Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2012, following a tax sale, Zinvest, LLC purchased improved property in Ravalli County. Zinvest subsequently learned that Michael and Angela Hudgins, the record owners of the property, had not paid the delinquent taxes on the property. Zinvest therefore applied for and received a tax deed to the property. Zinvest then proceeded with a quiet title action. The Hudginses opposed the action, arguing that the tax lien was void. During the quiet title proceeding, Zinvest moved for summary judgment. The Hudginses responded that the sale of the property to Zinvest was void because the County Treasurer failed to comply with Mont. Code Ann. 15-17-123. The district court, sua sponte, converted the Hudginses’ response to a cross-motion for summary judgment. The court then granted the Hudginses’ cross-motion for summary judgment and denied Zinvest’s on the ground that the County Treasurer failed to file an affidavit of publication as required by section 15-17-123. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that because the notices were duly and properly published and the Hudginses were accorded full notice and due process of law in the proceedings, the failure to contemporaneously file the affidavit did not render the tax deed void. View "Zinvest v. Hudgins" on Justia Law

Hansard Mining, Inc. and Donald Hansard (the Hansards) sought resolution of a dispute with Barry McLean and the Estate of Glen Harold McLean (the McLeans) concerning overlapping property rights. The parties’ competing claims derived from conflicting patents issued by the United States. The district court granted judgment in favor of the Hansards, concluding that the Hansards’ mining patents had priority over the McLeans’ homestead patent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting the Hansards’ motion for summary judgment and in denying the McLeans’ cross-motion for summary judgment, as the Hansards owned the surface and the subsurface rights of their mining claims, and the conflicting portions of the McLeans’ patent were void. View "Hansard v. McLean" on Justia Law

In 2011, IndyMac Bank foreclosed on a certain property. JAS, Inc. purchased the property and subsequently initiated a quiet title action. Defendants Countrywide Home Loans and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) defaulted. Bank of America (BOA), which had acquired Countrywide in 2008, was not named as a party defendant and did not appear in the proceeding. Final judgment was issued quieting title to the property in JAS’s name. Countrywide and MERS subsequently moved to have the entries of default entered against them set aside, and BOA filed a motion to intervene in the proceeding and sought to have the default entered against Countrywide set aside. The district court granted the motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in granting BOA’s motions to intervene and to set aside the default judgment entered against Countywide, as BOA met the express requirements of Mont. R. Civ. P. 24(a), and Countrywide had no present interest in the subject property at the time suit was filed; and (2) did not manifestly abuse its discretion by granting MERS’s motion to set aside the default judgment entered against it, as MERS established good cause to set aside the default judgment. View "JAS, Inc. v. Eisele" on Justia Law

In 1972, Phyllis and Clarence Hudson granted an easement to Burlington Northern, Inc. Plaintiffs were the successors in interest to the Hudsons, and Defendant was a successor to Burglinton Northern. The easement was a road or driveway that ran from a public road to Plum Creek’s property, crossing Plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Plum Creek seeking to extinguish the scope of the easement, alleging, inter alia, extinguishment of the easement due to non-use and limitation on use of the easement. The district court granted summary judgment for Plum Creek. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in granting Plum creek’s motion for summary judgment, as an issue of material fact existed as to whether the easement had terminated; and (2) the district court erred in determining the scope of the easement. Remanded. View "Whary v. Plum Creek Timberlands, L.P." on Justia Law

In 1988, Faith Lutheran Church of Great Falls, Inc., which held certain property in its own name, affiliated with the Evangelical Lutheran Church of America (ELCA) denomination. In 2010, seventy-one percent of members voted to terminate Faith Lutheran’s affiliation with ELCA. Thereafter, the majority continued as Faith Lutheran, and approximately half of the minority formed the group that would become New Hope Lutheran Ministry. New Hope subsequently filed an action seeking a declaration that the minority was the rightful owner of all church property, including property held by the Foundation for the Endowment of Faith Lutheran Church, Inc. The district court determined that New Hope was entitled to all Faith Lutheran property and all property held by the Foundation. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that New Hope was entitled to property held by Faith Lutheran because the ninety percent super-majority necessary for Faith Lutheran to retain the property under its constitution was not obtained; but (2) erred in holding that New Hope was entitled to the Foundation’s property because New Hope failed to prove that an express trust existed over the Foundation’s property in favor of the church members. View "New Hope Lutheran Ministry v. Faith Lutheran Church of Great Falls, Inc." on Justia Law

