Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Carol Hudson died in 2018, leaving most of her estate to her sons through her will and a revocable trust. Her long-term partner, Doug Nail, claimed entitlement to an elective spousal share of her estate, asserting that he and Carol were common-law spouses under Montana law. Carol’s son, Alan Johnson (AJ), disputed this claim, arguing that Carol did not consider Doug her husband and had consistently identified herself as single on official documents. The couple had lived together in Montana for nearly a decade, shared a home, and were viewed by many friends and family as married, though Carol kept her own name and filed taxes as single.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court of Gallatin County consolidated probate and declaratory relief actions and held a bench trial. After hearing conflicting testimony from friends, family, and the parties themselves, the District Court found that Doug and Carol were common-law spouses. The court credited testimony that Carol and Doug had mutually consented to a marital relationship and held themselves out as married to their community, despite evidence that Carol identified as single on financial and medical documents. The District Court concluded that Doug was entitled to seek an elective share of Carol’s estate.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s findings for clear error and its legal conclusions for correctness. The Supreme Court held that substantial credible evidence supported the District Court’s findings that Doug and Carol mutually consented to marriage and confirmed their marriage by public repute. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s ruling, holding that Doug and Carol were common-law spouses at the time of Carol’s death, and Doug was entitled to pursue an elective share of the estate. View "In re Estate of Hudson" on Justia Law

Frank and Shirlynne Apecella purchased property in Hamilton, Montana, in 2020, which historically received irrigation water from the Decker Ditch, originating at Roaring Lion Creek and running through their neighbor Lillian Overman’s property. After moving in, the Apecellas discovered they were not receiving water through the ditch and, upon investigation, learned that Overman’s husband had filled in the ditch and posted a “no trespassing” sign. The Apecellas own a water right in Roaring Lion Creek, and the disputed ditch segment runs from a bifurcation point on Overman’s property to the boundary with the Apecella property. The Apecellas sought a declaratory judgment affirming their ditch easement and alleged Overman interfered with their easement rights.The Montana Twenty-First Judicial District Court held a bench trial and found that the Apecellas had established both an implied and a prescriptive easement for the ditch in question, and that Overman had interfered with their easement by filling in the ditch. The court rejected Overman’s defenses of abandonment and reverse adverse possession, finding insufficient evidence that the Apecellas or their predecessors had abandoned the easement or that Overman had extinguished it through adverse use. The court permanently enjoined Overman from further interference and awarded the Apecellas attorney fees as the prevailing party under Montana law.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s judgment. It held that Overman failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence either abandonment or reverse adverse possession of the Apecellas’ irrigation ditch easement. The Court also held that the Apecellas were the prevailing party under § 70-17-112(5), MCA, and were entitled to reasonable costs and attorney fees. The District Court’s orders were affirmed in all respects. View "Apecella v. Overman" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to burglary, theft, and criminal mischief in 2017 and was sentenced to concurrent terms with a portion suspended, as well as ordered to pay restitution and various fees. After serving time in corrections and being released, he began the suspended portion of his sentence in 2020. In 2023, the State petitioned to revoke his probation, citing a new drug charge and several compliance violations, including failure to pay restitution and fees. The defendant admitted to the new criminal charge, and the other alleged violations were dismissed. At issue was whether he should receive credit for the time he spent on probation (“street time”) before revocation, given his failure to make restitution payments during a specific period.The Montana Eighth Judicial District Court found that, despite the lack of documented violations between August 2020 and January 2023, the defendant’s ongoing failure to pay restitution and fees constituted continuous noncompliance. The court denied him any credit for street time, reasoning that his nonpayment reflected a pattern of disregard for court-ordered conditions.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether the defendant’s nonpayment of restitution, absent evidence of a clear payment schedule or corrective interventions by his probation officer, constituted a violation sufficient to deny street time credit under § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA. The Court held that, without a specific directive or record of interventions regarding payment, the State failed to establish a violation during the relevant period. Therefore, the District Court erred in denying street time credit. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case, directing that the defendant be credited with 883 days of street time. View "State v. Powell" on Justia Law

