Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Lang and Sons owned and operated a cattle ranch. Plaintiff Burlington Resources Oil and Gas Company leased the rights to oil and gas beneath Lang's surface estate. Burlington reinstated use of an abandoned well on Lang's property for the disposal of wastewater, which Lang objected to. Burlington filed a complaint with the district court to compel access to Lang's property, and Lang counterclaimed that it had a right to compensation for the use of the pore space beneath the abandoned well. The district court determined that Burlington had no obligation to compensate Lang separately for injecting wastewater into the pore space and that Lang had failed to prove entitlement to damages under the Surface Owner Damage and Disruption Compensation Act (SODDCA). On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that Lang failed to establish that it was due separate compensation under SODDCA and the facts of this case, and (2) the district court correctly refused to defer to witnesses employed by the Montana Board of Oil and Gas Conservation in interpreting the SODDCA.

The Larsens, plaintiffs, commenced an action seeking to quiet title to a 26.96-acre parcel of land. The Richardsons, defendants, counterclaimed that they held an easement by prescription over a portion of that land. Subsequently, the Richardsons amended their counterclaim to allege they owned the northernmost 9.74 acres of the parcel outright, retaining their easement theory as an alternative ground for relief. The district court (1) ruled that the Larsens owned the entire 26.96 acres and that the Richardsons did not hold a prescriptive easement, and (2) awarded some of the Larsens' requested costs and denied their request for attorney's fees in its entirety. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not err in determining that the Larsens owned the disputed 9.74 acres; (2) the district court did not err in determining that the Richardsons did not hold a prescriptive easement; (3) the district court did not err in denying the Larsens' request for attorney's fees; and (4) the district court erred in denying the Larsens' request for costs for the reasonable expenses incurred in preparing additional maps and surveys for purposes of trial. Remanded.

Joseph Graziano, an owner of property in the Stock Farm subdivision and a member of the Stock Farm Homeowners Association, filed a complaint against the Association and Stock Farm LLC (SFLLC), asserting several claims, including negligence, breach of fiduciary duties, defamation, and constructive fraud. The Association and SFLLC moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration pursuant to a provision of Stock Farm's Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CCRs). The district court granted the motion, finding the CCRs were an enforceable agreement to arbitrate all the claims in Graziano's complaint. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not err in finding the CCRs were not a contract of adhesion and were within Graziano's reasonable expectations, and thus were enforceable; (2) the district court erred in finding Graziano's claim of breach of fiduciary duty was not a personal injury claim exempt from arbitration under Mont. Code Ann. 27-5-114(2)(a); and (3) all of Graziano's remaining claims were subject to the valid and enforceable arbitration provision and must be arbitrated pursuant to the CCRs. Remanded.

Appellants filed suit against Appellees under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (UDJA), alleging that they possessed a prescriptive easement over a roadway on Appellees' property. The district court concluded that Appellants had failed to establish the elements for a prescriptive easement and awarded attorney fees to Appellees. Appellants appealed, contending that the district court abused its discretion in granting attorney fees because nothing in the UDJA allowed an award of attorney fees solely on the basis that one party prevails over the other, or that one party had to defend property rights. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's award of attorney fees to Appellees, holding that Appellees failed to establish the threshold determination that equitable considerations supported the award.

