Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this action, the surviving children of the decedent disputed both the informal probate process brought by their stepfather as well as the validity of a 1997 will that devised to the stepfather all of the mineral rights from their mother’s estate. The district court granted summary judgment for the stepfather and concluded that the contestants had not offered sufficient evidence to challenge the decedent’s testamentary capacity or to support their allegations of undue influence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by permitting the stepfather to initiate probate proceedings on the decedent’s estate fourteen years after her death; and (2) did not err in granting summary judgment to the stepfather on the contestants’ objections. View "In re Estate of Harris" on Justia Law

Marian Davis lost control of her vehicle and struck a vehicle driven by Amy Locke. At the time of the accident, Davis was insured by Safeco Insurance Company under a policy with a $100,000 per person coverage. Davis died from her injuries. Locke, who also sustained injuries, filed a claim for damages against Davis’s estate. Prior to trial, Safeco paid Locke $16,306 for her past medical expenses. After a trial, the jury awarded Locke $400,000 in compensation for her injuries. The Estate appealed, and Safeco intervened. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) abused its discretion in denying the Estate’s motion to alter or amend the judgment because Locke was precluded from recovering against the Estate more than the $100,000 insurance limitation; and (2) did not abuse its discretion when it made findings and conclusions that effectively bound Safeco to a judgment in a case in which Safeco was not a named party, was not represented by counsel, and did not appear. View "Locke v. Estate of Davis" on Justia Law

Central United Life Insurance Co. (CULI) purchased Judith Gleason’s cancer benefit insurance policy prior to Gleason’s death from breast cancer. Gleason’s Estate submitted notice of potential claims under the policy to CULI. CULI paid certain claims but denied payment for claims submitted outside the policy limit. The Estate contested the denial of the untimely-filed claims. The district court granted partial summary judgment for the Estate, ruling that CULI owed payment for the untimely-filed claims, provided it was not prejudiced by the late notice. After a trial, the jury found that CULI had violated the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA) but did not award damages and therefore did not consider whether CULI acted with malice. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the district court correctly applied the notice-prejudice rule; and (2) when an insurer is found to have violated the UTPA, a jury is not required to find compensatory damages beyond those for breach of the insurance contract before considering malice and punitive damages under the UTPA, and therefore, a new trial must be held on the issue of malice and punitive damages. View "Estate of Gleason v. Cent. United Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Violet Quirin died in 2011. Prior to her death, Quirin had executed three wills in 2005, 2007, and 2010. In the first two wills Quirin divided her property equally between her two surviving daughters. However, in the 2010 will, Quirin made no provision for her daughters and instead divided her estate among several friends and charitable organizations. Following Quirin’s death, one of her daughters (“Daughter”) petitioned for formal probate of the will Quirin executed in 2007, claiming that Quirin lacked testamentary capacity when she signed the 2010 will. After a trial, the district court confirmed probate of the 2010 will, ruling that Daughter failed to show that Quirin lacked testamentary capacity. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order confirming probate of the 2010 will, holding that the court did not err when it determined that Quirin possessed testamentary capacity at the time she executed the 2010 will. View "In re Estate of Quirin" on Justia Law

Dennis Lawlor died the day after executing a will (“Will”). Dennis was survived by three of his siblings, Antoinette, Mary, and John Lawlor. An additional sibling predeceased Dennis, but that sibling’s daughter, Audrey, and grandson, John Stoican, survived Dennis. The Will devised all of Dennis’ estate to Antoinette and Mary. Audrey and John Stoican filed a complaint contesting the Will. Antoinette’s children, Mark and John Wagner, opposed the complaint and moved to dismiss the will contest. Audrey and John Stoican then filed a motion asking the court to remove Mark as personal representative and John Wagner as the Estate’s attorney. The district court decided that Audrey and John Stoican lacked standing to contest the will or to seek the removal of the personal representative. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) erred when it determined that Audrey lacked standing to contest the Will on the basis of its determination that Audrey would not succeed to the Estate if it passed by intestacy; and (2) did not err in deciding that Audrey was not a “person interested in the estate” with standing to petition for removal of a personal representative for cause. View "Stoican v. Wagner" on Justia Law

