Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Violet Quirin died in 2011. Prior to her death, Quirin had executed three wills in 2005, 2007, and 2010. In the first two wills Quirin divided her property equally between her two surviving daughters. However, in the 2010 will, Quirin made no provision for her daughters and instead divided her estate among several friends and charitable organizations. Following Quirin’s death, one of her daughters (“Daughter”) petitioned for formal probate of the will Quirin executed in 2007, claiming that Quirin lacked testamentary capacity when she signed the 2010 will. After a trial, the district court confirmed probate of the 2010 will, ruling that Daughter failed to show that Quirin lacked testamentary capacity. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order confirming probate of the 2010 will, holding that the court did not err when it determined that Quirin possessed testamentary capacity at the time she executed the 2010 will. View "In re Estate of Quirin" on Justia Law

Dennis Lawlor died the day after executing a will (“Will”). Dennis was survived by three of his siblings, Antoinette, Mary, and John Lawlor. An additional sibling predeceased Dennis, but that sibling’s daughter, Audrey, and grandson, John Stoican, survived Dennis. The Will devised all of Dennis’ estate to Antoinette and Mary. Audrey and John Stoican filed a complaint contesting the Will. Antoinette’s children, Mark and John Wagner, opposed the complaint and moved to dismiss the will contest. Audrey and John Stoican then filed a motion asking the court to remove Mark as personal representative and John Wagner as the Estate’s attorney. The district court decided that Audrey and John Stoican lacked standing to contest the will or to seek the removal of the personal representative. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) erred when it determined that Audrey lacked standing to contest the Will on the basis of its determination that Audrey would not succeed to the Estate if it passed by intestacy; and (2) did not err in deciding that Audrey was not a “person interested in the estate” with standing to petition for removal of a personal representative for cause. View "Stoican v. Wagner" on Justia Law

This action concerned the Will of Dennis Lawlor, who died in 2012. Audrey and John Stoican filed a complaint contesting the Will, claiming, inter alia, that Dennis lacked testamentary capacity at the time the Will was executed and that he was subject to undue influence. The Stoicans then moved to remove the personal representative and the Estate’s attorneys, alleging conflicts of interest. The district court concluded that the Stoicans lacked standing to contest the Will or to petition for the removal of the personal representative or the Estate’s attorney. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) erred when it determined that Audrey would not succeed to the Estate if the Estate passed by intestacy, and for this reason, the court erred when it determined that Audrey lacked standing to contest the Will; and (2) did not err when it determined that Audrey lacked standing to petition for the removal of the personal representative for cause. View "Stoican v. Wagner" on Justia Law

Edwin Moreau worked at the W.R. Grace mine from 1963 until 1992. Edwin died of asbestos-related lung cancer in 2009. In 2013, Transportation Insurance, W.R. Grace’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier, accepted liability for Edwin’s medical expenses. Both the Libby Medical Plan, an entity established and funded by W.R. Grace to pay the medical care expenses of employees who were injured by asbestos exposure, and W.R. Grace refused to accept reimbursement from Transportation for the medical expenses the Plan had paid on Edwin’s behalf. Cristita Moreau, as personal representative of Edwin’s estate, demanded that the amount of reimbursement declined by the Plan and W.R. Grace should be paid either to Edwin’s Estate or to a charity selected by the Estate. After Transportation refused to pay the money, Moreau filed this petition to the Workers’ Compensation Court (WCC) to resolve the dispute. The WCC denied the petition, determining that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter because Moreau lacked standing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Estate had standing and was entitled to have its petition determined on the merits. Remanded. View "Moreau v. Transp. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2008, William Corrigan filed for a divorce from his wife, Mary Helen Corrigan. The district court issued temporary restraining order (TRO) that prohibited William and Mary from changing the beneficiaries of any insurance. However, the TRO was never served on Mary. In 2012, William amended the terms of his IRA account with State Farm, removing Mary as beneficiary and naming his adult children as primary beneficiaries. After William died, Mary alerted State Farm that she would make an elective share claim on the IRA. Litigation ensued. The district court granted summary judgment to the adult children, concluding that the TRO was invalid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because William did not serve Mary with the TRO in the three years allotted for service, the TRO was rendered ineffective, and therefore, William was not prohibited from amending his IRA; and (2) as a result, the district court did not err in finding that the adult children were the primary beneficiaries of the IRA account. View "In re Estate of Corrigan" on Justia Law

