Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Dennis Deschamps purchased a mobile home park from the estate of Larry Rasmussen. Deschamps financed part of the purchase price through the estate in the form of an indenture note. In the previous case, Deschamps sued the estate, and a jury found the estate was not liable for negligent non-disclosure. In 2007 the estate began the proceedings for a nonjudicial foreclosure on the park after Deschamps stopped making payments on the note. In the instant case, Deschamps again sued the estate, seeking a temporary injunction barring the estate's sale of the property. The district court granted the estate's motion for summary judgment. Deschamps appealed, arguing (1) that the estate is barred from conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure on the property because the nonjudicial foreclosure must have been pleaded as a compulsory counterclaim in the first case; and (2) Deschamps was entitled to raise the affirmative defense of fraud to defeat the estate's nonjudicial foreclosure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in ruling that the estate was not required to assert nonjudicial foreclosure as a mandatory counterclaim in the first action; and (2) as a plaintiff, Deschamps cannot assert affirmative defenses.

Gregory Schindler purchased insurance from USAA for a house he owned. The house was destroyed by fire a year and a half later. USAA denied coverage on the basis that Schindler had committed fraud during his application conversation. Specifically, USAA determined that Greg had misrepresented that the house was his primary residence and a single family dwelling when instead it was a rental divided into eight apartment units. Schindler and his wife filed suit against USAA asserting breach of insurance contract and implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing. USAA defended on the basis of fraud. The jury found for USAA and awarded USAA the monies it had advanced to the Schindlers. The Schindlers appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying the Schindlers' motion for summary judgment; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing testimony from a USAA employee; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Schindlers' motion in limine to preclude USAA from introducing evidence of fraud; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in requiring the Schindlers to order and pay for additional transcripts.

A jury in the district court concluded that plaintiff did not breach its homeowners insurance policy with defendants and that one defendant had committed fraud when applying for the policy. Defendants appealed a district court order denying their motion for summary judgment and motions in limine and granting plaintiff's motion that defendants order and pay for additional transcripts on appeal. The court held that defendants were not entitled to estopp plaintiff from defending itself because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the one defendant applied for the policy in good faith. The court held that the district court appropriately permitted plaintiff's customer service representative to testify as to her recollection of the defendant's statements. The court further held that the district court acted within its discretion in permitting plaintiff to defend itself via section 33-15-403, MCA, by allowing the customer service representative to testify about the defendant's alleged fraudulent statements. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants' motion in limine. The court finally held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering additional transcripts under Montana Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(3)(b).

Appellant appealed from an order of the district court dismissing its complaint for condemnation and entering judgment in favor of appellee. At issue was whether the district court erred in issuing an order concluding that appellant did not possess the power of eminent domain, either express or implied, and it had no authority to take the private property of a nonconsenting landowner. The court concluded that HB 198 provided appellant authority to pursue eminent domain proceedings and that HB 198 explicitly codified eminent domain authority into the Major Facility Siting Act ("Act"), Title 75, chapter 20. The court held that HB 198 retroactively applied to appellant's certificate issued pursuant to the Act and the explicit language of HB 198 was in conflict with the district court's order. Accordingly, the court reversed the order dismissing appellant's complaint and remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant appealed a district court order denying his motion for summary judgment, granting summary judgment in favor of appellees, as personal representative of the Estate of Larry Rasmussen ("Estate"), and awarding the Estate attorney fees. At issue was whether the district court erred in concluding that the Estate's nonjudicial foreclosure was not a compulsory counterclaim to an earlier action between the parties and whether the district court erred in concluding that appellant could not revive fraud-related claims as an affirmative defense. The court held that the district court did not err in ruling that the Estate was not required to assert nonjudicial foreclosure where the Estate commenced a foreclosure by advertisement and sale, which was a nonjudicial remedy it was statutorily entitled to invoke and the rules governing judicial claims and defenses did not apply to nonjudicial proceedings. The court also held that the district court did not err in concluding that appellant's fraud claims were barred where he was the plaintiff in the case and could not assert affirmative defenses nor could he compel the Estate to commence a judicial action so that he could raise an affirmative defense. The court further held that the Estate was entitled to recover attorney fees in the instant case in connection with its defense of appellant's claims in the district court and on appeal.

