Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a complaint against a law firm and its attorneys (Defendants), alleging that Defendants committed legal malpractice when they advised Plaintiff, their former client, to sign a release with an insurer regarding his underlying suit arising from a vehicle accident. Defendants served discovery requests on Plaintiff, but Plaintiff’s responses to the requests for admission were not timely. Defendants moved for summary judgment based in large part on the fact that the requests for admission had not been timely answered and deemed admitted. Plaintiff filed a motion to withdraw or amend his admissions. The district court denied Plaintiff's motion, concluding that while granting Plaintiff’s motion would subserve the presentation of the merits of his case, it would prejudice Defendants. The court then granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to allow Plaintiff to withdraw or amend his admissions, as nothing in the record showed Defendants suffered prejudice sufficient to bar amendment of Plaintiff’s admissions. Remanded. View "Bates v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this action to challenge a decision by county commissioners (the Commissioners) to permit elected county officials to receive cash payments in lieu of county contributions on their behalf to a group health insurance program. Plaintiff claimed the Commissioners violated Montana’s open meetings statute and his constitutional right of participation, requested a declaration that the “cash in lieu” policy was unlawful, and filed a writ for mandamus that the county attorney commence an action to recover any illegal payments. The district court (1) dismissed Plaintiff’s right to know and right of participation claims as time barred; (2) dismissed Plaintiff’s declaratory claim for lack of standing; and (3) dismissed the mandamus claim, determining that mandamus did not apply. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff had standing to pursue his right to know and right of participation claims; and (2) Plaintiff’s right to know and right of participation claims were time barred, but Plaintiff’s allegations qualified for application of equitable tolling principles. Remanded. View "Schoof v. Nesbit" on Justia Law

The Boulder Monitor, which regularly attended meetings of the full Jefferson County High School Board, sued Jefferson High School District No. 1, claiming that a meeting of the Board’s budget subcommittee violated statutory open meeting and public participation requirements because there was a quorum of the Board present at the subcommittee meeting, the meeting discussed personnel matters in addition to the 2012-2013 budget, that all Board members present participated in the discussion, and that the public notice of the subcommittee meeting was inadequate. The district court granted summary judgment to the Monitor, concluding that the Board violated Montana law in the manner in which the budget subcommittee meeting was conducted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that summary judgment in this case was improper because contested issues of fact existed that may not be resolved on summary judgment. Remanded. View "Boulder Monitor v. Jefferson High Sch. Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to forgery and issuing bad checks and received a deferred sentence. Defendant subsequently violated the conditions of his supervision. The district court imposed two consecutive commitments to the Department of Corrections, with all time suspended. The district court subsequently found that Defendant violated the terms of his probation and revoked Defendant’s suspended sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) neither the relevant statutes nor due process require the State to produce independent evidence corroborating an offender’s admission of a violation of the conditions of his or her supervision; and (2) the district court did not violate Defendant’s right to confront adverse witnesses during the revocation hearing. View "State v. Macker" on Justia Law

Linda and Gerald Cintron gave Defendant a down payment of $180,000 and a promissory note to buy three five-acre lots from Defendant. The Cintrons never received title to the land, nor did Defendant refund the Cintrons’ money. Based on this incident, the State charged Defendant with felony theft by deception. Defendant entered a no contest plea to the charge in return for a six-year deferred sentence and a restitution obligation. After a restitution hearing, the district court imposed a total restitution in the amount of $164,861, which represented the $180,000 investment less the $125,000 Defendant had already paid, plus the Cintrons’ tax liability resulting from their use of their retirement accounts to raise the down payment, including an excise tax. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Defendant should not be required to make restitution for the income tax liabilities the Cintrons faced when they received restitution for the $180,000; but (2) Defendant may be required to pay restitution of the excise tax. View "State v. Cerasani" on Justia Law

C.B. was adjudicated a youth in need of care and placed in foster care due to Mother’s abuse of prescription drugs. The district court ordered Mother to complete a treatment plan to deal with her substance abuse issues. The court subsequently determined that Mother had not complied with the conditions of her treatment plan and, accordingly, terminated her parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the statutory criteria for termination were satisfied and in terminating Mother’s parental rights because (1) Mother failed to complete her treatment plan, (2) Mother’s prescription drug abuse was unlikely to change within a reasonable time, and (3) C.B.’s best interests would be served by terminating the parent-child relationship. View "Matter of C.B." on Justia Law

In 2004, Petitioner was hired as a production supervisor for Holcim Inc.’s cement manufacturing plant. In 2008, Petitioner was diagnosed with angina. After Petitioner left Holcim, Petitioner filed a claim under the Montana Human Rights Acts for discrimination. The Montana Department of Labor and Industry dismissed Petitioner’s complaint, concluding that Holcim did not discriminate against Petitioner on the basis of disability. The Montana Human Rights Commission upheld the dismissal, and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in affirming the hearing officer’s determination that Petitioner did not prove that he belonged to a protected class, as Petitioner failed to establish that he was disabled within the meaning of the Human Rights Act. View "Estate of Welch v. Holcim, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff agreed to an increase in his monthly support obligation. The increase was applied retroactively to the date the child’s mother requested the increase, which created an arrearage in Plaintiff’s account. Although Plaintiff arranged to pay off the arrearage, the State of Montana, Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) reported the arrearage to national consumer credit reporting agencies. Prospective employers subsequently rejected Plaintiff as an otherwise qualified candidate for being delinquent in his child support payments. Plaintiff filed suit against CSED for its erroneous report to the credit agencies. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiff’s arrearage constituted a delinquency or overdue child support, but the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint must be upheld because Plaintiff did not avail himself of the statutory and administrative processes for challenging this action by CSED; and (2) the resulting injustice in this case required remand with directions that the credit reporting agencies that reported Plaintiff’s arrearage remove from their data base any reference to Plaintiff having been in arrears or delinquent in the payment of his child support obligations. View "Kenck v. State, Child Support Enforcement Div." on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded no contest to arson, a felony. Appellant later moved to withdraw his no contest plea. The district court denied the petition, concluding that Appellant entered a knowing and voluntary plea and could not demonstrate that the offer of proof was insufficient or that his representation was ineffective. The district court's judgment was affirmed on appeal. Appellant subsequently petitioned for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and that the district court misinterpreted the arson statute. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in its interpretation of the arson statute; and (2) Appellant was unable to prove that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Ellison v. State" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with fourth-offense driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), a felony. As a basis for the charge, the State cited Defendant's three prior DUI convictions in Nevada. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the felony charge, asserting that his second and third DUI convictions were premised on a Nevada statute that was not sufficiently similar to Montana's DUI statutes to constitute prior convictions for purposes of supporting a felony charge. The district court denied the motion. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to felony DUI, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the felony DUI charge because Nevada's statute was sufficiently similar to Montana's DUI and DUI per se statutes to support Defendant's felony conviction under Montana law. View "State v. Calvert" on Justia Law