The Northland Royalty Corporation purchased mineral rights from the personal representative of two estates and subsequently brought a quiet title action naming certain beneficiaries (“Devisees”) as defendants. The district court quieted title in favor of Devisees, but the Supreme Court remanded to consider the applicability of Mont. Code Ann. 72-3-618. On remand, Northland moved for summary judgment, arguing that section 72-3-618 offered Northland protection against Devisees’ claims to the minerals. The district court denied summary judgment on the basis that Northland failed to act in good faith as required by the statute. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order denying summary judgment and remanded for entry of judgment in Northland’s favor, holding that section 72-3-618 protected Northland’s purchase. View "Northland Royalty Corp. v. Engel" on Justia Law

The district court entered a temporary injunction preventing Linda St. Peter, acting in her capacity as the trustee of the Osorio Irrevocable Trust, from selling a property held by the trust. Linda filed a motion for relief from the temporary injunction. After a hearing, the district court dissolved the temporary injunction. The property was then sold to a third party. Karlene Khor, Linda’s sister, appealed, arguing that the district court manifestly abused its discretion when it dissolved the temporary injunction. The Supreme Court did not address the merits of the issue because the property had been sold and the issue was therefore moot. View "Matter of Osorio Irrevocable Trust" on Justia Law

Robert Mead died in 2011, survived by his daughters, Roberta Jean Mead and Bobbi Jo Harr. Roberta initiated intestate proceedings, but Bobbi Jo petitioned for formal probate of Robert’s purported will. Roberta and Bobbi Jo filed cross-motions for summary judgment about the will’s validity and enforceability. The district court concluded that the will was valid and enforceable and granted judgment in favor of Bobbi Jo. Roberta appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that the will was valid and enforceable because it was properly executed and not the result of undue influence. View "In re Estate of Mead" on Justia Law

After executing her last will and testament in Montana, Laura Jean Kelly, who neither married nor had children, died at age sixty-two. Laura’s siblings petitioned the district court for a determination that Laura’s interest in a family partnership was not part of her residuary estate. The district court concluded that Laura’s interest in the family partnership was a non-probate asset and did not constitute part of the residue of Laura’s estate. As such, Laura’s partnership interest passed to Laura’s siblings, her “heirs-at-law.” Laura’s niece appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its interpretation of the term “heirs,” its application of Montana law, and its conclusions of law. View "In re Estate of Kelly" on Justia Law

After Norman Benjamin, the father of Delmar and Cecil, passed away, Cecil, who was named personal representative in Norman’s will, filed a petition for determination of testacy, for determination of devisees and for settlement and distribution of a testate estate. After a hearing, the probate court entered a decree approving the petition, which designated Norman’s wife, Joyce, as the sole devisee under the will. Delmar filed an action against Cecil and Joyce, alleging that Cecil violated his fiduciary duty by distributing Norman’s tangible personal property by distributing it among Norman’s other children, but not to Delmar. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Delmar’s claim. Subsequently, Delmar filed a petition to reopen probate, alleging that Cecil misrepresented the extent of Norman’s tangible personal property and engaged in self-dealing with regard to this property and that there was newly discovered tangible personal property that needed to be distributed. The district court sua sponte denied Delmar’s petition under principles of res judicata. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that res judicata did not bar Delmar’s fraud and newly discovered tangible personal property claims in this case. View "In re Estate of Benjamin" on Justia Law