Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

JAS, Inc. purchased certain property at a trustee’s sale. JAS later filed a quiet title action, naming several defendants, including Mortgage Electronic Systems, Inc. (MERS), Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., and OneWest Bank, FSB. Bank of America, N.A. (BOA), the successor to Countrywide, later intervened. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of BOA, concluding that the trustee’s sale of the property was void ab initio for failure to strictly follow Montana’s foreclosure laws. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly voided the sale on the basis of failure of strict compliance with the Small Tract Financing Act of Montana; and (2) the issue of JAS’s recovery of the funds it paid to OneWest Bank at the trustee’s sale was not properly before the Court. View "JAS, Inc. v. Eisele" on Justia Law

This was the third of three lawsuits arising from the development of condominiums at Lakeside Village on Hauser Lake in Lewis and Clark County. Cherrad, LLC (Cherrad) was the project’s developer and Mountain West Bank (Bank) was its lender. Craig Kinnaman was the general contractor on the project but died in 2007. In this third suit, the estate of Kinnaman (the Estate) brought eight claims against the Bank. The Bank moved for summary judgment on all the Estate’s claims on the grounds that the claims were barred by the compulsory counterclaim rule or the doctrine of claim preclusion. The district court granted summary judgment on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion (1) in granting the Bank’s motion to change venue; (2) in granting summary judgment in favor of the Bank on all claims; (3) by taking judicial notice of the record in previous actions; and (4) by denying the Estate’s motion for relief from judgment under Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). View "Kinnaman v. Mountain West Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

In 1982, Teton Co-Operative Canal Company (Teton Canal) filed a statement of claim for existing water rights for the Eureka Reservoir. Teton Cooperative Reservoir Company (Teton Reservoir) objected to Teton Canal’s claims. The Water Master held a hearing in 2012 and, in 2015, adjudicated Teton Canal’s claims. Teton Reservoir appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the Water Court’s order regarding Teton Canal’s water right claims to the Eureka Reservoir, holding that the Water Court erred in determining that off-stream water storage in the Eureka Reservoir was included as part of Teton Canal’s April 18, 1890 Notice of Appropriation. Remanded to the Water Court to assign a new priority date to Teton Canal’s rights to the Eureka Reservoir and for further proceedings. View "Teton Co-op Canal Co. v. Teton Coop Reservoir Co." on Justia Law

When Mary Stewart failed to pay real property taxes on her property, the Flathead County Treasurer held a tax lien sale for the delinquent taxes. The County was listed as the purchaser of the tax lien. In 2013, RN & DB, LLC paid the delinquent taxes, penalties, interests, and costs for the property and applied for a tax deed. The County issued a tax deed to RN & DB, after which RN & DB filed an action to quiet title in the property. The district court granted RN & DB’s motion for summary judgment and entered a decree quieting title in favor of RN & DB. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in not applying the statutory homestead exemption to the tax lien sale on Stewart’s property; (2) Stewart’s claim that the district court should have considered the tax assessor’s failure to investigate Stewart’s complaints regarding irregular tax assessments on Stewart’s property was barred; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting summary judgment without holding a hearing. View "RN & DB, LLC v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Defendants acquired real property by borrowing more than $2 million from Whitefish Credit Union (WCU) and signing a promissory note to WCU, secured by mortgages on the property. Defendants later defaulted on that note, owing a principal balance of $1,951,670. WCU filed this action for foreclosure and collection of the debt. The property was sold at a sheriff’s sale to WCU for $1,100,000. Thereafter, WCU filed a request for entry of a deficiency judgment against Defendants for the amount of $745,365. Defendants opposed the request, arguing that the fair market value of the property exceeded the loan balance. After a hearing, the district court found the property was worth $2,366,667 as of the date of the sheriff’s sale and that no deficiency was owed to WCU. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by proceeding in equity to determine the fair value of the property for purposes of entering a deficiency judgment; but (2) evidentiary errors clearly affected the outcome of the proceeding to the prejudice of WCU. Remanded for further proceedings on the evidentiary issues and the applicable standard. View "Whitefish Credit Union v. Prindiville" on Justia Law

