polygraph test results are inadmissible in Montana court proceedings; (2) did not abuse its discretion in excluding a defense expert’s testimony that Defendant’s psychosexual profile revealed no sexual interest in children where the testimony would have improperly bolstered Defendant’s claim of innocence; and (3) did not arbitrarily or mechanically apply the Rape Shield Law to exclude evidence. View "State v. Walker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants after determining that Defendants did not breach their contract with Plaintiffs, oil companies, but reversed for modification of the fees and costs awarded to Defendants, holding that the district court abused its discretion in fixing the amount of attorney fees and costs to which Defendants were entitled as the prevailing parties.Specifically, the Court held that the district court (1) did not err in determining on summary judgment that Defendants did not breach or repudiate the parties’ 2006 settlement agreement; but (2) erred in awarding Defendants’ fees generated in determining the amount of attorney fees and erred in allowing costs that fell outside of Mont. Code Ann. 25-10-201. View "Ferdig Oil Co., Inc. v. ROC Gathering, LLP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court terminating Father’s parental rights to his two children, holding that the district court correctly determined to proceed as if the children were Indian children and the Indian Child Welfare Act applied, but the court erred in failing to make specific findings about how or if the facts of the case met the “active efforts” required by clear and convincing evidence prior to removal and beyond a reasonable doubt prior to termination.The district court’s order found that children were Indian children, but neither transcripts nor written orders discussed how the Department of Public Health and Human Services made “active efforts” before removal and before termination. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order and remanded the matter for the court to document in detail if the Department met its burden of providing “active efforts” by clear and convincing evidence prior to removal and beyond a reasonable doubt prior to termination pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 1912(d) and 25 CFR 23.2. View "In re B.Y." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court holding that Kenyon-Noble Lumber Company (Kenyon Noble) had breached its contract with Dependent Foundations, Inc. (DF Inc.) by allowing a former authorized agent to charge on DF Inc.’s credit account after DF Inc. notified Kenyon Noble that it had ceased operations, holding that the district court did not err when it determined that DF Inc. was entitled to a presumption that Kenyon Noble received its letter terminating the agent’s authority.On appeal, Kenyon Noble argued that it lacked notice of the agent’s termination, and therefore, it could not have breached the contract. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the district court properly concluded that the statutory presumption of receipt applied and that Kenyon Noble did not successfully rebut the presumption; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding DF Inc. and Mark Markovich attorney fees and costs, and DF Inc. and Markovich were entitled to attorney fees in connection with this appeal. View "Kenyon-Noble Lumber Co. v. Dependant Foundations, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, holding that the Tax Credit Program, which provides a taxpayer a dollar-for-dollar tax credit based on the taxpayer’s donation to a Student Scholarship Organization (SSO), violates Mont. Const. art. X, 6.SSOs fund tuition scholarships for students who attend private schools meeting the definition of Qualified Education Provider (QEP). Pursuant to its authority to implement the Tax Credit Program, Mont. Code Ann. 15-30-3111, the Montana Department of Revenue implemented Admin. R. M. 42.4.802 (Rule 1), which excluded religiously-affiliated private schools from qualifying as QEPs. Plaintiffs, parents whose children attended a religious-affiliated private school, challenged Rule 1. The district court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Tax Credit Program violates Article X, Section 6’s prohibition on aid to sectarian schools and that the Department exceeded the scope of its rulemaking authority when it enacted Rule 1. View "Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and dismiss the case, holding that the district court did not erroneously compel arbitration.Plaintiff entered into a construction contract that contained an arbitration agreement. Plaintiff later filed a complaint against Defendants, asserting claims for breach of contract, negligence, and other torts. Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration and dismiss. The Supreme Court granted the motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) in concluding that the arbitration agreement required arbitration of matters within its scope rather than merely authorizing it as a matter of discretion upon timely demand; (2) in failing to conclude that Defendants equitably waived the right to arbitrate; (3) in compelling arbitration without consideration of Plaintiff’s proposed declaratory judgment claim challenging the validity of the arbitration agreement; (4) in concluding that Plaintiff’s asserted non-contract claims were subject to arbitration; and (5) in failing to conclude that, as a non-party to the agreement, one defendant lacked standing to enforce the arbitration agreement. View "Peeler v. Rocky Mountain Log Homes Canada, Inc." on Justia Law