Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Maxine's family contributed financially to help her keep her house, Maxine transferred title of the property to the Maxine Lane Irrevocable Trust. The Trust Agreement provided that if the property was sold during Maxine's lifetime, $50,000 was to be paid to each of Maxine's brothers. Later, Maxine consented to the sale of the property, and the Trust received $176,469 in net proceeds. The Trustee indicated she was obligated to make $50,000 distributions to Maxine's brothers as stated in the Trust and then use the remaining proceeds for Maxine's support. Maxine filed a declaratory judgment action against the Trustee, asking the district court to determine whether the Trust required the sale proceeds to be used to purchase another residence for Maxine, or whether the Trust required the $50,000 distributions be made. The district court granted summary judgment to Linda, concluding that the Trust mandated the Trustee to make the distributions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded the Trust Agreement required the Trust to make the $50,000 distributions upon the sale of the property. View "Lane v. Caler" on Justia Law

Defendants in this suit included the St. Labre Indian Education Association, Inc. and the St. Labre Home for Indian Children and Youth (collectively, St. Labre). After St. Labre experienced a decrease in government funding, St. Labor began a fundraising campaign that NCT asserted resulted in millions of dollars donated to St. Labre through efforts that marketed the plight and need of NCT. NCT filed suit against Defendants alleging (1) St. Labre's fundraising system created a constructive trust on behalf of NCT and St. Labre wrongfully converted those funds to its own use, thus unjustly enriching itself; (2) contract and fraud type issues; and (3) St. Labre unconstitutionally committed cultural genocide against NCT. The district court dismissed all of NCT's motions. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on NCT's claim for unjust enrichment and the imposition of a constructive trust that may arise from St. Labre's fundraising activities after 2002; (2) reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment regarding St. Labre's fundraising activities before 2002; and (3) affirmed the court's grant of summary judgment on all of NCT's remaining claims. View "N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Roman Catholic Church" on Justia Law

Brent Anderson purchased life insurance from Insurer and named three beneficiaries under the policy: (1) his then-wife, Lucia, (2) his parents, and (3) his sister. Brent and Lucia subsequently divorced. Later that year, Mont. Code Ann. 72-2-814 became effective. The statute provides that a divorce revokes "any revocable disposition or appointment of property made by a divorced individual to the individual's former spouse in a governing instrument." Brent died several years later without having changed his designation of Lucia as primary beneficiary under the life insurance policy. Insurer filed an interpleader action to determine the rightful beneficiary under Brent's policy. The district court ruled in favor of Lucia based in part on the fact that section 72-2-814 became effective after Brent and Lucia's divorce. The Supreme Court accepted a certified question from the U.S. court of appeals and answered that section 72-2-814 applies to a divorce that pre-dates the statute's enactment. View "Thrivent Fin. for Lutherans v. Andronescu" on Justia Law

In 2000, Decedent executed a will that devised his estate to his niece Dana Fink and her brother, Dustin Badgett. In 2009, approximately seven weeks before his death, Decedent signed a quitclaim deed conveying substantial real property to himself and Roberta Williams, Decedent's employee, as joint tenants with right of survivorship. After Decedent's death, Fink challenged the validity of the quitclaim deed, claiming her uncle was not competent to execute the deed. After a bench trial, the district court held that the quitclaim deed was void and had no legal effect. In addition, the court denied Williams' request for reimbursement for the mortgage and tax payments she had paid on the property for the period she held the property under the deed. Williams appealed the reimbursement ruling only. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Williams' request for reimbursement of the monies she paid toward the mortgage and taxes on the subject property because Williams failed within the time allotted to present evidence in support of her request for such reimbursement. View "Fink v. Williams" on Justia Law

Decedent's will divided his estate among his wife (Wife) and his sons and left to Wife all of their jointly-owned vehicles and other property. At the time of Decedent's death he and Wife owned a motor home as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. There was an outstanding purchase money security interest on the motor home, and both Decedent and Wife signed the loan document, which specifically provided that each of them was independently obligated for the full amount of the debt. Wife filed a claim against Decedent's Estate for one half the debt on the motor home. The Estate's Personal Representative denied Wife's claim. The district court (1) applied a majority common-law rule from other states providing that Decedent's estate has an equitable duty to pay its aliquot share of debts on such jointly-held property, and (2) held the equitable outcome was to allow Wife's claim against the Estate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding that Montana law would, as a matter of equity under common law, require Decedent's Estate to pay half of the outstanding security interest in the motor home that became Wife's sole property upon Decedent's death. View "In re Estate of Afrank" on Justia Law

In this dispute over real property, Roslyn Shephard, in her capacity as personal representative of the estates of real property owners (Lessors), terminated the third lease of Lessees based on an alleged violation of the terms of the lease. Shephard then sued Lessees, seeking to invalidate Lessees' third lease due to the fact that she had not signed it on Lessors' behalf. Shephard alternatively sought an order declaring that Lessees had breached the terms of the lease. Lessees counterclaimed, alleging that Shephard had breached the terms of the lease by wrongfully terminating the lease and by failing to provide notice to them of the alleged breach. The district court found in favor of Lessees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly determined that the lease was valid without Shephard's signature; (2) substantial evidence supported the district court's finding that Lessees had not violated the lease; and (3) the district court correctly determined that the terms of the lease entitled Lessees to notice of their alleged breach and an opportunity to cure. View "Shephard v. Widhalm" on Justia Law

