Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A trust (Trust) purchased lots in an RV park. The purchase agreement for the lots granted Trust an easement for access to a lake over and across lakefront property. At the time of the purchase, the lake property was encumbered by a deed of trust issued by Bank. After the owners of the lake property became delinquent on their loan obligations, Bank attempted to foreclose on the lake property by way of a trustee's sale, at which it purchased the property. Because Bank failed to provide Trust with notice of the sale, Bank subsequently noticed a second trustee's sale of the lake property, this time providing notice to Trust. Trust filed a complaint against Bank, claiming the Bank was precluded from holding the second sale and that it therefore could not extinguish its easement via the second sale. Bank subsequently purchased the property at the second trustees sale. The district court concluded (1) the first trustee's sale was invalid, but the second trustee's sale was valid; and (2) Trust's easement claims were therefore subordinate to Bank's interests in the lake property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that Bank effectively foreclosed on Trust's easement through the second trustee's sale. View "Terry L. Bell Generations Trust v. Flathead Bank of Bigfork" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased property from Defendants in 1993. The warranty deed for the property contained no express mention of water rights, ditch easements, or appurtenances. Plaintiff nevertheless believed that a water right came with the property and that a ditch easement existed to transport the water to his property. Defendants later purchased real property which historically contained a ditch. It was subsequently discovered the property did have a ditch that traversed from a creek, across Defendants' property, to a 20-acre "place of use" on the properly now owned by Plaintiff. Plaintiff subsequently attempted to reopen use of the ditch and filed an action against Defendants seeking a declaration that he had a ditch easement across Defendants' property. The district court ruled in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly determined that Plaintiff had no ditch easement across property owned by Defendants. View "Roland v. Davis" on Justia Law

After Maxine's family contributed financially to help her keep her house, Maxine transferred title of the property to the Maxine Lane Irrevocable Trust. The Trust Agreement provided that if the property was sold during Maxine's lifetime, $50,000 was to be paid to each of Maxine's brothers. Later, Maxine consented to the sale of the property, and the Trust received $176,469 in net proceeds. The Trustee indicated she was obligated to make $50,000 distributions to Maxine's brothers as stated in the Trust and then use the remaining proceeds for Maxine's support. Maxine filed a declaratory judgment action against the Trustee, asking the district court to determine whether the Trust required the sale proceeds to be used to purchase another residence for Maxine, or whether the Trust required the $50,000 distributions be made. The district court granted summary judgment to Linda, concluding that the Trust mandated the Trustee to make the distributions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded the Trust Agreement required the Trust to make the $50,000 distributions upon the sale of the property. View "Lane v. Caler" on Justia Law

To help finance her purchase of a condominium (condo) for $395,000, Mary McCulley sought a residential loan from Heritage Bank (Bank) for $300,000. American Land Title Company (ALTC) provided a commitment for title insurance. McCulley signed a promissory note and signed a deed of trust as collateral. Subsequently, ALTC changed the designated use of the condo in the deed from residential to commercial. After closing, McCulley discovered the Bank had issued her an eighteen-month, $300,000 commercial property loan rather than the thirty-year residential property loan for which she applied. When she was unable to obtain long-term refinancing on the property, McCulley signed a warranty deed transferring ownership of the condo to the Central Asia Institute and used the proceeds to pay off the loan. McCulley then sued ALTC and the Bank (collectively, Defendants) for, inter alia, negligence, breach of contract, slander of title, and fraud. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's order of summary judgment in favor of the Bank on the issue of fraud, as genuine issues of material fact existed relative to McCulley's claim of fraud on the part of the Bank; and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "McCulley v. Am. Land Title Co." on Justia Law

Appellant rented second-floor office space and owned one of the upper-floor residential units in the Baxter Hotel. In 2008, the Baxter Homeowners Association (BHA) restricted access to the hotel's elevator by only permitting unit owners and their tenants to access the elevator via swipe key cards. After Appellant filed a complaint with the Montana Human Rights Bureau (Bureau), the BHA board installed a time clock system that would keep the elevator unlocked during business hours and locked at night. Appellant subsequently moved his law office out of the building. Ultimately, a hearing officer with the Bureau concluded that BHA violated Mont. Code Ann. 49-2-304(1)(a) when it failed to provide a reasonable alteration to the elevator to permit disabled persons to have unfettered access to the second floor business offices in the hotel during business hours, awarded $6,000 in damages to Appellant, and denied both parties' requests for attorneys' fees. The Human Rights Commission affirmed. The district court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant did not possess proper standing to file a complaint of discrimination on behalf of his unidentified and potential clients. View "Baxter Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Angel" on Justia Law

