Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of two counts of incest, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's for-cause challenge of a prospective juror during voir dire.During voir dire, the prospective jurors were asked whether they knew the victim or any of her family members. One juror responded that he knew the victim's father. After a colloquy, Defendant moved to dismiss the juror from the jury for cause. The district court denied the for-cause challenge on the basis that the standard for removal under Mont. Code Ann. 46-16-115 had not been met. Defendant then used a preemptory challenge to remove the juror. After a trial, Defendant was convicted on both counts of incest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the juror affirmatively stated that he could fairly weigh the evidence at trial without impermissible coaxing the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the challenge for cause. View "State v. Block" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendants summary judgment and concluding that Elk Valley Road burdened Lots 70 and 71 to the benefit of other subdivision lot owners for ingress and agree to and from the adjoining off-plat land and concluding that Plaintiffs had no right to obstruct Elk Valley Road.The district court concluded that a sixty-foot-wide roadway easement (Elk Valley Road) existed that straddled the boundary of Plaintiffs' adjoining lots to the benefit of the other platted subdivision lots for ingress and egress to and from the subdivision and adjoining off-plat land. The court further denied Plaintiffs' damages claims in trespass and for property damage resulting from the removal and destruction of the gate placed across the roadway by Plaintiffs to limit access to the adjoining land to themselves and their guests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly concluded that (1) the relevant deeds and referenced subdivision plat created a roadway easement over Lots 70 and 71 to the benefit of other subdivision lots; (2) the disputed use of the roadway did not unreasonably interfere with use of the servient estates; and (3) Plaintiffs were not entitled to damages. View "O'Keefe v. Mustang Ranches HOA" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's motion to transfer venue to Flathead County, holding that the venue provisions of the Montana Uniform Trust Code (MUTC), Mont. Code Ann. 72-38-205(1), controlled in this case and that the district court did not err when it denied Appellant's motion to transfer venue.Appellant was appointed as the successor trustee to the David William Betts Trust. The trustor's children, who were remainder beneficiaries, decided to remove Appellant and appoint a successor trustee and filed a petition in Missoula County requesting that the court enforce the appointment of a nonprofit entity located in Missoula. Appellant agreed to step down as trustee. Thereafter, the Trust filed a separate action in Missoula County alleging, among other things, that Appellant breached his fiduciary duty and his duty as trustee. Appellant filed a motion for change of venue to Flathead County, but the district court denied the motion. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court erred by applying the venue provisions of the MUTC because the applicable venue provision was Mont. Code Ann. 25-2-122. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, as the more specific statute in this instance, the MUTC venue provision controlled. View "Betts v. Gunlikson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the orders of the district court certifying three classes to proceed in a lawsuit against the University of Montana, holding that the district court abused its discretion in certifying Class 3 to pursue the claims.Current and former students of the University brought this lawsuit as a class action complaint alleging that the University breached its fiduciary duty to students by entering into a contract with Higher One, Inc. to process student loan refunds through non-competitive financial accounts and by providing students' personal information to Higher One. In two orders, the district court certified three classes to proceed in the lawsuit. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the district court's certification of Class 3 under Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) was an abuse of discretion; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in certifying Class 1 and Class 2 under Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) but properly certified Class 1 and Class 2 under Rule 23(b)(3). View "Knudsen v. University of Montana" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying the motion to compel arbitration filed by Edwards Jones & Company, Jeremy Kientz, and Nick Ferranto (collectively, Edwards Jones) of post-termination claims asserted against them by former Edward Jones employee Adam Bucy, holding that Bucy's claims were mandatorily arbitrable and within the scope of the arbitration agreements.Bucy, who worked for Edward Jones for approximately nineteen years primarily as a financial advisor, was terminated after an internal review. Bucy filed a complaint against Edward Jones asserting claims for statutory blacklisting, statutory defamation, and common law tortious interference with a prospective business relationship. Edward Jones moved to dismiss and compel arbitration of Bucy's claims on the basis that they were subject to arbitration under Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA) and National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) regulations and two arbitration agreements between the parties. The district court denied arbitration of post-employment claims, concluding that the claims were not arbitrable within the scope of the arbitration agreements. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the arbitration agreements were valid and enforceable, that Bucy's claims were mandatorily arbitrable, and that the claims were within the scope of the arbitration agreements. View "Bucy v. Edward Jones & Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order entered by the Montana Water Court determining the volume of water to which the City of Fort Peck was entitled pursuant to its Claim 40E 182897-00 in Missouri River Basin between the Musselshell River and Fort Peck Dam, holding that the Water Court did not violate Ford Peck's due process right and that the Water Court's conclusions were correct.On appeal, Fort Peck argued that the Water Court erred by entering conclusions in contradiction to a pretrial order and that its due process rights were violated because it was not provided notice or an opportunity to present evidence concerning current use or abandonment of historical volume. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Fort Peck had adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Water Court entered its final order, both for purposes of the pretrial order and for due process and that the Water Court's conclusions were without error. View "United States Army Corps of Engineers; City of Fort Peck" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court finding Appellant guilty of attempted sexual intercourse without consent, a felony, holding that the district court erred by applying Montana's Rape Shield Law, Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-511(2), to exclude evidence of the presence of unidentified sperm cells that remained on B.J.'s underwear.Appellant was convicted of attempted sexual intercourse without consent for pulling down B.J.'s underwear and ejaculating on them. The Montana State Crime Lab discovered sperm cell evidence and skin cells on B.J.'s underwear but concluded that the major profile of the sperm cells was from an unknown male. The crime lab further determined that the skin cells were a mixture of a major profile that matched B.J.'s DNA. The State sought to exclude the sperm cell evidence as evidence of B.J.'s prior sexual conduct pursuant to the Rape Shield Law, but Appellant sought to introduce the evidence to rebut the State's explanation that laundering accounted for the absence of Appellant's DNA on the underwear. The district court excluded the evidence. The jury subsequently found Appellant guilty. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court incorrectly applied the Rape Shield Law when it failed appropriately to balance B.J.'s rights with Appellant's constitutional rights. View "State v. Lake" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court finding Defendants strictly liable for the breach of a pond on their property and awarding damages to Plaintiffs, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in the proceedings below.Defendants purchased property in Whitefish that included a 4.5 million-gallon manmade fish pond built by a previous owner. Plaintiffs later purchased land downhill from Defendants' property. After Plaintiffs hired experts to design and build a driveway to access the property, Defendants' pond breached its banks, and water flowed downslope. Plaintiffs' experts concluded that historical drainage patterns were greatly altered by the pond breach and doubled the driveway construction bid. Plaintiffs brought suit against Defendants for strict liability. The district court entered judgment for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it concluded that the pond constituted an abnormally dangerous condition that warranted the application of strict liability and when it allowed Plaintiffs to claim the full amount of damages for the increased cost of their driveway project. View "Covey v. Brishka" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court granting a motion to dismiss in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff's action seeking a declaratory judgment and asserting that provisions of the Montana Retail Installment Sales Act (RISA) barred Defendant from collecting fees under the parties' agreement, holding that the 2007 version of RISA controlled and did not confer a private cause of action but that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim.In 2009, Plaintiff purchased a mobile home and financed the majority of the purchased through an installment sales contract and security agreement that was later assigned to Defendant. Plaintiff later filed this action alleging Defendant assessed excessive late fees against her and violated RISA by failing to disclose the finance charge. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the 2007 version of RISA controlled and did not confer a private cause of action; but (2) the district court erred in dismissing the motion for failure to state a claim because Plaintiff properly asked the court for a declaratory judgment clarifying her rights under the agreement in light of the provisions of RISA. View "Strauser v. RJC Investment, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant for felony aggravated kidnapping and misdemeanor partner family member assault, holding that the district court committed reversible error by allowing the jury unrestricted access to view testimonial videos during its deliberations.In this case, the jury made no requests to view testimonial materials. The videos at issue were simply given to the jury by the court for unsupervised and unrestricted review at the start of deliberations. On appeal, Defendant argued that the videos contained testimonial evidence, and therefore, the district court abused its discretion by allowing the jury unsupervised review of these videos. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the district court erred by allowing the jury unsupervised access to view the videos during its deliberations and that the error was not harmless. View "State v. Nordholm" on Justia Law