Johnson Farms, Inc. and Floyd Johnson filed a complaint against Ethel Halland alleging (1) in her capacity as secretary of Johnson Farms, Inc., Ethel breached her fiduciary duties by diverting corporate funds to herself and others; and (2) Ethel conferred gifts to herself and other family members in contravention of a written trust agreement. The district court granted Ethel's motion for summary judgment, finding that the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations and that equitable estoppel did not toll the statute of limitations. The district court also awarded Ethel attorneys' fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Johnson's claims were barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) the district court did not err in awarding Ethel attorneys' fees and costs. View "Johnson Farms, Inc. v. Halland" on Justia Law

Louis G. Hannum, Jr. (Louis Jr.) appealed a district court's order removing him for cause as the personal representative of the estate of Louis G. Hannum, Sr. (Louis Sr.). Louis Sr. passed away in 2010, and was survived by his children, Louis Jr., Mike and Mark; and his grandchildren, Monika, Veronica, Michelle, Naomi, Zachary, Esther and Jim. Louis Sr. was predeceased by his daughter, Cheryl Gallagher, who was Esther’s and Jim’s mother. Louis Jr. filed an application for informal probate of will and appointment of personal representative of Louis. Sr.’s estate on September 2, 2010. Notice was sent to Louis Jr., Mike, Mark, Esther and Jim, but not to the remaining grandchildren. Naomi did, however, know of Louis Jr.’s appointment because Naomi was Louis Jr.’s daughter and she was acting as his counsel. It is unclear whether Zachary, Louis Jr.’s son, was aware of these proceedings. Notably, Louis Jr. did not send notice to Louis Sr.’s grandchildren Monika, Veronica and Michelle. In its Order, the District Court concluded that Louis Jr. violated numerous fiduciary duties, and as a result, his removal for cause was appropriate. In its conclusions of law, the District Court determined that Louis Jr. had failed in his duty to administer the probate according to the 2005 Will, a duty imposed by 72-34-101, MCA, when he included the value of certain alleged promissory notes and distributed them between himself and Mark without authority under the 2005 Will. The court additionally found that Louis Jr. failed in his duty to avoid conflicts of interest, in his duty to use ordinary skill and prudence, in his duty to exercise discretionary powers reasonably, and in his duty to file or otherwise deliver to interested parties, within nine months of his appointment, an inventory of estate assets that included a full and true value of the decedent’s interest in every item listed in the inventory. In reaching its decision, the the Supreme Court concluded that the District Court relied on substantial credible evidence. Though the Court disfavors removing a personal representative, the District Court has broad discretion in its decision to remove a personal representative, and the Court concluded that the District Court did not abuse that discretion when it removed Louis Jr. for cause. View "Estate of Hannum" on Justia Law

Glacier Kitchens, Inc., CR Weaver Trust, and the Estate of Grace Weaver (collectively "Defendants") appealed the denial of their motion to set aside the default judgments issued against them in district court. Weaver filed a complaint against Plaintiff Mountain West Bank (MWB) alleging breach of contract, unfair trade practices, and a violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. MWB filed its answer and counterclaim for judicial foreclosure. MWB attempted to serve the Defendants at the residence of Weaver by personally serving Weaver’s daughter Elizabeth Weaver (Elizabeth). Elizabeth bore no relationship to the Defendants, other than she is Weaver’s daughter. Weaver filed a pro se answer to MWB’s counterclaim as it related to him. The Defendants failed to file an answer or otherwise appear. As a result, MWB applied for entries of default against them. Weaver filed a pro se motion to set aside the judgments against Defendants. In his motion, Weaver noted that Elizabeth was not legally qualified to accept service on behalf of the Defendants. MWB objected and argued that Weaver had failed to explain why Elizabeth was not authorized to accept service on behalf of the Defendants. MWB additionally contended that Weaver, as a non-attorney, could not appear on behalf of the Defendants. The Supreme Court dismissed Weaver's appeal without prejudice due to the fact that as a pro se appellant, Weaver was unable to bring an appeal on behalf of the Defendants. Defendants through counsel made a motion to set aside the default judgments arguing MWB's alleged faulty service. The Defendants' motion to set aside the default judgments was deemed denied pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 60(c) (2009) when the District Court failed to rule on them within 60 days. It is from that denial that the Defendants appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred when it failed to set aside the default judgments issued against Defendants due to the problem with service. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mtn. West v. Glacier Kitchens, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1976 Cecilia Kincaid Bates, grantor, and co-trustees George Kincaid and Richard Peterson entered into a trust agreement establishing the Cecilia Kincaid Gift Trust for George. George was Cecilia's son and died in 2009. In 2010 the co-trustees filed a final account, petition for settlement, distribution, and termination of the trust. When distributing the proceeds of the trust, the district court determined that Jennifer, George's child who was born and given up for adoption after the trust was established, should be included in the trust distribution. The trustees appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the plain language of the trust, Jennifer was not a descendant of George because she was adopted and was therefore regarded as the lawful blood descendant of the adopting parent or parents. Remanded. View "In re Kincaid Gift Trust" on Justia Law