Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Plaintiff's motion to suppress evidence that was obtained when a highway patrol trooper, after noticing Plaintiff's vehicle parked on the side of the road, stopped to see if Plaintiff needed assistance, holding that the district court did not err when it denied Plaintiff's motion to suppress.On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the test set forth in State v. Lovegren, 51 P.3d 471 (Mont. 2002), to ensure that application of the community caretaker doctrine comports with constitutional protections was not met in this case. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the contact began as a welfare check, which met the first prong of the Lovegren test. The contact then shifted to a criminal investigation supported by particularized suspicion only after additional information became available to the trooper. View "State v. Grmoljez" on Justia Law

In this case concerning a boundary realignment agreement entered into between the parties in this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting specific performance of a contract to Plaintiff, holding that the district court correctly determined that the cause of action was timely prosecuted by Plaintiff and that Plaintiff was entitled to specific performance of a contract.The district court ruled that Plaintiff was entitled to specific performance and dismissed Defendants' trespass claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by concluding that Plaintiff's breach of contract claim was not barred by the relevant statute of limitation; (2) did not err by determining that Plaintiff was entitled to specific performance of the contract; and (3) properly dismissed Defendants' trespass claim. View "Miller v. Kleppen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court affirming the Public Service Commission's final order granting L&L Site Services, Inc.'s application for a Class D motor carrier certificate of public convenience and necessity, holding that the Commission properly exercised its discretion in considering competition in determining whether public convenience and necessity required the authorization of additional garbage collection service.In affirming the Commission's final order, the district court concluded that the Commission properly considered competition in determining whether public convenience and necessity required the authorization of additional garbage collection service. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not err in considering competition in determining public convenience and necessity under Mont. Code Ann. 69-12-323(2); (2) substantial evidence supported the Commission's decision to grant a Class D permit to L&L; and (3) the Commission is not required to go through rule making under the Montana Administrative Procedure Act to exercise its statutorily granted discretion to consider competition when determining public convenience and necessity. View "McGree v. Montana Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Appellant's petition for post conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing, holding that the district court correctly determined that Appellant's petition for post conviction relief was time barred under Mont. Code Ann. 46-21-102(1) and (2).Appellant pleaded guilty to felony partner or family member assault and was required to register as a violent offender. Appellant later entered a plea of nolo contenders to the charge of failure to register as a violent offender. Appellant's appeal was dismissed when the appeal was deemed frivolous. Appellant then filed his petition for post conviction relief. The district court summarily dismissed the petition, concluding that Appellant's claims were time barred and finding no equitable grounds to extend the deadline. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's petition fell outside the one-year deadline set forth in section 46-21-102(1) and that the evidence did not fall under the newly discovered evidence exception delineated in section 46-21-102(2). View "Mascarena v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that he was entitled to relief because he entered an "Alford plea" to sexual assault and solicitation for sexual assault in violation of Mont. Code Ann. 46-12-204(4), holding that, under Montana law, an Alford plea is not synonymous to a nolo contendere plea, which, under section 46-12-204(4), a court may not accept in a case involving a sexual offense.Petitioner pleaded guilty to two sexual offenses pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 (1970). In his habeas petition Petitioner argued that his guilty pleas violated Mont. Code Ann. 46-12-204(4), which provides that a court may not accept a plea of nolo contendere in a case involving a sexual offense. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Petitioner's Alford pleas were guilty pleas, not nolo contendere pleas, and therefore, section 46-12-204(4) did not prohibit the district court from accepting the Alford pleas to the sexual offenses. View "Lawrence v. Salmonsen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court that denied Mother's motion to set aside her earlier conditional relinquishment of parental rights, terminated her parental rights, and granted permanent legal custody of her child to the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child and Family Services Division, holding that the district court erred when it terminated Mother's parental rights based on the conditional relinquishment Mother executed in a prior proceeding.