Defendant purchased a vacation home in Ptarmigan Village in Montana. Defendant lived primarily in Arizona. Ptarmigan Owner's Association (Ptarmigan), which managed the units that comprised the Ptarmigan homeowner's association, filed a lien on Defendant's house when Defendant stopped paying fees and dues to Ptarmigan. After Ptarmigan filed a complaint to foreclose on its lien, it mailed the summons and complaint to an Arizona Postal Plus mailbox that Defendant had on file with Ptarmigan. The Arizona constable failed to locate Defendant through the mailbox and informed Ptarmigan that Defendant had not been served. Ptarmigan published the complain and summons, and after Defendant failed to appear in response to the summons, the district court granted default judgment in favor of Ptarmigan. Defendant filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, claiming that Ptarmigan never properly served him. The district court failed to set aside the default judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circumstances here authorized service by publication; and (2) Ptarmigan did not act in bad faith or deliberately conceal the lawsuit from Defendant. View "Ptarmigan Owner's Ass'n v. Alton" on Justia Law

This action arose from easement disputes at Big Sky Lake. Plaintiffs were homeowners who owned lakeshore lots. The access road was owned by the Homeowners Association and provided the access to each lakeshore lot. Later, the larger tracts of land outside the access road were divided between the Hollinger and Williams families. The Hollingers' land did not abut the lakeshore and did not abut the lakeshore lots. Plaintiffs claimed a right, based upon language in various documents that arose from the initial development of the lake, to an express easement allowing them the unrestricted use of four roads or trails on the Hollingers' lands for motorized access. After the Hollingers installed gates at several points to block motorized access to the disputed roads, Plaintiffs sued in district court. The district court granted summary judgment to the Hollingers, holding that none of the documents relied upon by Plaintiffs established an easement across the Hollingers' land. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly applied the facts and the law to conclude that Plaintiffs had not established any right to easements over the Hollingers' land. View "Thayer v. Hollinger" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were a group of landowners who owned properties abutting South Avenue in the City of Missoula. This lawsuit arose out of dispute between Plaintiffs and the City concerning the width of a public right-of-way constituting South Avenue. Following a bench trial, the district court determined that the right-of-way was sixty feet wide. Because the City's recent improvements to South Avenue extended beyond this sixty-foot parameter, the district court concluded that the City had effected a taking of property and awarded Plaintiffs compensation for the taking as well as their requested costs and attorney's fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court on all but two issues, holding that the district court (1) applied an incorrect measure of compensation; and (2) erroneously barred Plaintiffs' counsel from passing on to his clients the costs and fees incurred in proving underlying litigation expenses other than attorney's fees. Remanded. View "Wohl v. City of Missoula" on Justia Law

Appellant owned 5,400 contiguous acres of mostly undeveloped farmland in Chouteu County. Appellant filed a claim seeking declaratory relief regarding whether the entire length of a road that ran through Appellant's property, Lippard Road, constituted a public roadway. The district court determined that the entire length of Lippard Road constituted a public roadway. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly viewed the record as a whole, pursuant to the principles of Reid v. Park, to determine whether the County had established a public road; and (2) the district court properly determined that the entire length of Lippard Road constitutes a public roadway. View "Sayers v. Chouteau County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs acquired the assets of a restaurant. Defendant owned the real property on which the building was located. Plaintiffs and Defendant entered into an agreement granting Plaintiffs a ten-year lease of Defendant's real property. The lease granted Plaintiffs the option to purchase Defendant's real property in 1999 at the expiration of the lease. Plaintiffs claimed they provided written notice to Defendant of their interest in purchasing the property and that Defendant agreed to the appointment of an independent appraiser in 2000, but Defendant never followed through in procuring an appraisal. In 2009, Plaintiffs filed a complaint requesting a declaratory judgment and order requiring Defendant to select an independent appraiser and sell the property. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint on statute of limitations grounds and granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on her unlawful detainer counterclaim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a set of facts that would enable them to equitably estop Defendant from raising her statute of limitations defense; and (2) the district court did not improperly consider matters outside the pleadings in reaching its decision to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint. View "Situ v. Smole" on Justia Law