Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Borrowers obtained a home loan from Mann Mortgage and executed of deed of trust (DOT) naming the lender. Borrowers also signed a promissory note, which was endorsed to GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) was identified in the DOT as the beneficiary of the note. Borrowers later defaulted on the note. MERS then assigned its interest in the DOT to Greenpoint, and Greenpoint assigned the servicing rights to Countrywide Home Loans. Following a series of cancelled foreclosure sales, Borrowers filed a complaint against MERS, Greenpoint, and Countrywide (collectively, Lenders), alleging that they lacked the authority to foreclose. The district court granted summary judgment for Lenders. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Lenders because (1) MERS did not qualify as a beneficiary of the DOT under Montana's Small Tract Financing Act; and (2) MERS' agency relationship with the lender was not sufficiently established to warrant summary judgment. View "Pilgeram v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc." on Justia Law

After Susan Cavanaugh defaulted on her loan, which was secured by a deed of trust on the home she shared with her husband, the bank that was the beneficiary of the deed of trust made two forestalled attempts at a trustee's sale. The bank then elected to proceed by judicial foreclosure. The district court entered a judgment and decree of foreclosure, finding that the Cavanaughs were not entitled to a statutory right of redemption. The Supreme court affirmed, holding (1) the Cavanaughs were not entitled to a one-year right of redemption because their property was foreclosed by judicial procedure rather than by advertisement and sale; and (2) the Cavanaughs were not entitled to a right of redemption because their property was a multi-family residence, as the Cavanaughs' home was a single family residence at the time the deed of trust was executed. View "Cavanaugh v. Citimortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Burcalow Family, LLC purchased property that sat adjacent to The Corral Bar, Inc. property. Burcalow and The Corral signed a license agreement whereby The Corral agreed to pay Burcalow for the use of Burcalow's property for its drain field and well. After the license agreement expired, Burcalow filed suit against The Corral, alleging claims for trespass and a declaratory judgment. The Corral counterclaimed for, inter alia, prescriptive easement, detrimental reliance, and mistake. The district court (1) determined that The Corral possessed a prescriptive easement over and across Burcalow's property, and (2) rescinded the license agreement, ordering Burcalow to refund the fees The Corral had paid under the license agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) The Corral failed to demonstrate the elements required to establish a prescriptive easement; and (2) Burcalow's counsel did not make fraudulent representations entitling The Corral to rescind the parties' license agreement, and therefore, Burcalow did not have to return The Corral's payments made pursuant to the agreement. Remanded. View "Burcalow Family, LLC v. The Corral Bar, Inc." on Justia Law

James and Rachel Earl filed an action against Pavex Corporation seeking declarations concerning two overlapping easements that burdened the Earls' land for the benefit of Pavex's land. One of the easements was 100 feet in width and the other thirty feet in width. The Earls asserted (1) the 100-foot-wide easement was unenforceable because it did not appear in the chain of title to the Earls' property, and (2) in the alternative, even if the 100-foot-wide easement was valid, they were not required to remove structures and cropland that encroached upon both easements. The district court concluded (1) the 100-foot-wide easement did not burden the Earls' property, and (2) the Earls may be required to remove the structures and cropland from the easements - if the Supreme Court found the 100-foot-wide easement to be valid - to the extent necessary to effectuate the purposes of the easements. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's conclusion that Pavex's 100-foot-wide easement was extinguished by failure to properly record it; and (2) affirmed the district court's ruling that encroachments must be removed from the two easements to the extent they constituted unreasonable interference with Pavex's easement rights. Remanded. View "Earl v. Pavex" on Justia Law

In Brown I, the Supreme Court held that the district court properly found that Defendants had a prescriptive easement to cross Plaintiff's land that included residential and recreational uses but improperly limited the width of the easement to twenty feet for the purposes of trailing cattle. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court to clarify the scope of recreational and residential uses authorized by the easement and to modify its order regarding the easement's width. After the case was remanded, Plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court once more remanded the matter to the district court to modify its order to better define the character and frequency of the recreational and residential use, holding that the district court erred by failing to delineate the scope of Defendants' residential and recreational prescriptive easements across Plaintiff's real property. View "Brown & Brown of Mont., Inc. v. Raty" on Justia Law

