Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court, which concluded that Soup Creek Road was an extinguished prescriptive easement across the parcel of land owned by Plaintiffs - Soup Creek, LLC, Dewey Skelton, and Rosana Skelton - holding that the district court erred in concluding that Soup Creek Road was not a public highway.Soup Creek Road had been used as a public travel way for more than 150 years. In 2010, Defendants’ predecessor-in-interest successfully petitioned to abandon only that portion of Soup Creek Road that crosses over what is now Defendants’ parcel. In 2009, the Skeltons asked the district court to declare the portion of Soup Creek Road that traverses their land to be a private road over which Defendants had no easement to reach their parcel. Defendants counterclaimed that the road is a public highway established prior to 1895 through prescriptive use. The district court found no right-of-way or easement on Soup Creek Road and that any public prescriptive easement had been extinguished. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that only the part of Soup Creek Road that passed through Defendants’ parcel was abandoned and that the remainder of Soup Creek Road, including the portion crossing the Skeltons’ lot, continues to be a public highway. View "Soup Creek LLC v. Gibson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court extending B.A.F.’s commitment to the Montana Mental Health Nursing Care Center, holding that the requirements of Mont. Code Ann. 53-21-119(1) did not apply when B.A.F. requested a hearing to stipulate to the extension of his involuntary commitment.On appeal, B.A.F. argued that the district court’s recommitment should be reversed because the record lacked evidence demonstrating that B.A.F. understood his statutory rights, the nature of the proceeding, and intentionally and knowingly waived those rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 53-21-119(1) did not apply because B.A.F. did not seek a hearing on the petition to extend his commitment and that B.A.F. made it clear to the court that he understood his circumstances and intentionally agreed to the extension of care. View "In re B.A.F." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions of two counts of criminal endangerment, one count of driving under the influence of alcohol, and one count of open container violation, holding that the district court did not err in refusing to give Defendant’s proposed jury instruction.During trial, Defendant proposed jury instructions on the lesser included offense of negligent endangerment. The district court declined to give the proposed instruction, concluding that the evidence did not support a finding that Defendant did not act knowingly. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give Defendant’s proposed jury instruction. View "State v. Jensen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court imposing a two-year suspended sentence in connection with Defendant’s conviction, holding that the district court correctly determined that Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-201(1)(b) barred it from deferring Defendant’s sentence.In 2017, Defendant pleaded guilty to felony criminal possession of dangerous drugs. The State and Defendant agreed to jointly recommend a two-year deferred sentence if Defendant was eligible and, if he was not eligible, a two-year suspended sentence. At issue was whether Defendant’s previous conviction in Arizona was a felony under Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-201(1)(b), which provides that a court may not defer an offender’s sentence in a felony case if she was previously convicted of a felony. The district court ultimately concluded that Defendant’s Arizona conviction was a felony that barred her from receiving a deferred sentence and, accordingly, imposed a two-year suspended sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that section 46-18-201(1)(b) barred it from deferring Defendant’s sentence. View "State v. Nelson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court terminating Mother’s parental rights to her child, S.C.L., holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Mother did not overcome the presumption that termination was in S.C.L.’s interests or in terminating Mother’s parental rights to S.C.L.On appeal, Mother conceded that she did not comply with the approved treatment plan but argued that the conduct or condition rendering her unfit was likely to change without a reasonable time. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the district court’s consideration of Mother’s history and her inability to care for her older children did not violate Mont. R. Evid. 404(b); (2) overwhelming evidence supported the district court’s determination that the conduct or condition rendering Mother unfit, unwilling, or unable to parent was unlikely to change within a reasonable time; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in S.C.L.’s best interests. View "In re S.C.L." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to J.D., holding that although the district court abused its discretion by issuing a subpoena for privileged communication between Father and his therapist and by allowing certain cross-examination, the errors were harmless.At issue on appeal was whether the district court abused its discretion in granting a court appointed special advocate (CASA) a subpoena to review notes from Father’s therapist and in allowing the CASA to question witnesses at the termination of the parental rights hearing. The Supreme Court held that the district court did abuse its discretion as to these issues, but because the record supported the district court’s decision to terminate the parents’ parental rights without reference to the material that should have been excluded, the district court’s decision did not warrant reversal. View "In re J.D." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting a preliminary injunction in favor of Defendants in this dispute over certain property, holding that the district court did not err by granting the preliminary injunction in favor of Defendants even where they did not show they would suffer irreparable injury.Plaintiff brought a quiet action seeking to resolve the question of property ownership of disputed area between the parties. Defendants counterclaimed for a prescriptively acquired easement permitting them to use an access route to their property pending the outcome of the litigation. The district court determined that Defendants had made a prima facie showing of their claim for prescriptive easement and granted them a preliminary injunction pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 27-19-201(1). Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court erred by granting the preliminary injunction because Defendants did not show they would suffer irreparable injury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendants established that they would suffer continuing harm by not being able to access their property while the litigation was pending and, therefore, the purpose of equitable injunctive relief was fulfilled. View "BAM Ventures, LLC v. Schifferman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of offense of partner or family member assault, holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to excuse a prospective juror for cause.In this case, a prospective juror spontaneously asserted that she would have a “hard time,” a personal “problem,” and a “real problem” with requiring the State to prove an essential element of the charged offense. The Supreme Court held that where the prospective juror’s multiple spontaneous statements were consistent, clear, unequivocal, and emphatic and where the record unequivocally manifested the juror’s bias, the district court abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to disqualify the prospective juror for cause. Further, the error was structural, requiring automatic reversal. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court upholding the denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss her driving under the influence (DUI) charge, holding that Montana’s statutory protections against double jeopardy did not bar Defendant’s charge.In 2016, Defendant pleaded guilty to careless driving. After reviewing Defendant’s toxicology report, the Helena Attorney’s Office additionally charged Defendant with DUI. Defendant moved to dismiss her DUI charge as a subsequent prosecution barred by Mont. Code Ann. 46-11-504(1). The municipal court denied the motion to dismiss. The district court upheld the denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Thereafter, Defendant pleaded guilty to negligent endangerment pursuant to a plea agreement, preserving her right to appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Mont. Code Ann. 46-11-503 applied in this case; but (2) because no probable cause existed to charge Defendant with DUI before resolution of her careless driving charge, section 46-11-503 did not bar the subsequent DUI charge from prosecution. View "City of Helena v. O'Connell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court assumed original jurisdiction over the issue presented in this case and held that the plain and ordinary meaning of “land acquisition” per Mont. Code Ann. 87-1-209(1) does not encompass conservation easement acquisition and that the statute does not require the Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks (FWP) to finalize its conservation easement transactions with the Board of Land Commissioners (Land Board).Steve Bullock, in his official capacity as Governor of Montana, and Martha Williams, in her official capacity as Director of the Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks, invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to declare whether section 87-1-209(1) requires FWP to bring conservation easement transactions of more than 100 acres or $100,000 in value before the Board of Land Commissioners for final approval. The Supreme Court held (1) the issue presented is justiciable; (2) the Governor and FWP Director have standing to petition the Court; (3) the Court is within the sphere of its constitutional authority to interpret the statutory meaning of section 87-1-209(1); and (4) acquisitions of interests in land do not require Land Board approval, and therefore, FWP is not statutorily required to take its conservation easement transactions before the Land Board. View "Bullock v. Fox" on Justia Law