Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

For tax year 2004, the State of Montana, Department of Revenue (DOR) centrally assessed property owned by Omimex Canada Ltd. and classified it under class nine. Omimex contested the assessment, claiming that it did not operate a “single and continuous property,” and therefore, its properties should be locally assessed and subject to the lower tax rate under class eight. The district judge entered an order in 2007 finding that Omimex’s properties operated as a single and continuous property. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Omimex’s property was not subject to classification under class nine, regardless of whether it was centrally assessed. For the tax year 2011, DOR again centrally assessed Omimex’s property and classified it under class nine. Ommimex filed a declaratory action arguing that it did not operate a single and continuous property. The district court granted partial summary judgment for DOR, concluding that the doctrine of issue preclusion barred Omimex from relitigating the issue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court erred when it concluded that the district court’s 2007 finding precluded Omimex from litigating the issue of whether it operated a single and continuous property because Omimex demonstrated the existence of genuine questions of material fact regarding whether the issue in the current litigation was identical to the issue in the 2007 litigation. View "Omimex Canada, Ltd. v. State Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Jeff Shannon’s use of an easement crossing the northwest corner of property owned by Walter and Nereida Woods. When Shannon informed the Woodses that he intended to construct a driveway on the easement, the Woodses petitioned for injunctive relief, claiming that the easement was created by necessity and should be extinguished because it was no longer necessary. The district court granted Shannon’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, finding that the easement was created by an express grant, the terms of which were clear and unambiguous. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the easement was an express grant, and the Woodses failed to allege any facts that would entitle them to relief. View "Woods v. Shannon" on Justia Law

This case concerned a wall that Defendants constructed near a border shared by property owned by Plaintiffs, owners of lots in a subdivision. Plaintiffs sued Defendants claiming that the wall was constructed in violation of the subdivision’s “Declaration of Restrictions” and constituted a nuisance and a spite fence. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants and awarded Defendants attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the wall constituted a spite fence or violated the Restrictions; (2) the district court's reasoning on the issue of whether the wall constituted a nuisance was based on an erroneous interpretation of the law; and (3) the district court, therefore, erred in awarding attorney fees to Defendants. View "Bennett v. Hill" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs - three generations of the Meine family - filed this action against Defendants - a small corporation operated by family members - seeking a determination that they held a prescriptive easement over a road where it crossed Defendants’ land and a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants from blocking or impeding the use of this easement. The district court concluded that Plaintiffs established a prescriptive easement over Defendants’ land and permanently enjoined Defendants from blocking or impairing the easement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly interpreted and applied the law when it found that a prescriptive easement may exist despite the dominant and servient estates being non-contiguous; (2) the evidence supported a finding that Defendants used their land for many lawful purposes; (3) the evidence supported the district court’s finding of a prescriptive easement; and (4) the district court did not err in determining the nature and the scope of the prescriptive easement. View "Meine v. Hren Ranches, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2006, Robert and Teresa James brought a lot in a rural subdivision. At the time of the purchase, Chicago Title Insurance Company issued a title insurance policy that insured against loss or damage by reason of “lack of right of access to and from the land.” In 2013, the Jameses sued Chicago Title, contending that the title insurance policy required Chicago Title to provide them “legal” access to their lot. The district court granted summary judgment to Chicago Title, concluding that the Jameses failed to establish that the title insurance policy entitled them to “legal access” to their lot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly granted judgment to Chicago Title on the Jameses’ claim, under the title insurance policy, that they lacked a right of access to their real property, as the language of the policy insured against loss from not having “a right” of access, and the Jameses clearly had a right of access when they bought the lot. View "James v. Chicago Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Section 11-41-2 of the Helena City Code (the Ordinance) places limitations on roofing materials used on structures located within the wildland-urban interface (WUI) district. The City filed suit against homeowners whose property was situated within the WUI zoning district (Homeowners), alleging violation of the Ordinance. Homeowners answered the complaint and petitioned for a declaratory judgment that the Ordinance was invalid on statutory and constitutional grounds. The district court granted summary judgment for Homeowners, concluding that the Ordinance was a building regulation, and the City was not authorized to adopt building regulations under the guise of a zoning ordinance. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err by determining that the Ordinance was an impermissible building code and not a zoning ordinance; (2) erred by concluding that Homeowners were ineligible for an award of attorney fees; and (3) did not err by denying and dismissing Homeowners' constitutional arguments. View "City of Helena v. Svee" on Justia Law

After the City decided to undertake road improvements along South Avenue in Missoula, Montana, Plaintiffs, a group of landowners who owned property along South Avenue, contested the City’s assessment of the width of the right-of-way on a section of the street. The district court concluded that the City’s actions constituted a taking. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded for a redetermination of damages. Plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing asking the Court to award both attorney’s fees and costs incurred for the appeal. The Supreme Court denied the petition. On remand, Plaintiffs agreed to reduce their “taken property” value and asked the district court to assess both attorney’s fees and costs against the City for the appeal. The district court determined that Plaintiffs were the prevailing party on appeal and awarded them appellate attorney’s fees and costs. The City appealed, arguing that the Court’s refusal to award fees in its order on rehearing constituted “law of the case.” The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s award of appellate attorney’s fees and costs, holding that the district court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs had a constitutional right to be made whole through an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal. View "Wohl v. City of Missoula" on Justia Law

The Northland Royalty Corporation purchased mineral rights from the personal representative of two estates and subsequently brought a quiet title action naming certain beneficiaries (“Devisees”) as defendants. The district court quieted title in favor of Devisees, but the Supreme Court remanded to consider the applicability of Mont. Code Ann. 72-3-618. On remand, Northland moved for summary judgment, arguing that section 72-3-618 offered Northland protection against Devisees’ claims to the minerals. The district court denied summary judgment on the basis that Northland failed to act in good faith as required by the statute. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order denying summary judgment and remanded for entry of judgment in Northland’s favor, holding that section 72-3-618 protected Northland’s purchase. View "Northland Royalty Corp. v. Engel" on Justia Law

The district court entered a temporary injunction preventing Linda St. Peter, acting in her capacity as the trustee of the Osorio Irrevocable Trust, from selling a property held by the trust. Linda filed a motion for relief from the temporary injunction. After a hearing, the district court dissolved the temporary injunction. The property was then sold to a third party. Karlene Khor, Linda’s sister, appealed, arguing that the district court manifestly abused its discretion when it dissolved the temporary injunction. The Supreme Court did not address the merits of the issue because the property had been sold and the issue was therefore moot. View "Matter of Osorio Irrevocable Trust" on Justia Law

This case arose from a restriction placed on a certain parcel of real property providing that the land would be used exclusively for agricultural purposes. Greg Hampton, a developer, requested the consent of Lewis and Clark County to revoke the agricultural covenant. The County approved the lifting of the covenant subject to thirteen conditions. Hampton then began working on developing his residence on the parcel. The County later filed a complaint requesting injunctive relief and an order requiring Hampton to complete the conditions. A jury determined that Hampton had notice of the thirteen conditions prior to building his home and that he failed to complete four conditions prior to development. The district court then entered final judgment, ordering Hampton to pay the proportionate share of the cost to upgrade Lodgepole Road to County road requirements, among other orders. The Supreme Court largely affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in ruling on summary judgment that the County consented to revocation of an agricultural covenant on Hampton’s property; (2) the district court erred in determining that Hampton was only proportionally responsible for the cost of upgrading Lodgepole Road; and (3) the district court did not err in the remainder of its judgment. View "Lewis & Clark County v. Hampton" on Justia Law