Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Sherman Anderson and other concerned residents of the City of Deer Lodge (Anderson) appealed a district court order that denied their petition for a writ of mandamus. The issue in this case arose from the revocation of Zoo Mountain Natural Care, Inc.'s business license. Zoo Mountain contacted the City in 2010 regarding a business license. Zoo Mountain had purchased property in the City limits for the purpose of lawfully growing and selling medical marijuana. The City was not issuing business licenses at that time, however, due to a change from a calendar-year licensing system to a fiscal year licensing system. The City previously had determined that it would waive the business license requirement for new applicants during this transition period. The City accordingly allowed Zoo Mountain to operate lawfully without a business license until July 2010. The City Council convened shortly after Zoo Mountain’s move to Deer Lodge. Anderson expressed concern over Zoo Mountain’s location at this meeting. He specifically disliked the fact that Zoo Mountain was located in a residential neighborhood, and that Zoo Mountain was located near the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. Anderson believed that the City’s decision to issue the business license violated Ordinances 130 and 136. Anderson further believed that the City violated the 2009 version of the Medical Marijuana Act when it issued the business license to a corporation, rather than to an individual. Anderson sought a writ of mandamus from the District Court to require the City to revoke Zoo Mountain’s business license. The court declined to issue the writ. It concluded that the MMA provided no clear legal duty for the City to revoke the business license. It similarly concluded that the City Code, particularly Ordinances 130 and 136, contained no clear legal duty to revoke the business license. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: Anderson has failed to establish any clear legal duty that requires the City to revoke Zoo Mountain’s business license. The District Court acted accordingly in denying the writ. View "Deer Lodge v. Chilcott et al." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a dispute between two neighboring property owners regarding a workshop addition to the home of Appellants, Neil and Seth Milner (Milner). The addition violated the city's setback requirement, and Appellee Gary Olsen reached an agreement with Milner to sell strip of his property so the building would be in compliance. The parties disagreed, however, about the terms of the agreement. Milner filed suit, and the district court rescinded and set aside the agreement. Olsen was ordered to return Milner's money and costs, and Milner was required to deed the land back to Olsen. After Olsen discovered that Milner's addition encroached past the boundary line of his property, Olsen filed suit alleging trespass and nuisance. The district court found in favor of Olsen and ordered Milner to remove the addition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining (1) Olsen's claims were not barred by res judicata; (2) Olsen's claims were not barred by equitable estoppel or waiver; and (3) Milner was liable to Olsen for trespass. View "Olsen v. Milner" on Justia Law

Lake Cabin Development entered into two separate written agreements with the Robert Hurly and John Hurly families to purchase their respective properties. Pursuant to an agreement, Lake Cabin provided Robert Hurly with a $250,000 option payment. After public opposition to Lake Cabin's proposed development on the land forced Lake Cabin to extend the deadline on the closing date of its agreement with the Hurlys, Lake Cabin declared the contract to be null and void and demanded return of its option payment. Both Hurly families brought separate breach of contract actions. The district court concluded that Robert Hurly was required to refund the $250,000 option payment to Lake Cabin because there was never an enforceable contract between the parties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in determining that the parties had not entered into a binding agreement, and (2) Lake Cabin was not entitled to a refund of the option payment. Remanded. View "Hurly v. Lake Cabin Dev., LLC" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between Cascade Development, Inc. and the City of Bozeman. On December 7, 2007, Cascade filed a complaint alleging various claims against Bozeman. A summons and complaint were issued by the clerk's office on the same day, but service was not attempted by Cascade for nearly three years. On December 2, 2010, a professional process server took the summons and complaint to the city attorney's office, and a deputy city attorney took the papers. Bozeman filed a motion to quash service and dismiss the complaint, which the district court granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court was correct in determining that Cascade had not validly served its summons and complaint on Bozeman pursuant to Mont. R. Civ. P. 4(t), as the deputy city attorney had neither implied authority nor apparent authority to accept service of process on behalf of Bozeman; and (2) the district court was correct in concluding that Bozeman was not estopped from asserting defective service of process. View "Cascade Dev., Inc. v. City of Bozeman" on Justia Law

Clayton DeVoe applied for a building permit for a large storage building to be located on a lot in an area zoned for single-family residences. The City of Missoula issued a building permit pursuant to applicable zoning regulations. After DeVoe began construction, the Board of Adjustment revoked DeVoe's building permit, finding that the storage building was in violation of the zoning regulations. DeVoe filed a civil action in the district court against, inter alia, the Board of Adjustment, the City, and two individuals. The district court granted the individuals' motions to dismiss and awarded attorney fees and costs to the individuals because DeVoe had forced them to defend a frivolous action. The court then upheld the Board's decision to revoke the building permit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly upheld the decision of the Board revoking the building permit for DeVoe's storage building; and (2) the court did not err in awarding attorney fees and costs to the two individuals. View "DeVoe v. City of Missoula" on Justia Law

Hobble Diamond Ranch, Robert and Susan Burch, and James Lowe, (collectively, Neighbors), appealed the district court's judgment affirming the Montana Department of Transportation's (DOT) decision to issue billboard sign permits under the Montana Outdoor Advertising Act. Neighbors sought removal of two billboards, arguing that the billboards were not in compliance with MOAA, DOT's granting of the permits was unlawful, and the billboards were a public nuisance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court's ruling upholding the DOT decision was not arbitrary capricious, or unlawful, as the permit applications were in conformance with MOAA and DOT based its decision on sufficient evidence. View "Hobble Diamond Ranch v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Gary Myers owned landlocked property across property owned by Stephen and Victora Dee. Myers' property contained several dilapidated buildings that had not been inhabited for several decades. Myers filed an action against the Dees, asking the district court to grant him access to his property across the Dees' property based on the right of eminent domain. Myers based his claim on Mont. Code Ann. 70-30-102(36), which states that eminent domain may be exercised to create a private road leading from a highway to a residence or farm. The district court granted the Dees' motion for summary judgment on the basis that the buildings on Myers' property did not qualify as a residence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the term "residence" in the statute refers to a habitable structure or dwelling place, i.e., a place where people are living; (2) in this case it was undisputed that the buildings on Myers' property were uninhabitable and that no one had lived in them for several decades; and (3) therefore, because there was no residence on Myers' property, access could not be granted across the Dees' property based on the eminent domain statute.

Appellees Dana Headapohl and Lawrence Martin placed two buildings in the floodplain without a permit and installed an un-permitted incinerating toilet. The health department issued a notice of violation (NOV) to Appellees, informing them that the two structures constituted "increased use" of the septic system in violation of the health code and requiring Appellees to remove the buildings and incinerating toilet. The health board affirmed the Department's NOV following a hearing. The district court concluded that Appellees had not violated the health code by adding the two buildings, that the contested provisions of the health code suffered unconstitutional vagueness as applied to Appellees, and that the incinerating toilet did not qualify as a wastewater treatment and disposal system under the health code. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court relied on an incomplete interpretation of "increased use" to determine whether the addition of the two buildings constituted increased use of the septic system that violated the health code, and (2) Appellees' incinerating toilet required a permit under the health code as a wastewater treatment and disposal system. Remanded to determine whether Appellees' changes of use could result in increased effluent flow to the septic system.

In an effort to regulate gravel pits within the county, the Gallatin County Board of Commissioners (Commission) created an interim zoning district and proposed creation of four permanent zoning districts throughout the county. The Gateway Opencut Mining Action Group (GOMAG) sought an injunction against the Commission, claiming the public comment provision of the applicable zoning statute, Mont. Code Ann. 76-2-205(6), was unconstitutional. Subsequently, GOMAG and Gallatin County agreed to defer certain statutorily-required actions until GOMAG's injunction request was heard by the district court. Meanwhile, several county farms and ranchers and two gravel pit owners (Intervenors) intervened in the action, seeking summary judgment on the ground that the Commission had failed to act within the statutorily-required time and, therefore, the case was moot. The district court granted Intervenors' motions for summary judgment. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because protests filed under the challenged statute had no impact on the course of the Commission proceedings and that no constitutional violation capable of repetition occurred here, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Intervenors on the basis of mootness.

Appellants Mike Touris and Chuck Sneed filed a petition for judicial review after the County Board of Commissioners denied Appellants' request for a zoning change. Appellants subsequently moved to dismiss the action (Touris I) with prejudice, and the district court granted the motion. Appellants then filed the current action (Touris II), setting forth a factual scenario identical to Touris I and asserting eleven counts. The County moved to dismiss Touris II, and the district court entered an order dismissing some but not all of the counts. The County then amended its answer in Touris II to include res judicata as an affirmative defense. The County moved for summary judgment on the remaining counts in Touris II, asserting the action was barred by res judicata. The district court entered an order dismissing Touris II. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that res judicata barred Appellants' claims, and (2) the County did not waive its right to assert res judicata.