Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After John McClure’s death, his widow (Ellie) and his children (collectively, Siblings) embarked on contentious litigation regarding the McClure Family Trust. Ellie filed suit seeking to enforce an amendment to the Trust. The district court denied relief, concluding that, under the Trust’s plain language, Ellie had no interest in any of the Trust’s assets. The court also denied Ellie’s motion for partial summary judgment asking the court to forfeit Siblings’ interests for purportedly contesting the Trust’s validity. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) Ellie had an interest in Trust assets, and therefore, the district court incorrectly concluded that the amendment was invalid; and (2) the district court correctly determined that Siblings did not forfeit their interest in the Trust. Remanded. View "In re Estate of McClure" on Justia Law

A.M.M.’s two children - Timothy McCann and Genet McCann (together, Appellants) - appealed from three groups of orders entered by the district court during actions it took to oversee the guardianship and conservatorship of A.M.M., including a preliminary injunction, Rule 11 sanctions, and a request for recusal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting the Guardian’s motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin Appellants from engaging in certain activities the Guardian believed were detrimental to A.M.M.’s health; (2) the district court did not err by denying Genet’s motion to recuse; and (3) the district court did not err by sanctioning Genet for violating Rule 11. View "In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of A.M.M." on Justia Law

In 2000, Paul Kurth, who never married or had children, died at the age of eighty-two. In 2013, Sinda and Marty Puryer, Kurth’s niece and her husband, petitioned to probate a document entitled “Instructions and Last Will and Testament of Paul L. Kurth.” Marty claimed Kurth dictated the contents of this document to him and then signed it in the presence of two witnesses. Kurth’s nephew challenged the will. The district court eventually ruled that Mont. Code Ann. 72-3-122(1) barred probate of Kurth’s alleged will and, therefore, that Kurth had died intestate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that Kurth died intestate and that his estate must be distributed in accordance with Montana’s intestacy statutes. View "In re Estate of Kurth" on Justia Law

Roy Volk and Pamela Dee Volk had a son, RBV, in the fall of 2000. In 2011, the marriage was dissolved. At the time of the divorce, Roy owned two term life insurance policies. While a statutorily-mandated temporary restraining order was still in effect, Roy changed the beneficiary designations on both policies and designated his sister, Valerie Goeser, as the new beneficiary. Just over four months after the divorce was final, Roy died. Valerie received the life insurance proceeds from both policies. Pamela subsequently filed this action on behalf of RBV against Valerie and Roy’s estate seeking a constructive trust over the insurance policy payouts for the benefit of RBV. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Valerie, concluding that Valerie was not unjustly enriched when she received Roy’s life insurance proceeds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Valerie was unjustly enriched because Roy’s errors in changing the beneficiary of his life insurance under the statutorily-mandated restraining order invalidated his designations on the insurance policies, and a constructive trust was created on RBV's behalf as a result of these errors. Remanded. View "Volk v. Goeser" on Justia Law

August Schreiber’s (the decedent) will devised three lots and five certificates of deposit (CDs) to named beneficiaries (the beneficiaries). Before the decedent died, he sold the lots and the CDs. The personal representative, who was also the residuary beneficiary of the will, concluded that the decedent spent the process of the sales prior to his death. The personal representative filed a final accounting and petition for distribution calling for the beneficiaries to receive nothing and the residuary beneficiary to receive the net distributable estate. The district court denied the final accounting and petition for distribution. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly concluded that the decedent did not intend ademption of his specific devise of the lots, so the proceeds of the sale of the lots were to be distributed to the beneficiaries, regardless of whether the original funds could be traced; (2) incorrectly concluded that the decedent did not intend ademption of the devise of the CDs and thus erred in ordering the personal representative to distribute to the beneficiaries the value of those CDs; and (3) did not err when it denied the final accounting submitted by the personal representative. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Schreiber" on Justia Law