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court violated Mother's due process rights when it terminated her parental rights based on the earlier conditional relinquishment because (1) neither condition in Mother's conditional relinquishment occurred before the court dismissed the first abuse and neglect case, and (2) Mother executed the conditional relinquishment as part of a previously-dismissed abuse and neglect case. View "In re K.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court awarding attorney's fees to TCH Builders and Remodeling, holding that the district court abused its discretion by assessing all of TCH's attorney fees against the construction lien bond posted by Homes For Our Troops (HFOT).TCH filed a construction lien against HFOT's property and initiated this action claiming, among other things, breach of contract and foreclosure of the construction lien bond. The district court dismissed all claims against HFOT except for TCH's lien claim against HFOT's bond. A jury found in favor of TCH. The district court entered an order ruling that all attorney fees incurred by TCH throughout the course of the proceeding were payable from the bond posted by HFOT. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for redetermination of the amount of fees to be assessed against HFOT's bond, holding that the assessment of the entirety of TCH's attorney fees against HFOT's bond was inequitable, arbitrary, and not reasonable. View "TCH Builders v. Elements of Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted a question certified to it by the United States District Court for the District of Montana to address an Estate's third-party claim to stacked liability limits in an aircraft insurance policy that covered multiple aircraft, concluding that the answer to the question, which the Court reformulated, was no.The Supreme Court reformulated the question as follows: "Is the Estate of Darrell L. Ward entitled to stack the limits of liability coverage for three separate aircraft under the terms of an insurance policy issued to the pilot of an aircraft in which Ward was a passenger at the time it crashed?" The Supreme Court answered no to the reformulated certified question because (1) the plain, unambiguous language of the contract limits the coverage to the aircraft that is involved in the accident; (2) there is no public policy or statute that mandates payment of the cumulative coverage for separate aircraft in an aviation liability insurance policy that does not provide for such payment; and (3) the insurance policy at issue was not subject to stacking of its passenger liability coverages. View "U.S. Specialty v. Estate of Ward" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s conviction on the misdemeanor offenses of negligent endangerment and reckless driving in the municipal court, holding that the municipal court erred in refusing to instruct the jury and allow evidence and argument on the authority of private citizens to make a citizen’s arrest as a factual consideration in determining whether Defendant committed the charged offenses as alleged.Defendant was prosecuted after he pulled his pickup and towed boat across a main thoroughfare in the City of Helena to block the escape of a motorcyclist fleeing from pursuing police in a high-speed chase through the City. At Defendant’s ensuing jury trial, the municipal court precluded him from presenting evidence and argument that he acted reasonably under the circumstances to assist police in apprehending the fleeing motorcyclist as authorized by Mont. Code Ann. 46-6-501, which establishes citizen arrest authority. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the municipal court erroneously precluded the evidence, jury instruction, and argument on Defendant’s asserted statutory authority and intent to make a citizen’s arrest because these were factual considerations materially relevant on the record to whether Defendant acted in negligent, willful, or wanton disregard for the safety of others beyond a reasonable doubt. View "City of Helena v. Parsons" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court, which concluded that Soup Creek Road was an extinguished prescriptive easement across the parcel of land owned by Plaintiffs - Soup Creek, LLC, Dewey Skelton, and Rosana Skelton - holding that the district court erred in concluding that Soup Creek Road was not a public highway.Soup Creek Road had been used as a public travel way for more than 150 years. In 2010, Defendants’ predecessor-in-interest successfully petitioned to abandon only that portion of Soup Creek Road that crosses over what is now Defendants’ parcel. In 2009, the Skeltons asked the district court to declare the portion of Soup Creek Road that traverses their land to be a private road over which Defendants had no easement to reach their parcel. Defendants counterclaimed that the road is a public highway established prior to 1895 through prescriptive use. The district court found no right-of-way or easement on Soup Creek Road and that any public prescriptive easement had been extinguished. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that only the part of Soup Creek Road that passed through Defendants’ parcel was abandoned and that the remainder of Soup Creek Road, including the portion crossing the Skeltons’ lot, continues to be a public highway. View "Soup Creek LLC v. Gibson" on Justia Law