Gregory Ternes purchased a residential property from Keith and Sue Eberhard. The Eberhards were insured by State Farm when the house received water damage. Sue reported the damage, and State Form listed the claim on a website report. The Ternes purchased the home without being aware of the website report. The Ternes later attempted to sell the property to the Giardinos, who backed out of the deal. Afterwards, Ternes learned of the website report. Ternes filed a complaint with the state commissioner of insurance, alleging that State Farm put false information on the website, causing the sale of the residence to the Giardinos to fall through. The commissioner advised Ternes that State Farm had not submitted a false report as per State Farm's understanding at the time of the loss. Ternes then filed an action in the district court against State Farm and the Eberhards. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for State Farm and the Eberhards because there were no genuine issues of material fact and both defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Russell and Melissa Levens and Al Ballard, neighboring property owners, entered into an agreement defining the location of the boundaries of their properties. The agreement provided that Ballard would not excavate on his property within thirty feet of the Levens' property. After Ballard occupied the area between the two properties and refused to sign a certificate of survey pursuant to the agreement, Levens brought an action against Ballard to enforce the agreement and for an injunction. The district court enjoined Ballard from excavating on the disputed property and later granted Levens' motion for summary judgment. Levens later filed a motion for contempt against Ballard for failure to abide by the judgment. The district court denied the motion and entered an order awarding attorney fees to Ballard. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the orders, holding that the judgment must be construed to prevent Ballard from excavating in such a way that the pit intrudes into the thirty-foot buffer strip at the edge of Levens' property.

After a petition seeking to transfer territory from Dutton/Brady K-12 School District to Conrad High School and Elementary Districts was refused by the county superintendent of schools, the petition was referred to a three-member panel of county superintendents. The panel denied the petition, and the district court affirmed. Conrad Schools appealed, arguing that the district court erred in concluding the panel of superintendents abused its discretion in denying the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record demonstrated that the panel carefully evaluated the effects of the proposed transfer and made its decision based upon the best and collective interests of all students involved.

Appellees John and Janet Ethen sought declaratory relief in district court to resolve a boundary dispute with neighbors River Resource Outfitters and Christine Fischer. The district court declared that the common boundary line between the parties' properties runs in a meander line along the west bank of Flint Creek and declined to award the Ethens' request for attorney fees. The neighbors appealed and the Ethens cross-appealed on the issue of attorneys fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not improperly rely upon extrinsic evidence to determine legal title to the disputed property; (2) the district court correctly determined that the boundary line between the parties' properties meanders along Flint Creek; (3) the Ethens filed a timely claim for declaratory relief; (4) the district court correctly determined that it could grant meaningful relief without joining other landowners along Flint Creek; (5) the district court correctly determined that the neighbors did not gain title to the disputed property through adverse possession; and (6) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to award attorneys fees to the Ethens.

Gary Hoff filed a complaint alleging contract and negligence claims against Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. and Lake County Abstract & Title Company. Countrywide failed to appear or answer within the 20 days permitted by Mont. R. Civ. P. 12(a), after which Hoff moved for entry of default against Countrywide. Countrywide later attempted to reverse the default proceedings with a motion to set aside the default pursuant to Mont. R. Civ. P. 55(c) and then a Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to set aside the entry of default for mistake or excusable neglect. The court denied the motions and entered a default judgment against Countrywide. Countrywide appealed and Hoff cross-appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in its judgment against Countrywide because pursuant to Cribb v. Matlock Commc'n, Inc., good cause did not exist to set aside the entry of default, and (2) the district court did not err as Countrywide's 60(b) motion was procedurally defective. Lastly, the Court concluded the district court correctly denied Hoff's request for attorneys fees because the contract did not entitle either party to attorneys fees under the circumstances.

Michael Clark owns property on which he stores unused, abandoned, or broken vehicles. Joseph Doyle owns surrounding properties. After attempting for several years to get Clark to clean up the portion of Clark's property that was visible from Doyle's property, Doyle sued Clark and others, claiming that Clark breached a written and oral contract and created a public and private nuisance. A jury ruled in favor of Clark and the other defendants. Following the trial, the district court awarded costs to the defendants. Doyle appealed. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion (1) in excluding certain exhibits and testimony, (2) in refusing to give Doye's jury instructions on breach of contract and negligence theories, and (3) by limiting Doyle's counsel's closing argument with threats of a mistrial. The Court, however, found the court abused its discretion by awarding Clark his costs. The Court affirmed the judgment of the district court but with instructions to vacate the award of costs to Clark.