Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff commenced an action in the district court seeking a preliminary injunction preventing Defendants, their neighbors, from crossing Plaintiff's land, or in the alternative, a declaratory judgment stating that Defendants did not have a prescriptive easement. The district court granted a prescriptive easement in Defendants' favor but limited the width of the easement to twenty feet. Defendants appealed. Plaintiff cross-appealed, arguing that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact existed concerning whether Defendants' use was permissive, whether the prescriptive easement included residential and recreational uses, and the width of the prescriptive easement. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the existence of a prescriptive easement; (2) reversed and remanded the portion of the district court's judgment concluding that the prescriptive easement included residential and recreational uses; and (3) reversed and remanded the district court's decision to limit the width of the prescriptive easement to twenty feet for the purpose of trailing cattle. View "Brown & Brown of MT, Inc. v. Raty" on Justia Law

This appeal pertained to the location of a partially-constructed horse barn in a planned unit development (PUD). Plaintiffs were the owner of the barn, the owner's contractor, and FPR Properties. After it was notified that the barn did not comply with the regulations and covenants and must be removed, FPR submitted an application to modify the conditional use permit of the PUD development to bring the location of the barn into compliance. The planning and zoning commission affirmed the code compliance specialist's determination that the barn violated zoning regulations and applicable covenants. The commission also denied FPR's request to modify the conditional use permit for the PUD. On appeal, the district affirmed the commission's rulings and dismissed FDR's takings claim without conducting a trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) affirming the commission's determination that the partially-constructed barn violated applicable zoning regulations and covenants and must be removed; (2) affirming the commission's denial of FPR's application to modify the PUD's conditional use permit; and (3) dismissing FPR's constitutional takings claim. View "Botz v. Bridger Canyon Planning & Zoning Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants asserting that a tree on Defendants' property was a nuisance and trespass because it blocked Plaintiff's view. The district court dismissed the complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the district court properly granted Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's nuisance claim, as the naturally growing tree that obstructed Plaintiff's view did not constitute, as a matter of law, conduct that was "intentional, negligent, reckless, or ultrahazardous," "an inherently injurious act," or a condition which "obviously exposes another to probable injury;" but (2) the complaint adequately stated a legal claim for trespass because it alleged that the roots of Defendants' tree entered, remained on, and damaged Plaintiff's property. View "Martin v. Artis " on Justia Law

Plaintiff submitted an application for a 119-lot subdivision, which the Board of Missoula County Commissioners denied. Plaintiff petitioned for judicial review of the Board's action and alternatively claimed that the Board's actions constituted a regulatory taking that entitled him to just compensation. The district court granted summary judgment to the County on all of Richard's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by not allowing Plaintiff to conduct further discovery before ruling on the summary judgment motion; (2) the district court properly granted summary judgment to the County on the Board's decision to deny the subdivision; and (3) the County was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's regulatory taking claim. View "Richards v. County of Missoula" on Justia Law

In this real property dispute about asserted easement rights, the district court ruled in favor of Defendant and in favor of Plaintiff on others. The court concluded neither party had "prevailed" as required by Mont. Code Ann. 70-17-112(5) and declined to award attorney fees and costs. Plaintiff appealed the district court's rulings in favor of Defendant but did not appeal the court's ruling pertaining to attorney fees. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling in favor of Defendant. On remand, the district court denied Plaintiff's request for attorney fees and costs, holding (1) Plaintiff should have appealed the issue of attorney fees on the first appeal, and (2) Plaintiff had not prevailed on all issues raised under section 70-17-112, and therefore was not entitled to fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff did not prevail on all claims, it was not entitled to fees and costs under section 70-17-112. View "Musselshell Ranch Co. v. Joukova" on Justia Law

James Turner and Julie Viers opened a line of credit with Wells Fargo Bank and granted Wells Fargo a deed of trust on property they owned as security for the line of credit. Later, John Turner, Christina Turner, and Sandy Couch (the John Turners) purchased the property. Julie and James paid off the entire outstanding balance under the credit line agreement using the proceeds from the sale of the property to the John Turners, but Julie subsequently borrowed $169,090 under the credit line agreement secured by the property. Thereafter, Wells Fargo refused to release the deed of trust. The John Turners then filed a complaint to quiet title to the property. The district court granted Wells Fargo's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the John Turners could not enforce the terms of the credit line agreement because they were not intended beneficiaries of the agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded (1) the John Turners were not entitled to judgment requiring Wells Fargo to release the deed of trust the bank held on the property; and (2) the John Turners failed to establish prima facie claims of promissory or equitable estoppel. View "Turner v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Appellants Montana Department of Natural Resources and Montana Board of Land Commissioners (collectively, “the State”) appealed several portions of a district court's summary judgment order in the State’s quiet title action. The issues raised on appeal were: (1) whether the District Court erred by declaring that islands arising vertically from the bed of the Missouri River after statehood were not held by the State in trust for the financial benefit of the public schools; (2) whether the District Court erred by refusing to declare a surveyed boundary between the islands and adjacent private lands based on the State’s evidence; (3) whether the District Court erred in requiring the State to pay damages for taxes paid and improvements made on the land under the theory of unjust enrichment; and (4) whether the District Court erred by denying costs to the State. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the State was the owner of the disputed lands, and as the prevailing party, it was entitled to recover the costs of producing the survey of the boundary of the State-owned land at issue. "While the costs were substantial, the law affords the court no discretion." Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s denial of the State’s costs and remanded the case with instructions to determine and award the appropriate amount. View "Dept. of Nat. Resources v. ABBCO et al." on Justia Law