Letica Land Company, LLC and Don McGee (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed an amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking a preliminary injunction to close Modesty Creek Road, which consisted of an upper branch and a lower branch and crossed Plaintiffs’ respective properties. Plaintiffs claimed that they were unaware of any claim of public right of access over either branch of Modesty Creek Road at the time they purchased their respective properties. The district court concluded that Modesty Creek Road’s lower branch was a statutorily created road, that a public prescriptive easement established Modesty Creek Road’s upper branch as a public road, and that the prescriptive easement had not been extinguished by reverse adverse possession. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in concluding that Modesty Creek Road’s lower branch was statutorily created; but (2) erred in concluding that the public prescriptive easement the court found on Modesty Creek Road’s upper branch was not extinguished by reverse adverse possession. View "Letica Land Co., LLC v. Anaconda-Deer Lodge County" on Justia Law

Scott Bardsley owned a parcel of residential property where he resided with Dora Cichantek (together, Plaintiffs). Earnest Anderson and Lizann Pluger (together, Defendants) resided on the adjacent property. When relations between Scott and Lizann soured, Lizann sought an order of protection against Scott. The district court granted Lizann’s petition for a permanent order of protection against Scott. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint against Defendants alleging that Plaintiffs’ property enjoyed an express easement over the property on which Defendants resided with regard to “Pluger Way.” The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants and amended its order of protection by prohibiting Dora from using Pluger Way. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s amended order of protection and affirmed the district court in all other respects, holding that the district court (1) abused its discretion by failing to conduct a hearing before expanding the order of protection to include Dora; and (2) did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint, granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and awarding Defendants attorney’s fees. View "Bardsley v. Pluger" on Justia Law

In 2000, Defendant purchased 4,900 acres of property in Teton County known as Boadle Ranch. Thereafter, Defendant prohibited public use of the two main roads transecting the ranch. Public Lands/Water Access Association (PLWA), a Montana non-profit membership organization dedicated to promoting access to public-owned lands, successfully sought in the courts to regain access to these roads for public use. Defendant, however, had not yet removed the gates barricading entrance to the property. Here Defendant appealed the district court’s grant of supplementary declaratory relief to PLWA. PLWA cross-appealed the portion of the judgment denying its motion for reasonable attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in awarding money damages as supplemental declaratory relief under Mont. Code Ann. 27-8-313; (2) did not fail to consider ownership of Defendant’s railroad car and its suitability as a bridge in fashioning relief, in accordance with PLWA IV; and (3) erred by not awarding PLWA reasonable attorney fees and costs. View "Public Land/Water Access Ass’n, Inc. v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 1996, Donna Metcalf transferred a forty-acre parcel of land to Richard Thieltges by warranty deed. The deed contained certain covenants, restrictions, conditions and charges (“Restrictions”). In 2000, Thieltges transferred the full parcel to Terrance and Laurie Scott by warranty deed. In 2013, the Scotts filed a complaint asking the district court to invalidate the Restrictions and seeking permission to subdivide their property. The Lee and Donna Metcalf Charitable Trust filed a counterclaim seeking to enforce the Restrictions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Trust, concluding that the Restrictions were enforceable against the Scotts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that the Restrictions could be enforced by the Trust against the Scotts. View "Scotts v. Metcalf Charitable Trust" on Justia Law

The parties in this case owned adjoining parcels of land adjacent to Rock Creek in Carbon County. Plaintiffs brought this action in 2008, alleging that Defendants interfered with Plaintiffs’ water right by erecting a pond, engaging in significant construction activities, and placing rip-rap and fill in wet areas without protecting the flow of water onto Plaintiffs’ property. After a bench trial, the district court granted judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that Defendants had not interfered with Plaintiffs’ water right, that Defendants could only prove their case through expert testimony, which the court previously excluded, and that Defendants’ activities on Plaintiffs' property did not unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs’ water rights. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment in favor of Defendants and the award of attorney fees against Plaintiffs, holding (1) the district court erred in granting Defendants’ motion in limine to exclude Plaintiffs’ expert witnesses from testifying at trial; and (2) because the experts were wrongfully excluded, the result of the trial was tainted and must be reversed. View "Sharbono v. Cole" on Justia Law