Bilt Rite Construction and Landscaping, LLC (Bilt Rite) opened a credit account with Larson Lumber Company (Larson) in 2003. Bilt Rite did not make the required payments, and as of 2006, when Bilt Rite had ceased operations, it owed approximately $14,000. That same year, Bilt Rite transferred real property it had purchased to Anita Bartz, who had loaned Rankin or Bilt Rite $45,000. In 2007, Casey Rankin, a partner in Bilt Rite, signed a contract agreeing to pay Larson Bilt Rite’s debt. In 2009 and 2010, Larson Lumber Company (Larson) filed suit against Bilt Rite, Rankin, and Bartz, among others. The district court entered judgment in favor of Larson, holding (1) Rankin and Bilt Rite breached a written contract with Larson; and (2) the transfer of the real property from Bilt Rite to Bartz was fraudulent. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err by denying summary judgment to Defendants; (2) did not err by holding that Rankin and Bilt Rite were jointly and severally liable to Larson; (3) erred by holding that the Bartz loan was made to Rankin personally; and (4) erred by holding that the transfer of the real property to Bartz was a fraudulent transfer. View "Larson Lumber Co. v. Bilt Rite Constr. & Landscaping LLC" on Justia Law

To secure a loan, Plaintiff executed a promissory note naming ABN AMRO Mortgage Group (ABN) as the note holder. ABN later merged with CitiMortgage, Inc., which became the holder of Plaintiff’s note. CitiMortgage notified Plaintiff that her balloon payment was due and that she could either make the payment or exercise her “reset option.” Plaintiff did not notify CitiMortgage of her intent to exercise the reset option and did not make the payment. The property was foreclosed. CitiMortgage purchased the property and conveyed it to Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA). Plaintiff filed a complaint against FNMA and CitiMortgage (Defendants). Plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, asserting that no evidence of the transfer of the note from ABN to CitiMortgage had been produced during discovery. Defendants subsequently produced a copy of the certificate of merger between ABN and CitiMortgage. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the untimely disclosure was harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to impose sanctions against Defendants for discovery violations; and (2) the clause requiring Plaintiff to give written notice of her intent to exercise the reset option was not an unenforceable contract of adhesion or a violation of the Montana Consumer Protection Act. View "Doherty v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n" on Justia Law

Ruby Valley National Bank (RVNB) obtained and recorded a deed of trust (DOT) on certain real property subsequent to a previously recorded DOT. Wells Fargo Delaware Trust Co. (Wells Fargo) claimed to be the beneficiary of the first DOT. RVNB filed for judicial foreclosure of its interest in the property. The district court granted summary judgment for RVNB, holding that RVNB’s DOT was entitled to priority over the earlier DOT held by Wells Fargo because Wells Fargo had not proven the elements necessary for judicial foreclosure and was unable to do so because its trial witness and exhibit list had been stricken. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Wells Fargo was not required to file a counterclaim for foreclosure to protect its interest in the property; and (2) because the undisputed facts established that Wells Fargo was the current beneficiary of the first DOT, the undisputed facts established that Wells Fargo was entitled to judgment as a matter of law that its indenture held priority over RVNB’s indenture. View "Ruby Valley Nat'l Bank v. Wells Fargo Del. Trust Co., N.A." on Justia Law

Then-owners of real property entered into a “Waiver of Right to Protest” the creation of special improvement districts (SIDs) for the purpose of making road and intersection improvements to Cottonwood Road between Huffine Lane and West Babcock Street. The waiver stated that the parties to the waiver would participate in alternate financing methods for completion of the road improvements if the SIDs were not utilized. No SIDs were implemented, and Covenant Investments, Inc. (Covenant) undertook and paid for all improvements to the intersection of Huffine and Cottonwood. First Security Bank (FSB), a successor to the original covenantor, subsequently constructed a building at the intersection. After FSB refused to reimburse Covenant for the costs of the street improvements, Covenant sued FSB seeking enforcement of the waiver agreement. The district court dismissed Covenant’s complaint, concluding that the waiver did not contain the essential elements of a contract and therefore did not bind FSB. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, holding (1) the waiver’s alternative financing provision was void for lack of certainty, (2) by acting unilaterally Covenant waived its right to belatedly demand enforcement of the waiver provision, and (3) Covenant’s complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. View "Covenant Invs., Inc. v. First Sec. Bank" on Justia Law

Public Lands Access Association, Inc. (PLAA) sought a declaration that the public may use certain roads and bridges to access Ruby River. In 2008, the district court granted PLAA summary judgment on the issue of public access to the Ruby River from Lewis Lane. In 2012, the district court denied the public access to Ruby River at Seyler Lane and Seyler Bridge. PLAA appealed, and James Kennedy, who intervened as a defendant, cross-appealed. The Supreme Court consolidated the appeal and cross-appeal. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded, holding (1) the district court erred in deciding that the County had a secondary easement that was independent and separate from the public road right-of-way at the intersection of Seyler Lane and Ruby River; (2) in determining the width of the public right-of-way at the intersection of Seyler Lane and Ruby River, the trial court’s blanket exclusion of recreation use evidence was improper; (3) the scope of use of the public road right-of-way was not limited to the adverse usage; and (4) the district court did not effectuate an unconstitutional taking of Kennedy’s property when it ruled that the public may access Ruby River at Lewis Lane. View "Pub. Lands Access Ass'n, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Madison County" on Justia Law