Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of aggravated assault and remanded the case for dismissal without prejudice, holding that the district court erred by denying Defendant's motion to dismiss for unnecessary delay between his arrest and initial appearance.On appeal, Defendant argued that his constitutional rights were violated when he suffered an unnecessary seventeen-day delay between his arrest and his initial appearance, justifying dismissal of the aggravated assault charge with prejudice. In response, the State argued that no unnecessary delay occurred because Defendant's initial appearance occurred the day after he was charged with aggravated assault. The Supreme Court held (1) while the charge was filed only one day before, Defendant's detention counted toward, and constituted, "unnecessary delay" in appearance under Mont. Code Ann. 46-7-101; and (2) Defendant did not experience prejudice from the delay that would require dismissal of the charge with prejudice. View "State v. Norvell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court finding Defendant guilty of criminal possession of dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia and driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI), holding that the district court did not err.Specifically, the Court held that the district court did not err when it (1) denied Defendant's motion in limine to prevent the arresting officer from testifying at trial; (2) denied Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle where probable cause existed to issue a warrant authorizing a search of his truck; and (3) denied Defendant's motion to dismiss the DUI charge due to the State's failure to preserve video evidence where there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of Defendant's DUI charge would be different had the video not been overwritten. View "State v. Robertson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendants in this putative class action seeking a declaratory judgment that the Montana Retail Installment Sales Act (RISA), Mont. Code Ann. 31-1-201, et seq., barred Defendants from recovery of any interest, finance charges, or late charges on installment contracts for the purchase of a manufactured home, holding that the 2009 version of RISA controlled in this case and did not confer a private cause of action.Plaintiffs purchased a mobile home from Cherry Creek Development Inc. and financed a portion of the price through an installment contract assigned to RJC Investment, Inc. Plaintiffs filed this putative class action against Cherry Creek and RJC Investment (together, Defendants), asserting several violations of Mont. Code Ann. 31-1-231 through -243. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on the basis that RISA did not confer a private cause of action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the applicable version of RISA did not confer a private right of action. View "Somers v. Cherry Creek Development, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court affirming Defendant's sentence, including conditions restricting Defendant's contact with minors upon his release, holding that the court abused its discretion in ruling that there was a sufficient nexus between the conditions prohibiting contact with minors and Defendant or his offense.Defendant raped an unconscious woman in the parking lot of a bar. Defendant later pleaded guilty to sexual intercourse without consent. The district court imposed sentencing conditions restricting Defendant's contact with minors. On appeal, Defendant argued that because the victim was not a minor there was not a sufficient nexus between Defendant or his offense and the conditions protecting minors. The Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case for the limited purpose of striking the conditions regarding contact with minors, holding that the State presented insufficient arguments to establish the required nexus. View "State v. Mehan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court upheld a district judge's order temporarily permitting qualified advanced practice registered nurses (APRNs) to perform outpatient early-term abortions while the APRNs challenge the constitutionality of a state law that restrictions abortion practice to physicians and physicians' assistants, holding that preliminary injunctive relief was appropriately granted.In 2005, the Montana Legislature amended Mont. Code Ann. 50-20-109(1)(a) to restrict the performance of pre-viability abortions to licensed physicians and physician assistants-certified. In 2018, Plaintiffs, a certified nurse practitioner and a certified nurse midwife, filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the statute violates Montana citizens' constitutional right of privacy, equal protection and dignity. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, and the district court granted that relief. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence at this stage of the proceedings to establish a likelihood of irreparable injury during the pendency of the lawsuit to patients who would qualify for the lawful medical procedure. View "Weems v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court determining that a stipulated settlement entered into by the parties was reasonable, holding that a stipulated settlement entered without the consent of an insurer to resolve litigation between the insured and a third-party claimant will not be presumed reasonable against the insurer when the insurer has been defending the insured throughout the litigation.The liability insurer in this case provided the insured a defense throughout the relevant proceedings but did not confirm coverage under the policy. The insurer declined to settle with Plaintiffs for policy limits and misrepresented the policy limits. Eventually, Plaintiffs entered into a stipulated settlement with the insured. The insurer intervened to challenge the reasonableness of the settlement. The district court found that the settlement agreement was reasonable, determining that the insurer had effectively abandoned its insured. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a court may approve a stipulated judgment as between a third-party claimant and the insured in the underlying liability case, but the agreement will not be presumed reasonable as to the insurer if the insurer did not participate in the settlement and was providing a defense; and (2) the district court's reasonableness determination was based in part on its conclusion that a presumption of reasonableness applied, requiring reversal. View "Draggin'y Cattle Co. v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of one count of deliberate homicide and two counts of attempted deliberate homicide, holding that Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not appropriately considered on direct appeal.On appeal, Defendant argued that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to irrelevant, highly prejudicial evidence concerning his criminal past in two video interviews admitted at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment without prejudice to Defendant raising his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a postconviction relief proceeding, holding that the record was not sufficient to address Defendant's claim on direct appeal. View "State v. Sawyer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim to an accounting and recovery of surplus proceeds on the resale of her mobile home after she returned it to RJC Investment, Inc. holding that the district court erred in holding that Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) was inapplicable in this case.Plaintiff entered into an installment sale contract and security agreement to purchase a mobile home. The contract was assigned to RJC. Plaintiff later allowed RJC to take possession of the mobile home and signed a full release of contract relinquishing all rights to the mobile home. After RJC resold the mobile home RJC failed to provide an accounting of the sale and did not refund any surplus to Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued RJC. The district court granted summary judgment for RJC. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the release between Plaintiff and RJC did not terminate application of the UCC's requirement for an accounting and surplus after RJC sold the collateral; (2) the district court erred in granting RJC summary judgment on the ground that RJC satisfied the elements of the acceptance of collateral in full satisfaction pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 30-9A-620; and (3) RJC was not entitled to summary judgment on other grounds. View "Hutzenbiler v. RJC Investment, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the district court granting summary judgment to the State of Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), Birk Engineering and Bret A. Birk (Birks) and Flathead County on Amber Norbeck and Andrew Norbeck's complaint asserting violations of the Montana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, continuing nuisance, and constructive fraud, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Defendants.After the Norbecks built a home in a subdivision they experienced flooding and ongoing water quality issues. When the Norbecks could not sell their home using conventional financing due to DEQ violation notices the Norbecks brought this suit. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that the Norbecks' claims were not commenced within the applicable statutes of limitation. View "Norbeck v. Flathead County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying summary judgment for Upper Missouri Waterkeeper, granting the cross-motions for summary judgment of Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) and the City of Billings, and affirming DEQ's decision to issue a Montana Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit (the General Permit), holding that the DEQ's decisions in issuing the General Permit were not unlawful, arbitrary, or capricious.Specifically, the Count held (1) the General Permit complied with public participation requirements; (2) the DEQ's decision to incorporate construction and post-construction storm water pollution controls into the General Permit was not unlawful, arbitrary, or capricious; (3) the DEQ's decision incorporating Total Maximum Daily Loads into the General Permit was not unlawful, arbitrary, or capricious; and (4) DEQ's decision to incorporate pollution monitoring requirements into the General Permit was not unlawful, arbitrary, or capricious. View "Upper Missouri Waterkeeper v. Montana Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law