Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A dispute arose between Cascade Development, Inc. and the City of Bozeman. On December 7, 2007, Cascade filed a complaint alleging various claims against Bozeman. A summons and complaint were issued by the clerk's office on the same day, but service was not attempted by Cascade for nearly three years. On December 2, 2010, a professional process server took the summons and complaint to the city attorney's office, and a deputy city attorney took the papers. Bozeman filed a motion to quash service and dismiss the complaint, which the district court granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court was correct in determining that Cascade had not validly served its summons and complaint on Bozeman pursuant to Mont. R. Civ. P. 4(t), as the deputy city attorney had neither implied authority nor apparent authority to accept service of process on behalf of Bozeman; and (2) the district court was correct in concluding that Bozeman was not estopped from asserting defective service of process. View "Cascade Dev., Inc. v. City of Bozeman" on Justia Law

Clayton DeVoe applied for a building permit for a large storage building to be located on a lot in an area zoned for single-family residences. The City of Missoula issued a building permit pursuant to applicable zoning regulations. After DeVoe began construction, the Board of Adjustment revoked DeVoe's building permit, finding that the storage building was in violation of the zoning regulations. DeVoe filed a civil action in the district court against, inter alia, the Board of Adjustment, the City, and two individuals. The district court granted the individuals' motions to dismiss and awarded attorney fees and costs to the individuals because DeVoe had forced them to defend a frivolous action. The court then upheld the Board's decision to revoke the building permit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly upheld the decision of the Board revoking the building permit for DeVoe's storage building; and (2) the court did not err in awarding attorney fees and costs to the two individuals. View "DeVoe v. City of Missoula" on Justia Law

Hobble Diamond Ranch, Robert and Susan Burch, and James Lowe, (collectively, Neighbors), appealed the district court's judgment affirming the Montana Department of Transportation's (DOT) decision to issue billboard sign permits under the Montana Outdoor Advertising Act. Neighbors sought removal of two billboards, arguing that the billboards were not in compliance with MOAA, DOT's granting of the permits was unlawful, and the billboards were a public nuisance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court's ruling upholding the DOT decision was not arbitrary capricious, or unlawful, as the permit applications were in conformance with MOAA and DOT based its decision on sufficient evidence. View "Hobble Diamond Ranch v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Gary Myers owned landlocked property across property owned by Stephen and Victora Dee. Myers' property contained several dilapidated buildings that had not been inhabited for several decades. Myers filed an action against the Dees, asking the district court to grant him access to his property across the Dees' property based on the right of eminent domain. Myers based his claim on Mont. Code Ann. 70-30-102(36), which states that eminent domain may be exercised to create a private road leading from a highway to a residence or farm. The district court granted the Dees' motion for summary judgment on the basis that the buildings on Myers' property did not qualify as a residence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the term "residence" in the statute refers to a habitable structure or dwelling place, i.e., a place where people are living; (2) in this case it was undisputed that the buildings on Myers' property were uninhabitable and that no one had lived in them for several decades; and (3) therefore, because there was no residence on Myers' property, access could not be granted across the Dees' property based on the eminent domain statute.

Appellees Dana Headapohl and Lawrence Martin placed two buildings in the floodplain without a permit and installed an un-permitted incinerating toilet. The health department issued a notice of violation (NOV) to Appellees, informing them that the two structures constituted "increased use" of the septic system in violation of the health code and requiring Appellees to remove the buildings and incinerating toilet. The health board affirmed the Department's NOV following a hearing. The district court concluded that Appellees had not violated the health code by adding the two buildings, that the contested provisions of the health code suffered unconstitutional vagueness as applied to Appellees, and that the incinerating toilet did not qualify as a wastewater treatment and disposal system under the health code. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court relied on an incomplete interpretation of "increased use" to determine whether the addition of the two buildings constituted increased use of the septic system that violated the health code, and (2) Appellees' incinerating toilet required a permit under the health code as a wastewater treatment and disposal system. Remanded to determine whether Appellees' changes of use could result in increased effluent flow to the septic system.

In an effort to regulate gravel pits within the county, the Gallatin County Board of Commissioners (Commission) created an interim zoning district and proposed creation of four permanent zoning districts throughout the county. The Gateway Opencut Mining Action Group (GOMAG) sought an injunction against the Commission, claiming the public comment provision of the applicable zoning statute, Mont. Code Ann. 76-2-205(6), was unconstitutional. Subsequently, GOMAG and Gallatin County agreed to defer certain statutorily-required actions until GOMAG's injunction request was heard by the district court. Meanwhile, several county farms and ranchers and two gravel pit owners (Intervenors) intervened in the action, seeking summary judgment on the ground that the Commission had failed to act within the statutorily-required time and, therefore, the case was moot. The district court granted Intervenors' motions for summary judgment. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because protests filed under the challenged statute had no impact on the course of the Commission proceedings and that no constitutional violation capable of repetition occurred here, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Intervenors on the basis of mootness.