Bank and Lumber Company had business and financial relationships with Sawmill. A few years into its operation, Sawmill began experiencing serious financial difficulties. Sawmill defaulted on approximately $1.4 million in loan obligations to Bank and owed Lumber Company approximately $900,000. Proceedings were initiated in bankruptcy court and district court. While the cases were pending, Sawmill was destroyed by fire. Bank recovered approximately $980,000 from Sawmill's insurance proceeds. In a subsequent case between Bank and Lumber Company, the jury determined that neither Bank nor Lumber Company was entitled to recover damages from the other. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit into evidence a particular letter written by the Bank president. View "H.E. Simpson Lumber Co. v. Three Rivers Bank of Mont." on Justia Law

Dean and Nancy Ziehl contended that they owned a prescriptive easement over a portion of dock located on the Swan River that extended onto Gayle Pederson's property. The Ziehls argued that the easement allowed them to maintain and use the entire dock. The district court concluded that the Ziehls did not hold a prescriptive easement and ordered that the intruding portion of dock be removed and costs be awarded to Pederson. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by determining that the Ziehls failed to use the dock adversely for the required statutory period in order to obtain the prescriptive easement. View "Pedersen v. Ziehl" on Justia Law

Carol Miller, the owner of two adjacent parcels of real property, conveyed one of the parcels to the Biggerstaffs in 2005. In the conveyance, Miller purported to reserve an easement over the Biggerstaffs' parcel for the benefit of her retained parcel. In 2006, Miller conveyed her retained pracel to Yorlum Properties. Later, a dispute arose among Yorlum, the Biggerstaffs, and Lincoln County concerning the validity of the reserved easement. In 2011, Yorlum filed the instant action seeking to quiet title to its property and access rights. The district court granted summary judgment to Yorlum. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the easement over the Biggerstaffs' parcel was valid; (2) The Biggerstaffs and Lincoln County failed to establish any basis that Miller lacked title to convey to Yorlum; and (3) Yorlum's complaint was not barred by equitable principles. View "Yorlum Props., Ltd. v. Lincoln County" on Justia Law

Terry Willis purchased a tract of property with funds that were apparently the proceeds from illegal drug sales. After Willis failed to make a payment, David Ferterrer contributed approximately half of the late payment. Willis was later sentenced to life imprisonment for drug-related crimes, which left him unable to pay for the property as the contract for deed contemplated. The parties agreed that Ferterrer would be responsible for completing the payments to purchase the property. Ferterrer also removed funds from Willis's checking account to prevent federal authorities from seizing those funds. Armed with a notarized agreement allegedly from Willis to sell the property to Ferterrer (the Deed), Ferterrer obtained a loan to purchase the property. Willis subsequently filed an action challenging Ferterrer's ownership of the property, also alleging that Ferterrer had converted the funds from Willis's bank account. The district court affirmed the validity of the Deed and concluded that Fertterer had not converted any funds belonging to Willis. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the district court's findings of fact; and (2) the district court properly determined that Willis failed to prove that Fertterer had converted funds from Willis's bank account. View "Willis v. Fertterer" on Justia Law

In 1997, Plaintiff purchased a historical building that was the largest apartment house between St. Paul and Spokane when it was built in 1916. In 2013, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against various defendants, including the Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO). ARCO purchased a copper mining company (ACM) in 1977, including all of ACM's liabilities. These liabilities included claims for property damage caused by mining-related surface subsidence. Plaintiffs alleged that mining-related subsidence had caused the current damage to the building. A jury found in favor of ARCO. Plaintiffs moved for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) correctly denied Plaintiffs' motion for judgment as a matter of law, as ARCO produced sufficient evidence to cast doubt in a juror's mind as to whether mining-related subsidence actually caused the damage alleged by Plaintiffs; and (2) correctly denied Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, as substantial credible evidence supported the jury's verdict. View "Barile v. Butte High Sch." on Justia Law