This action concerned the Will of Dennis Lawlor, who died in 2012. Audrey and John Stoican filed a complaint contesting the Will, claiming, inter alia, that Dennis lacked testamentary capacity at the time the Will was executed and that he was subject to undue influence. The Stoicans then moved to remove the personal representative and the Estate’s attorneys, alleging conflicts of interest. The district court concluded that the Stoicans lacked standing to contest the Will or to petition for the removal of the personal representative or the Estate’s attorney. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) erred when it determined that Audrey would not succeed to the Estate if the Estate passed by intestacy, and for this reason, the court erred when it determined that Audrey lacked standing to contest the Will; and (2) did not err when it determined that Audrey lacked standing to petition for the removal of the personal representative for cause. View "Stoican v. Wagner" on Justia Law

Edwin Moreau worked at the W.R. Grace mine from 1963 until 1992. Edwin died of asbestos-related lung cancer in 2009. In 2013, Transportation Insurance, W.R. Grace’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier, accepted liability for Edwin’s medical expenses. Both the Libby Medical Plan, an entity established and funded by W.R. Grace to pay the medical care expenses of employees who were injured by asbestos exposure, and W.R. Grace refused to accept reimbursement from Transportation for the medical expenses the Plan had paid on Edwin’s behalf. Cristita Moreau, as personal representative of Edwin’s estate, demanded that the amount of reimbursement declined by the Plan and W.R. Grace should be paid either to Edwin’s Estate or to a charity selected by the Estate. After Transportation refused to pay the money, Moreau filed this petition to the Workers’ Compensation Court (WCC) to resolve the dispute. The WCC denied the petition, determining that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter because Moreau lacked standing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Estate had standing and was entitled to have its petition determined on the merits. Remanded. View "Moreau v. Transp. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2008, William Corrigan filed for a divorce from his wife, Mary Helen Corrigan. The district court issued temporary restraining order (TRO) that prohibited William and Mary from changing the beneficiaries of any insurance. However, the TRO was never served on Mary. In 2012, William amended the terms of his IRA account with State Farm, removing Mary as beneficiary and naming his adult children as primary beneficiaries. After William died, Mary alerted State Farm that she would make an elective share claim on the IRA. Litigation ensued. The district court granted summary judgment to the adult children, concluding that the TRO was invalid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because William did not serve Mary with the TRO in the three years allotted for service, the TRO was rendered ineffective, and therefore, William was not prohibited from amending his IRA; and (2) as a result, the district court did not err in finding that the adult children were the primary beneficiaries of the IRA account. View "In re Estate of Corrigan" on Justia Law

The Northland Royalty Corporation purchased mineral rights from the personal representative of two estates and subsequently brought a quiet title action naming certain beneficiaries (“Devisees”) as defendants. The district court quieted title in favor of Devisees, but the Supreme Court remanded to consider the applicability of Mont. Code Ann. 72-3-618. On remand, Northland moved for summary judgment, arguing that section 72-3-618 offered Northland protection against Devisees’ claims to the minerals. The district court denied summary judgment on the basis that Northland failed to act in good faith as required by the statute. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order denying summary judgment and remanded for entry of judgment in Northland’s favor, holding that section 72-3-618 protected Northland’s purchase. View "Northland Royalty Corp. v. Engel" on Justia Law

The district court entered a temporary injunction preventing Linda St. Peter, acting in her capacity as the trustee of the Osorio Irrevocable Trust, from selling a property held by the trust. Linda filed a motion for relief from the temporary injunction. After a hearing, the district court dissolved the temporary injunction. The property was then sold to a third party. Karlene Khor, Linda’s sister, appealed, arguing that the district court manifestly abused its discretion when it dissolved the temporary injunction. The Supreme Court did not address the merits of the issue because the property had been sold and the issue was therefore moot. View "Matter of Osorio Irrevocable Trust" on Justia Law