Tristin Fahrnow was injured when a hot-oil truck operated by an employee of E-5 Oilfield Services struck him on an icy Montana highway. Fahrnow had been inspecting his own vehicle after a prior collision at the intersection, and was standing in the roadway when the E-5 truck lost control and hit him. Fahrnow sued E-5 for negligence under a theory of vicarious liability, alleging that the E-5 driver failed to operate the truck safely given the hazardous conditions. E-5 asserted that Fahrnow’s own actions, including parking in the traffic lane and failing to display warning devices, constituted comparative negligence.The Seventh Judicial District Court of Montana granted summary judgment in favor of E-5, finding that Fahrnow was solely responsible for his injuries as a matter of law. The District Court also denied Fahrnow’s motions for sanctions against E-5 for alleged spoliation of evidence (loss of truck data and employment records) and denied his motion to compel E-5 to answer an interrogatory comparing the parties’ medical experts’ qualifications, granting E-5’s cross-motion for a protective order.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. It held that the record presented a genuine issue of material fact regarding the comparative negligence of both drivers, making summary judgment inappropriate. The Court reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to E-5 and remanded for trial. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s denial of Fahrnow’s motions for default judgment as a sanction for spoliation and its denial of the motion to compel further expert discovery, finding no abuse of discretion in those rulings. View "Fahrnow v. E-5 Oil Services" on Justia Law

On May 29, 2003, two Blaine County Sheriff’s deputies responded to a domestic disturbance involving Laurence Dean Jackson Jr. in Harlem, Montana. During a pursuit through a field, both deputies were shot; Deputy Rutherford died from a gunshot wound to the chest, and Deputy Janis was severely injured. Jackson, claiming an alcohol-induced blackout, could not recall the events, leaving Janis as the sole eyewitness. At trial, the State relied on Janis’s testimony and physical evidence to argue that Jackson shot both deputies after a struggle. Jackson’s defense presented expert testimony challenging the State’s account, including a theory that the fatal bullet may have been fired by Janis, not Jackson.Following a 17-day trial in October 2004, Jackson was convicted of deliberate homicide and attempted deliberate homicide, receiving life sentences without parole. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction in 2009, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2010. In 2011, Jackson filed a petition for postconviction relief in the Seventeenth Judicial District Court, Blaine County, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The District Court allowed for additional evidence and expert review but ultimately denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing, finding Jackson’s claims lacked specific factual support as required by Montana law.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion by denying Jackson’s petition without a hearing. Applying the Strickland v. Washington standard, the Court held that Jackson failed to present established facts showing deficient performance or prejudice by counsel. The Court found Jackson’s claims speculative and unsupported by the record, concluding the District Court acted within its discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief. View "Jackson v. State" on Justia Law

The defendant was cited for a third offense of driving under the influence (DUI) and for driving with a suspended license, both misdemeanors, in November 2021. He was initially convicted in Justice Court and then sought a trial de novo in the District Court. At trial, a jury found him guilty of both offenses. During sentencing, the defendant’s counsel informed the court that the defendant was on a limited income, receiving disability and social security, and requested that the court consider his financial situation when imposing fines and fees, including a request to waive the public defender fee.After the jury verdict in the Twenty-First Judicial District Court, the court sentenced the defendant to jail time, most of which was suspended, and imposed a $3,000 fine with statutory surcharges and a $250 public defender fee. The written judgment also included a $10 technology fee and $50 in prosecution costs, which were not mentioned in the oral pronouncement. The defendant appealed, arguing that the written judgment conflicted with the oral sentence and that the court failed to consider his ability to pay the fines and fees.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that when there is a conflict between the oral sentence and the written judgment, the oral sentence controls, and thus the $10 technology fee and $50 prosecution costs should not have been included. The court further held that the District Court erred by failing to inquire into the defendant’s ability to pay the public defender fee, the $3,000 fine, and the statutory surcharges, as required by Montana statutes. The Supreme Court reversed the sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Post" on Justia Law

A married couple with four children sought dissolution of their marriage after several years together. The wife, who had primarily cared for the children earlier in the marriage, was employed as a surgical nurse earning about $2,990 per month, while the husband worked as a carpenter earning approximately $7,250 per month. In the dissolution proceedings, the marital estate was divided, with the wife receiving a share of the husband’s retirement and half the equity in the marital home, while the husband retained the home and its associated debt. The court also ordered the husband to pay child support, spousal maintenance, and the wife’s attorney’s fees.The Fourth Judicial District Court of Montana conducted a bench trial and issued a decree that included the award of attorney’s fees to the wife. The only evidence regarding attorney’s fees was the wife’s testimony that she owed her attorney about $2,000 and could be responsible for her own fees, and the husband’s testimony that he had paid his attorney by borrowing from his parents. The District Court found that the husband had been able to pay his attorney’s fees and the wife had not, and ordered the husband to pay the wife’s attorney’s fees without further explanation or reference to legal standards. The husband appealed, and after partial resolution in appellate mediation, the sole issue on appeal was the propriety of the attorney’s fees award.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and held that the District Court abused its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees without grounding its decision in substantial evidence or applying the governing legal standards. The Supreme Court found that the District Court failed to make necessary findings regarding the necessity and reasonableness of the award and did not provide a sufficient factual or legal basis for its decision. The Supreme Court reversed the award of attorney’s fees. View "In re Marriage of Salois" on Justia Law