A.M.M. was the mother of eight adult children, including Timothy McCann. Timothy filed a petition requesting that he be appointed A.M.M’s sole guardian and conservator. After a trial, the district court found that A.M.M. was an incapacitated person, appointed attorney Casey Emerson as guardian and appointed Timothy, Timothy’s brother, and attorney Douglas Wold as joint conservators. The district court later awarded attorney fees to Wold and Emerson. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion by denying Timothy’s motion to vacate, nor did the court err in its ruling on any of the issues therein; (2) did not abuse its discretion by striking Timothy’s reply brief for untimely service; (3) did not abuse its discretion when it limited the powers of the conservators to act on behalf of A.M.M. in her role as a corporate director or signatory; and (4) did not abuse its discretion by ordering payment of attorney fees to either Wold or Emerson. Lastly, Timothy’s allegations of attorney misconduct were not properly before the Court. View "In re Guardianship of A.M.M." on Justia Law

Howard H. Mills (the Decedent) died, survived by three sons - Howard W. (Howard), John, and David. On August 21, 2014, Howard petitioned for formal probate of Decedent’s will and appointment of a personal representative. The district court informed the parties that any objections may be filed within fourteen days, by October 6, 2014. Neither John nor David filed an objection by the district court’s deadline. On October 15, 2014, Howard moved the district court for entry of default against John and David for failure to object to the petition. Before an actual default was entered, John and David each filed motions to set aside the default. After a hearing at which neither John nor David was present, the district court issued an order denying John and David’s requests to set aside the defaults. The district court subsequently appointed Howard as personal representative and admitted the will to formal probate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion by determining that David failed to establish good cause for not filing timely and potentially meritorious objections to the initiation of the formal probate proceedings. View "In re Estate of Mills" on Justia Law

In this action, the surviving children of the decedent disputed both the informal probate process brought by their stepfather as well as the validity of a 1997 will that devised to the stepfather all of the mineral rights from their mother’s estate. The district court granted summary judgment for the stepfather and concluded that the contestants had not offered sufficient evidence to challenge the decedent’s testamentary capacity or to support their allegations of undue influence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by permitting the stepfather to initiate probate proceedings on the decedent’s estate fourteen years after her death; and (2) did not err in granting summary judgment to the stepfather on the contestants’ objections. View "In re Estate of Harris" on Justia Law

Marian Davis lost control of her vehicle and struck a vehicle driven by Amy Locke. At the time of the accident, Davis was insured by Safeco Insurance Company under a policy with a $100,000 per person coverage. Davis died from her injuries. Locke, who also sustained injuries, filed a claim for damages against Davis’s estate. Prior to trial, Safeco paid Locke $16,306 for her past medical expenses. After a trial, the jury awarded Locke $400,000 in compensation for her injuries. The Estate appealed, and Safeco intervened. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) abused its discretion in denying the Estate’s motion to alter or amend the judgment because Locke was precluded from recovering against the Estate more than the $100,000 insurance limitation; and (2) did not abuse its discretion when it made findings and conclusions that effectively bound Safeco to a judgment in a case in which Safeco was not a named party, was not represented by counsel, and did not appear. View "Locke v. Estate of Davis" on Justia Law

Central United Life Insurance Co. (CULI) purchased Judith Gleason’s cancer benefit insurance policy prior to Gleason’s death from breast cancer. Gleason’s Estate submitted notice of potential claims under the policy to CULI. CULI paid certain claims but denied payment for claims submitted outside the policy limit. The Estate contested the denial of the untimely-filed claims. The district court granted partial summary judgment for the Estate, ruling that CULI owed payment for the untimely-filed claims, provided it was not prejudiced by the late notice. After a trial, the jury found that CULI had violated the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA) but did not award damages and therefore did not consider whether CULI acted with malice. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the district court correctly applied the notice-prejudice rule; and (2) when an insurer is found to have violated the UTPA, a jury is not required to find compensatory damages beyond those for breach of the insurance contract before considering malice and punitive damages under the UTPA, and therefore, a new trial must be held on the issue of malice and punitive damages. View "Estate of Gleason v. Cent. United Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law