Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Tom Harpole, a former owner of real property in Powell County, sued First American Title Insurance Company and Powell County Title Company claiming they negligently misrepresented the status of the access road into his former property and thus foiled a potential sale of the property. The Third Judicial District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the title companies. Harpole appealed. Finding no error or abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Harpole v. Powell Co. Title" on Justia Law

The State appealed a jury verdict that awarded damages to L. Fred Weaver, Joan Weaver and Vicki Weaver. The Weavers had sued the State over negligent fire containment procedures on their real property. The State argued on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss the Weavers' negligence claim; (2) whether the trial court did not allow the State to assert a "public duty doctrine" defense; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing the jury to find the state negligent without expert testimony to establish the standard of care; and (4) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the State's motion to change venue. Finding no errors or abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Weaver v. DNRC" on Justia Law

Appellant Laura Lee Neva sued Appellee Jim Bates, arguing he violated Montana's Human Rights Act by halting necessary repairs to a commercial building she rented from him because she rebuffed his sexual advances. In her complaint to the Human Rights Commission, Appellant alleged violation of the Public Accommodations Provision but made no mention of the Real-Estate Transaction Provision. The Commission nevertheless found that Appellee violated the Real-Estate Transaction Provision by sexually harassing Appellant while she was leasing the space from him. The District Court reversed that decision, holding that the Commission’s action violated Appellee's right to due process. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the District Court erred in its conclusion that Appellee was not afforded due process when Appellant brought claims under section 49-2-304 of the Act, but that the Commission did not find he violated section 49-2-305. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court, finding that the essential difference between a 49-2-304 claim and a 49-2-305 claim was the setting of the discrimination: a place of public accommodation as opposed to a real-estate transaction. "The setting here was fully litigated, as was the discrimination- Bates' sexual harassment of Neva." The Court concluded Appellee understood the issues as was afforded full opportunity to justify his conduct. Therefore, his due process rights were not violated. View "Bates v. Neva" on Justia Law

Timothy Watts sold real property to the Marions, who financed the purchase with one loan from PrimeLending and a second loan from Watts. Watts signed a subordination agreement agreeing to subordinate his loan to the PrimeLending loan. The Marions subsequently signed a deed of trust to PrimeLending and a trust indenture in favor of Watts. The Marions defaulted on the loan originating with PrimeLending, which assigned its interest in the loan to HSBC Bank. After a trustee's sale, HSBC purchased the property. The Marions also defaulted on the loan from Watts. Claiming to be unaware of the previous HSBC trustee's sale, Watts held his own trustee sale and was purchaser of record. After discovering HSBC claimed ownership of the property, Watts filed a complaint against HSBC and other parties claiming an interest in the property, seeking to quiet title to the property. The district court granted Watts' motion for summary judgment against HSBC, finding that the Marion debt to PrimeLending was no longer in the first priority lien position because the debt had been assigned to HSBC. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that HSBC's deed of trust in the property was clearly entitled to priority over Watts' subordinated trust indenture. View "Watts v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A." on Justia Law

Carl and Karen were married in 1993. In 1995, Karen made Carl a co-owner of certain property. In 2007, the county clerk recorded a quit claim deed transferring Carl's interest in the property back to Karen. When the parties divorced in 2009, the district court concluded that Karen was the owner of the property and that the $100,000 increase in the property's value from 1993 to 2009 was due to market force and had nothing to do with any contributions made by Carl. In 2012, Carl filed a complaint alleging that Karen fraudulently forged Carl's signature on the deed to the property and that Alta, another defendant, notarized the forged signature. The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the two-year statute of limitations for fraud claims had run. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that Carl's fraud claim was barred by the statute of limitations; but (2) erred by awarding fees and costs to Defendants. View "Kananen v. South" on Justia Law