Appellants Mike Touris and Chuck Sneed filed a petition for judicial review after the County Board of Commissioners denied Appellants' request for a zoning change. Appellants subsequently moved to dismiss the action (Touris I) with prejudice, and the district court granted the motion. Appellants then filed the current action (Touris II), setting forth a factual scenario identical to Touris I and asserting eleven counts. The County moved to dismiss Touris II, and the district court entered an order dismissing some but not all of the counts. The County then amended its answer in Touris II to include res judicata as an affirmative defense. The County moved for summary judgment on the remaining counts in Touris II, asserting the action was barred by res judicata. The district court entered an order dismissing Touris II. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that res judicata barred Appellants' claims, and (2) the County did not waive its right to assert res judicata.

In 2010, MATL, a Calgary-based company currently building a power transmission line, filed a complaint for condemnation against Larry Salois, the guardian and conservator of Shirley Salois. Salois moved for summary judgment. The district court then issued an order concluding that MATL did not possess the power of eminent domain and had no authority to take the private property of a nonconsenting landowner. MATL appealed. The Supreme Court reversed. At issue was HB 198, which was made into law on May 9, 2011. The bill expressly gives a person issued a certificate under the Major Facility Siting Act the power of eminent domain. The legislature explicitly provided for HB 198 to apply retroactively to certificates issued after September 30, 2008. In October 2008, MATL received a Major Facility Siting Act certificate. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that (1) HB 198 applies retroactively to MATL's certificate issued pursuant to the Major Facility Citing Act, and (2) the explicit language of HB 198 is in conflict with the district court's order.

Plaintiffs sued defendants seeking recognition and enforcement of their easement over Prairie Drive in Park County, Montana, near the City of Livingston. The parties raised several issues regarding the district court's findings of facts, conclusions of law, and order dated August 4, 2010. The court held that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the relief ordered by the district court, if properly implemented, would not allow them to use their easement essentially as they did and therefore, the district court both recognized and upheld plaintiffs' easement rights and ordered relief specifically designed to address their complaints. The court held that plaintiffs were entitled to attorney fees and costs where there was no factual support for defendants' argument that they were actually the prevailing party and plaintiffs prevailed on all substantive issues. The court held that the Prairie Drive Subdivision Homeowner's Association ("HOA") had standing to participate in the case where the HOA cured a defect with the Secretary of State when it had been involuntarily dissolved for failure to file its annual report. The court held that there was no evidence that plaintiffs' property right in the easement had been taken or extinguished and the district court correctly concluded that plaintiffs' private easements existed independently of any public right to use the right of way. The court held that there was no merit in the argument that plaintiffs' settlement with the City of Livingston absolved defendants of any liability. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court except as to the matter of plaintiffs' entitlement to attorney fees and costs and that matter was remanded for further proceedings.

The Missoula City Counsel, the City of Missoula, and the Mayor, (collectively "City") and Muth-Hilberry, LLC ("developer") appealed a district court determination that found that the City was arbitrary and capricious in approving a zoning and preliminary plat for a subdivision known as Sonata Park located in Rattlesnake Valley, Montana. At issue was whether neighbors, several parties opposed to the subdivision, and the North Duncan Drive Neighborhood Association, Inc. ("Association") had standing. Also at issue was whether the district court erred in striking affidavits filed by the developer and the City in connection with their motions for summary judgment. Further at issue was whether the 1989 Sunshine Agreement between the City and the developer's predecessor in interest superseded the City's growth policy. Finally at issue was whether the City's decision in Sonata Park was arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful. The court held that the neighbors had standing to sue in their own right and that the Association had associational standing to proceed on behalf of its members. The court also held that any error made by the district court in granting the neighbor's motion to strike the developer's affidavit was harmless. The court further held that the Sunlight Agreement did not supersede the City's growth policy where the Sunlight Agreement could be void ab initio and did not appear to guarantee certain density. The court finally held that substantial compliance was still valid and that a government body must substantially comply with its growth policy in making zoning decisions and that the City's decision to approve Sonata Park was arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful.