Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Lila Clavin (Lila) and Robert Gilbert founded Pastimes and executed an operating agreement (Agreement) that provided that Pastimes would terminate upon the death of a member unless at least two members remained who agreed to continue the business. After Lila died in 2000, Gilbert and Tim Clavin, Lila's son, could not agree on the value of Lila's share of Pastimes at the time of her death. This disagreement led Tim and Gilbert to conclude that Gilbert should continue to operate Pastimes. Gilbert filed a complaint for declaratory relief on behalf of Pastimes in 2005, requesting a date-of-death valuation for Lila's interest in 2005. The district court valued the Estate's interest at the date of trial rather than at the time of Lila's death. The Supreme Court affirmed in relevant part, holding that the district court properly valued the Estate's interest at the date of trial rather than at the time of Lila's death because Gilbert's and Tim's agreement and Gilbert's continued operation of Pastimes constituted a fully executed oral agreement that modified the dissolution provision of the Agreement. View "Pastimes v. Clavin" on Justia Law

Marjorie Ward established a trust that devised $100,000 to her stepdaughter, Joan, and provided that the trust residue be distributed in equal shares to Ward's sons, Jack and James. Ward also instructed that before Jack would receive any distributions from the trust, his share would be decreased, and Joan's increased, by any amount he owed Joan. After Ward died, the district court concluded Jack's share would be reduced by $298,356, the amount he owed Joan on the date of Ward's death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court complied with the requirements of Mont. R. Civ. P. 52(a) by orally stating its findings of fact and conclusions of law; and (2) the district court did not err in ordering that Jack's share of the trust be reduced by the amount he owed his stepsister, pursuant to Ward's instructions contained in the trust, even though that debt was previously discharged in bankruptcy proceedings. View "Ward v. Ward" on Justia Law

After Decedent died, Decedent's wife moved to admit his will to probate. Decedent's son, Bruce, filed an objection, alleging that Decedent lacked testamentary capacity to enter into the will, and that another of Decedent's sons, Neil, exerted undue influence over Decedent. Bruce further sought to set aside a cattle sale and options agreement and lease-cattle agreement, alleging that Decedent's lack of capacity to contract voided the agreements and that the agreements were the product of Neil's undue influence over Decedent. The district court granted the Estate's motion to dismiss, concluding that Bruce lacked standing to contest the will and agreements. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Bruce's allegations that a previous will existed that devised to him a larger portion of Decedent's estate than did the disputed will created a sufficient basis for Bruce to establish standing to contest the will; and (2) Bruce possessed standing to challenge the validity of the agreements to the extent that they concerned real property. Remanded with instructions for the district court to vacate its order to dismiss and to permit the parties to engage in discovery. View "In re Estate of Glennie" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Carter Boehm, Trustee, sued Defendants Cokedale, L.L.C. and Allen Carter for property damages when, during construction of a road to reach Defendants' land, rocks of various sizes rolled downhill onto Plaintiff's property. Plaintiff subsequently added claims for assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that Boehm was not the trustee of any trust validly established under Montana law, and therefore Boehm was perpetuating the lawsuit on behalf of a non-existent trust. The district court also awarded Defendants attorneys' fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court properly granted summary judgment to Defendants pursuant to Mont. R. Civ. P. 17(a), which requires that every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees to Defendants. The award of fees was reversed.

Appellant appealed a district court order denying his motion for summary judgment, granting summary judgment in favor of appellees, as personal representative of the Estate of Larry Rasmussen ("Estate"), and awarding the Estate attorney fees. At issue was whether the district court erred in concluding that the Estate's nonjudicial foreclosure was not a compulsory counterclaim to an earlier action between the parties and whether the district court erred in concluding that appellant could not revive fraud-related claims as an affirmative defense. The court held that the district court did not err in ruling that the Estate was not required to assert nonjudicial foreclosure where the Estate commenced a foreclosure by advertisement and sale, which was a nonjudicial remedy it was statutorily entitled to invoke and the rules governing judicial claims and defenses did not apply to nonjudicial proceedings. The court also held that the district court did not err in concluding that appellant's fraud claims were barred where he was the plaintiff in the case and could not assert affirmative defenses nor could he compel the Estate to commence a judicial action so that he could raise an affirmative defense. The court further held that the Estate was entitled to recover attorney fees in the instant case in connection with its defense of appellant's claims in the district court and on appeal.

This case concerns two competing wills made slightly over one month apart near the end of decedent's life. The district court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment in favor of the probate of a will executed by decedent in January 2009 and dismissed appellant's formal petition to probate a handwritten document he claimed was a valid holographic will executed by decedent in December 2008 and denied appellant's motion to vacate, alter, or amend the order granting summary judgment. At issue was whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee; erred in denying appellant's motion to vacate, alter, or amend; and erred in denying appellant's M.R.Civ.P. 56(f) motion. Also at issue was whether appellee was entitled to attorney's fees and costs. The court held that summary judgment was properly granted to appellee where the district court's evidentiary rulings were correct, appellant failed to present any genuine issues of fact, and the court correctly analyzed appellant's claim of undue influence. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion based on alleged discovery abuses where the district court's ruling was made irrespective of any information contained in appellee's affidavits that appellant would have been better prepared to rebut. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion where nothing in counsel's affidavit explained what additional facts appellant would obtain through additional discovery that would effectively oppose the motion for summary judgment. The court finally held that appellant's appeal was now no longer pending and appellee had defended a contested will that was later confirmed, entitling him to fees and costs as provided in 72-12-206, MCA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the issue of attorney's fees and costs for further proceedings.

Appellants appealed the order of the district court denying their motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the estate of their father, the decedent. At issue was whether the district court erred when it assumed subject matter jurisdiction over the probate of the estate when the decedent was an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Tribe and all of his estate property was located within the exterior boundaries of the Blackfeet Reservation at the time of his death. The court overruled State ex rel. Iron Bear v. District Court and held that the Blackfeet Tribal Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the probate of the decedent's estate and assumption of subject matter jurisdiction by the district court was impermissible because Montana and the Blackfeet Tribe had not taken the necessary steps for Montana to assume civil jurisdiction over the Blackfeet Reservation.

This case involves two competing wills made slightly over one month apart near the end of the decedent's life. The district court granted the estate's personal representative Roger Harmon's motion for summary judgment in favor of the probate of a will executed by the decedent Cecilia Harmon in January, 2009. The court dismissed Appellant Dennis Waitt' s formal petition to probate a handwritten document Waitt claimed was a valid holographic will executed by the decedent in December, 2008, and denied Waitt's motion to vacate, alter or amend the order granting summary judgment in favor of Harmon. Waitt produced affidavits alleged to have contained the decedent's wishes in drafting the holographic will, but the affidavits were excluded as hearsay. On review of the record, the Supreme Court held that Waitt did not present sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact required to defeat the summary judgment, and affirmed the lower court's decision.