Faith Malpeli brought an inverse condemnation action against the Montana Department of Transportation (MDT), seeking compensation for the alleged taking of her property as a result of the reconstruction of Montana Highway 191 near Big Sky during a highway safety improvement project. A jury found that MDT had not taken a property right belonging to Malpeli, and therefore did not reach the question of compensation. Malpeli appealed, arguing that the District Court erred by: (1) denying Malpeli's motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial; (2) excluding Malpeli's appraiser from testifying; and (3) allowing MDT to disclose to the jury an offer of compromise it had made to Malpeli before this action was filed. MDT cross-appealed, arguing that the District Court erred by denying its motion for partial summary judgment before trial. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court determined that the motion for summary judgment should have been granted, and therefore affirmed the judgment in favor of MDT. View "Malpeli v. Montana" on Justia Law

Al Ballard and Ecosafe Gold Recovery, LLC (Ballard), appealed a district court's order entered following the Supreme Court’s remand in the first appeal of the case. The Supreme Court reversed the entry of judgment in favor of Ballard, and reversed the award of attorney fees to Ballard and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Upon remittitur, Russell and Melissa Levens moved for an order on remand that would provide various forms of relief, including attorney fees. When Ballard did not initially respond, the District Court entered an order requiring Ballard to immediately restore a 30-foot buffer zone by appropriate filling, compacting, and buttressing. The court ordered Ballard to commence work immediately and to complete the restoration within 30 days, and imposed a $100 per day penalty for every day beyond the 30-day deadline that the restoration was incomplete. The court required Ballard to mark the boundary of the buffer zone and to pay Levens' attorney fees and costs, and scheduled a hearing to determine the proper amount of fees. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err on remand of the case. "Ballard has no meritorious defense and the takings claim was raised for the first time on appeal." The District Court properly awarded attorney fees to Levens under the agreement. The Levens were likewise entitled to attorney fees on appeal. View "Ballard et al v. Levens" on Justia Law

This was a dispute over rights to use water from the Teton River in Montana. Giese, Kelly and Reichelt use water from the downstream portion of the Teton near Fort Benton, Montana. They claimed generally that they are damaged by diversion practices on the upstream portion of the Teton near Choteau, Montana, and that their "calls" on upstream appropriators to release water for their downstream use have been ignored. They first filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the District Court in February, 2011, and ultimately filed second and third amended petitions seeking to halt certain water diversions from the Teton. The issue underlying this case arose in part from the decision in "Perry v. Beattie." "Perry" decreed the priority date and flow rate of about 40 water right claims in the upper Teton River west of Choteau. The District Court appointed a Water Commissioner pursuant to 85-5-101, MCA, to administer the water rights decreed in "Perry." The majority of water users on the Teton (and their successors in interest, including downstream users Giese, Kelly and Reichelt) were not parties to the Perry case. Giese, Kelly and Reichelt claimed water rights from the Teton with priority dates that are senior to or contemporary with the upstream rights decreed in Perry. Water right claimants on the Teton were participating in the Water Court’s on-going adjudication of water rights under Title 85, Chapter 2 of the Montana Code. While that process was nearing its final stages, it was not yet complete and the Water Court did not issue a final decree. Giese, Kelly and Reichelt challenged the Water Commissioner’s practice of diverting the flow of the Teton down the Bateman Ditch. They contended that their water rights pre-date the rights of many upstream Perry decree rights and pre-date the Water Commissioner’s diversion of the Teton through the Bateman Ditch. They contended that since the Bateman Ditch was not used to divert the entire river at the time of the Perry decree, the Water Commissioner lacked the authority to make the diversion. The Supreme Court restated the issue on appeal as whether the District Court erred in dismissing Appellants’ request for certification to the Chief Water Judge pursuant to 85-2-406(2)(b), MCA. Upon review, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to certify all appropriate issues to the Chief Water Judge as provided in 85-2-406(2)(b), MCA, and to grant such injunctive or other relief that, in the District Court’s discretion, it determined to be necessary and appropriate. View "Giese v. Blixrud" on Justia Law