After Edwin and Linda divorced, Linda obtained a New Jersey judgment ordering Edwin to pay $695,477 in unpaid alimony, unpaid child support, medical expenses, and attorney fees and costs. Linda subsequently filed a motion seeking to satisfy the New Jersey judgment with Edwin's interest in a Nevada limited liability corporation (BMR) licensed to do business in Montana and with assets in Montana. A writ of execution was issued against Edwin, and thereafter, the district court issued a charging order and an order for the appointment of a receiver, for foreclosure of the lien, and for the sale of BMR's property. Edwin subsequently filed a motion for relief from the charging order and order for the appointment of the receiver foreclosure of the lien, which the district court denied after concluding that Edwin's arguments were waived because he had foregone earlier opportunities to challenge the two orders on the bases he asserted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly applied the law of the case doctrine to deny Edwin's motion; and (2) because Edwin's appeal was vexatious and filed for the purposes of delay, costs and fees assessed should be solely levied against Edwin. Remanded. View "Jonas v. Jonas" on Justia Law

Respondent purchased a 240-acre parcel of land in Gallatin County in 1980 that he rented out for grain and hay production. Respondent subdivided a thirty-acre parcel of the property in 1995. The subdivision was known as Bridger Lake Meadows (BLM). Respondent adopted covenants for BLM at the time he subdivided the property reflecting his intent that the lots be used for private residential purposes. However, Respondent sold no lots in BLM, which remained in hay and grain production. In 2009, the Department his Revenue (DOR) reclassified BLM from agricultural land to residential land. Respondent requested an informal review with DOR on the grounds that nothing had changed on the land or its usage. DOR denied the request due to the restrictions imposed by the covenants. The State Tax Appeal Board (STAB) determined that Respondent's property satisfied the statutory test for agricultural classification. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Respondent's continued use of the land for agricultural purposes belied any claim that the covenants "effectively prohibit" agriculture as contemplated by the amendment to Mont. Code Ann. 15-7-202(5). View "State Dep't of Revenue v. Heidecker" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between Johnny Hughes and his parents, Jack and Shirley Hughes, regarding borrowed money, the partition of jointly owned real property and accompanying water rights, and a contested pasture lease. The district court ruled in favor of Johnny on all of the issues except for the water rights. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the jury's determination that Johnny paid interest on a promissory note executed in favor of Jack and Shirley in 1989 restarted the statute of limitations on the note, and therefore, the matter was remanded to consider the amount of principal and interest Johnny owed on the note; (2) the partition agreement between the parties dissolved whatever right Jack and Shirley may have possessed in a life estate on a house on the land Johnny received pursuant to the agreement or to insurance proceeds Johnny received after the house was destroyed by fire; (3) Jack was entitled to an easement for stock water across Johnny's property; and (4) the arbitrator who arbitrated the pasture lease did not exceed his authority or miscalculate damages. View "Hughes v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Bruce Nelson subdivided property in the 1970s. Appellant claimed he purchased tract eighteen from Nelson ten days after Nelson filed the plat. Appellant claimed that at the time of the conveyance, Nelson guaranteed that it would not sell adjoining tracts sixteen and seventeen. Appellee filed a notarized declaration four years later. In 2005, however, Nelson sold tracts sixteen and seventeen. Appellee purchased tracts sixteen and seventeen in 2008. Appellee filed a quiet title action to clear her title of any cloud that may have arisen as a result of Appellant's declaration. The district court granted summary judgment for Appellee, concluding that Appellant's declaration did not create a restriction on development and that there was no restriction on the property prohibiting the sale of the disputed tracts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Appellee. View "Pennington v. Flaherty" on Justia Law

When Father and Mother divorced, the district court ordered Father to pay child support. After Father failed to make child support payments, the Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) of the Department of Public Health and Human Services (Department) placed a support lien on all of his property. After Father and Mother's divorce, Mother married Plaintiff. Plaintiff and Mother subsequently divorced pursuant to a final decree of dissolution in which Mother assigned to Plaintiff her interest in the child support lien. Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced a proceeding against Father seeking to foreclose on the CSED support lien. The district court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, ordering that Plaintiff could foreclose on the child support lien. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff was precluded from obtaining an enforceable interest in the support lien, as, under Montana law, the Department alone held the rights to and was authorized to foreclose on the child support lien. Remanded. View "LeCount v. Davis" on Justia Law