The case concerns the fatal shooting of Brett Ness in Billings, Montana, following a series of drug-related disputes. Alexander Garrett LaForge III, along with several others, was involved in confrontations with Ness over an alleged shortfall in a methamphetamine transaction. After escalating tensions and threats, LaForge and a group of associates returned to Ness’s trailer, where LaForge shot Ness in the head with a .45 caliber pistol. Ness died later that day. Multiple co-defendants received plea deals in exchange for their testimony against LaForge.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, presided over LaForge’s trial. LaForge requested a substitution of counsel shortly before trial, citing communication issues and dissatisfaction with his attorney’s preparation. The District Court conducted an inquiry and denied the request, finding no substantial breakdown in communication. During trial, LaForge also requested a cautionary jury instruction regarding the credibility of co-defendants’ testimony, which the District Court declined, instead providing standard witness credibility instructions and a specific instruction regarding one co-defendant’s accountability. The jury convicted LaForge of deliberate homicide. At sentencing, the court ordered LaForge to pay $72,000 in restitution to the victim’s mother for lost business income, based on her testimony about canceled jobs following her son’s death.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying LaForge’s request for substitute counsel or in its jury instructions regarding co-defendant testimony. However, the Supreme Court found that the $72,000 restitution award was not supported by sufficient evidence and that the record was unclear as to whether the victim’s mother, as a business representative, qualified as a “victim” under the restitution statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and other aspects of the judgment, reversed the restitution award, and remanded for a new hearing to determine the proper amount and recipient of restitution. View "State v. LaForge" on Justia Law

Two minor children’s maternal grandfather and step-grandmother, who were already their court-appointed guardians, filed a petition in March 2024 to terminate both parents’ rights and adopt the children under the Montana Adoption Act. At the time, the children’s father was incarcerated. He was personally served with the summons and petition but did not file a response. The Montana Twentieth Judicial District Court entered his default and set a termination hearing, sending notice to the father at the prison. The father had no attorney, did not appear at the hearing, and the court received no sworn testimony. The court terminated his parental rights by adopting the petitioners’ allegations.After the termination, the father obtained permission to file out-of-time appeals, which were consolidated. He argued that the District Court failed to appoint counsel as required by Montana precedent, did not comply with statutory notice requirements, and violated due process. The record showed that the District Court never advised the father of his right to counsel, made no inquiry into indigency, and did not provide the statutorily required notice warning that failure to appear could result in termination of parental rights. No proof of service of such notice was filed, and the court did not adjourn the hearing despite the father’s absence and lack of proof of service.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the District Court violated the father’s constitutional right to equal protection by failing to advise him of his right to counsel and to inquire into indigency before terminating his parental rights. The court also found that the District Court failed to comply with the Montana Adoption Act’s mandatory notice-of-hearing provisions. The Supreme Court reversed the termination orders and remanded the case, directing the District Court to provide proper advisement, conduct an indigency inquiry, ensure statutory notice, and require clear and convincing evidence before any further termination. View "In re Adoption of A.K.M. & R.J.M." on Justia Law

In February 2016, Kevin Frost kidnapped his estranged wife, Sherri Frost, during a contentious divorce. He lured her into a situation where he could seize her, forced her into his vehicle, and held her for several hours in a barn owned by a family associate. During captivity, Kevin made Sherri severely intoxicated and later delivered her to the emergency room before turning himself in. Kevin pleaded guilty to assault and kidnapping and served a prison sentence. Sherri subsequently filed a civil suit against Kevin, Frost Ranching Corporation (the Ranch), and other parties, seeking damages for injuries and emotional distress resulting from the kidnapping. She alleged that Kevin acted, at least in part, to prevent her from obtaining an interest in the Ranch during the divorce.The Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, dismissed claims against some defendants and granted summary judgment to Frost Limited Partnership. The court denied summary judgment to the Ranch on vicarious liability, allowing that issue to proceed to trial. At trial, Sherri presented evidence of medical expenses, pain and suffering, and other damages. The jury found Kevin liable for several torts but awarded only $20,000 in damages, which matched the lower end of medical expenses and did not account for pain and suffering. The District Court granted Sherri’s motion for a new trial, finding the jury’s award unsupported by substantial evidence, as it disregarded uncontradicted, credible evidence of pain and suffering. The court also granted the Ranch’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, holding that the Ranch could not ratify Kevin’s conduct absent acceptance of any benefit from the kidnapping.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed both rulings. It held that the jury’s damages award was not supported by substantial evidence and that a new trial on damages was warranted. The court also held that, under Montana law, ratification requires acceptance of a benefit, which was absent here, so the Ranch could not be held liable for Kevin’s actions. View "Frost v. Frost" on Justia Law