Plaintiff sued defendant and others claiming, among other things, that defendant breached a written and oral contract and created a public and private nuisance when plaintiff tried unsuccessfully for several years to get defendant to clean up the portion of his property that was visible from plaintiff's property. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding certain exhibits and testimony; in refusing to give plaintiff's proposed jury instructions on breach of contract and negligence theories; by limiting plaintiff's counsel's closing argument with threats of mistrial; and in awarding defendant his costs. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit certain evidence and exhibits during the testimony of the Department of Environmental Quality's section chief, who summarized the legal obligations imposed under the applicable statutes, where the district court sustained the objections and noted that it was the "the province of the court to instruct this jury what the law is and what the definitional aspects of the law require." The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on contract law where no oral or written contract was created; the district court's jury instruction on promissory estoppel potentially benefited, rather than harmed, plaintiff; plaintiff's argument vis-a-vis negligence jury instructions was without merit; the district court refused to instruct the jury on negligence per se upon the conclusion that there was no private right of action under the applicable statutes; and in refusing plaintiff's original proposed instructions on negligence per se. The court declined to address the issue of counsel's closing arguments with threats of mistrial. The court further held that defendant waived his right to recover costs and the district court abused its discretion in awarding them.

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging contract and negligence claims against defendants. Defendants subsequently appealed from a district court order denying its motion under M.R.Civ.P 55(c) to set aside an entry of default and its motion under M.R.Civ.P 60(b) for relief from default judgment. Plaintiff cross-appealed the court's denial of attorney fees. The court held that good cause did not exist to set aside the entry of default where defendants willfully disregarded the judicial process when it failed to answer after being served properly and where defendants had not established that it possessed a meritorious defense that would have completely eliminated its liability. The court also held that no default judgment existed when defendants moved for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) where an interlocutory judgment did not constitute a final judgment order under the rule. The court declined to address the issue raised for the first time on appeal regarding default judgment against defendants. The court further held that the district court correctly denied plaintiff's request for attorney fees where the complaint raised no allegations related to a default on defendants' loan and the trust indenture provision did not entitle either party to attorney fees under these circumstances.

Appellants appealed the order of the district court denying their motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the estate of their father, the decedent. At issue was whether the district court erred when it assumed subject matter jurisdiction over the probate of the estate when the decedent was an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Tribe and all of his estate property was located within the exterior boundaries of the Blackfeet Reservation at the time of his death. The court overruled State ex rel. Iron Bear v. District Court and held that the Blackfeet Tribal Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the probate of the decedent's estate and assumption of subject matter jurisdiction by the district court was impermissible because Montana and the Blackfeet Tribe had not taken the necessary steps for Montana to assume civil jurisdiction over the Blackfeet Reservation.

Plaintiffs sued defendants seeking recognition and enforcement of their easement over Prairie Drive in Park County, Montana, near the City of Livingston. The parties raised several issues regarding the district court's findings of facts, conclusions of law, and order dated August 4, 2010. The court held that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the relief ordered by the district court, if properly implemented, would not allow them to use their easement essentially as they did and therefore, the district court both recognized and upheld plaintiffs' easement rights and ordered relief specifically designed to address their complaints. The court held that plaintiffs were entitled to attorney fees and costs where there was no factual support for defendants' argument that they were actually the prevailing party and plaintiffs prevailed on all substantive issues. The court held that the Prairie Drive Subdivision Homeowner's Association ("HOA") had standing to participate in the case where the HOA cured a defect with the Secretary of State when it had been involuntarily dissolved for failure to file its annual report. The court held that there was no evidence that plaintiffs' property right in the easement had been taken or extinguished and the district court correctly concluded that plaintiffs' private easements existed independently of any public right to use the right of way. The court held that there was no merit in the argument that plaintiffs' settlement with the City of Livingston absolved defendants of any liability. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court except as to the matter of plaintiffs' entitlement to attorney fees and costs and that matter was remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioner filed a petition for dissolution in district court and the only contested issue between the parties was the valuation and division of the marital home and surrounding acreage, which was purchased for $45,000 in the mid-1990's. Petitioner had obtained a letter from a realtor stating that the marital home could be worth approximately $250,000-275,000 if the home was in good condition. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied petitioner's M.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) motion, which was filed after the district court found the marital home was valued at $22,423, where petitioner alleged that her attorney grossly neglected her case when she failed to identify the realtor as an expert, or any other qualified real estate expert, and failed to prepare any evidence for trial to reflect petitioner's estimated value of the marital home. The court held that under the unique circumstances, where the district court had a statutory obligation to equitably apportion the marital estate and petitioner's counsel totally failed to present evidence on the issue, the district court abused its discretion in denying her Rule 60(b)(6) motion and should have granted the motion, thereby allowing her to present evidence regarding the value of the marital home so that the district court could make an equitable distribution. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.