Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Yellowstone River, LLC (YR) commenced an action against Meriwether Land Fund and Meriwether Land Company (collectively, Meriwether), seeking a determination that it had an easement to access its property over Meriwether's adjacent property. Through summary judgment proceedings, the issue was narrowed to the sole question of whether YR had an easement by necessity. The district court ruled that an easement by necessity did not exist over Meriwether's property for the benefit of YR's property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in concluding that unity of title did not exist in this case, but (2) the court nevertheless reached the correct result because the easement failed for several reasons related to the history of ownership of the land and the fact that granting an easement would be against public policy.

Gary Myers owned landlocked property across property owned by Stephen and Victora Dee. Myers' property contained several dilapidated buildings that had not been inhabited for several decades. Myers filed an action against the Dees, asking the district court to grant him access to his property across the Dees' property based on the right of eminent domain. Myers based his claim on Mont. Code Ann. 70-30-102(36), which states that eminent domain may be exercised to create a private road leading from a highway to a residence or farm. The district court granted the Dees' motion for summary judgment on the basis that the buildings on Myers' property did not qualify as a residence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the term "residence" in the statute refers to a habitable structure or dwelling place, i.e., a place where people are living; (2) in this case it was undisputed that the buildings on Myers' property were uninhabitable and that no one had lived in them for several decades; and (3) therefore, because there was no residence on Myers' property, access could not be granted across the Dees' property based on the eminent domain statute.

Sellers entered an alleged contract with Buyer for the sale of property. After the parties failed to complete the sale, Buyer sued Sellers, seeking specific performance of the alleged contract. Buyer filed an amended complaint that added as a defendant Attorney, who had served as counsel for Sellers in the failed transaction, alleging fraud and other tortious conduct. Attorney filed a motion to substitute the district court judge, which the district court denied after finding Attorney's motion was untimely. At issue on appeal was whether Attorney qualified as a third-party defendant who possessed an independent right of substitution as opposed to a subsequently joined defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Attorney and Buyer qualified as adverse parties, and therefore, Attorney was a third-party defendant; and (2) Attorney timely filed his motion of substitution. Remanded.

Rohnn Lampi's neighbor admitted liability for negligently dumping ashes that caused a wildfire that burned the trees and vegetation on Lampi's property. After the parties failed to agree on a settlement amount, Lampi brought an action in district court against his neighbor and sought a jury trial to determine damages. The jury awarded Lampi $250,000. On appeal, Lampi contended that the district court wrongly denied his motions to establish restoration damages as the appropriate measure of damages in his case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by not concluding that restoration damages constituted the appropriate measure of damages in this case. Remanded for a new trial to allow the jury to determine what reasonable amount of damages would restore Lampi's property to its pre-fire condition.

Plaintiff Carter Boehm, Trustee, sued Defendants Cokedale, L.L.C. and Allen Carter for property damages when, during construction of a road to reach Defendants' land, rocks of various sizes rolled downhill onto Plaintiff's property. Plaintiff subsequently added claims for assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that Boehm was not the trustee of any trust validly established under Montana law, and therefore Boehm was perpetuating the lawsuit on behalf of a non-existent trust. The district court also awarded Defendants attorneys' fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court properly granted summary judgment to Defendants pursuant to Mont. R. Civ. P. 17(a), which requires that every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees to Defendants. The award of fees was reversed.

Plaintiffs, ranches and their owners, owned an irrigation ditch on which they relied to irrigate hay fields for their cattle operation. The ditch ran through Nataliya Joukova's property. The dispute between the parties arose when Joukova placed a culvert in the ditch bottom and built a bridge of rock and gravel across a portion of the ditch for which Plaintiffs had secondary easement rights for ditch maintenance. The district court concluded that the culvert and bridge could remain in place as they did not unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' secondary easement rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in allowing Joukova's culvert and rock bridge to remain in the irrigation ditch as (1) Joukova's construction of a structure permanently blocking use of a portion of Plaintiffs' secondary easement inarguably encroached on the easement, and (2) the law governing easements makes clear that construction of the culvert constituted an unreasonably interference with Plaintiffs' easement rights, for which the statute required Joukova to obtain written permission.

After Homeowners' house burned down, Homeowners' insurer denied coverage, stating that payment was not timely delivered, the money order was not signed, and the damaged house was the secondary house and Insurer's underwriting policies required insurance on the primary house also to be purchased through Insurer in order to have coverage in place for the secondary residence. Homeowners filed suit, asserting that no reasonable basis in fact or law existed for denial of the claim and seeking damages and a declaratory judgment that the loss was covered. The district court granted Insurer's motion for summary judgment and denied Homeowners' motion for partial summary judgment with respect to their declaratory judgment action. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Insurer as genuine issues of material fact remained, and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Homeowners' motion for partial summary judgment.

Appellees Dana Headapohl and Lawrence Martin placed two buildings in the floodplain without a permit and installed an un-permitted incinerating toilet. The health department issued a notice of violation (NOV) to Appellees, informing them that the two structures constituted "increased use" of the septic system in violation of the health code and requiring Appellees to remove the buildings and incinerating toilet. The health board affirmed the Department's NOV following a hearing. The district court concluded that Appellees had not violated the health code by adding the two buildings, that the contested provisions of the health code suffered unconstitutional vagueness as applied to Appellees, and that the incinerating toilet did not qualify as a wastewater treatment and disposal system under the health code. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court relied on an incomplete interpretation of "increased use" to determine whether the addition of the two buildings constituted increased use of the septic system that violated the health code, and (2) Appellees' incinerating toilet required a permit under the health code as a wastewater treatment and disposal system. Remanded to determine whether Appellees' changes of use could result in increased effluent flow to the septic system.

Appellant, Summer Night Oil Company, and Appellees, individuals and oil companies, resolved a dispute over the operation of two oil wells through a settlement agreement. Appellant filed a motion to compel performance of the agreement after the parties failed to perform timely their obligations under the agreement. Specifically, Appellant asked the district court to compel Appellees to deliver all title clearance documents under the agreement. Appellees responded with a request to compel Appellant to pay a fine due to the EPA and a payment owed to Appellees under the agreement. Both parties sought attorney fees. The district court enforced what it determined to be the plain meaning of the agreement's terms, and (1) ordered Appellant to pay the fine owed to the EPA, (2) ordered Appellant to pay Appellee the amount owed it under the agreement, (3) ordered Appellees to deliver all title clearance documents to an escrow agent, and (4) declined to award attorney fees to either party. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly denied Appellant's motion to compel performance of the agreement according to Appellant's terms, and (2) the district court correctly denied Appellant's motion to alter or amend its judgment.

Victor Tacke failed to pay real property taxes on his property in Lake County from 2005 to 2008. In 2006, the County conducted a tax sale for the year 2005, at which the County purchased the tax lien. In 2009, the County assigned its interest in the tax lien to Montana Lakeshore Properties (Lakeshore) in exchange for payment of the past due taxes and issued a tax sale certificate to Lakeshore. The County subsequently issued a tax deed to Lakeshore. In 2010, Tacke filed an action to quiet title in the property, seeking a judicial declaration that the tax deed was void. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Lakeshore. At issue on appeal was whether Lakeshore violated Mont. Code Ann. 15-17-212(3) by paying the back taxes two hours and forty-five minutes short of two weeks after giving notice to Tacke. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by granting summary judgment upholding the tax deed obtained by Lakeshore because this case fit within the general principle that "the law regards the day as an indivisible unit" and discards fractional days in most time computations.