Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from the judgment and conviction of deliberate homicide, felony murder. At issue was whether the district court erred by denying defendant's motion to suppress and by denying defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence at the close of the State's case-in-chief. Also at issue was whether defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel. The court held that the district court's findings of fact, considering the totality of the circumstances, were not clearly erroneous, and its conclusions of law were correct where defendant's waiver was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently given. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find the elements of the crime had been committed beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore, the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. The court further held that defendant failed to demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective and the court declined to address certain related issues on appeal and to apply plain error review. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiff alleged that the two vehicles that it purchased from defendant, a used Ford and a new 2008 Dodge, had mechanical problems and body damage. The parties disputed responsibilities for repairs. At issue was whether the court could rely upon testimony on appeal for a vacated default judgment hearing and whether the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant. The court held that the district court afforded the parties sufficient opportunity to refute affidavits through depositions, interrogatories, and through witness testimony at a hearing. Defendant elected not to depose plaintiff's owner and opted not to cross-examine plaintiff's witnesses at a rescheduled hearing. Defendant waived its right to the hearing and presented its own evidence in the form of affidavits. Therefore, defendant's argument that the court must disregard certain testimony or any of plaintiff's affidavits presented to the district court was unconvincing. The court also held that the Montana court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant through long-arm provisions did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant appealed a district court order denying his motion for summary judgment, granting summary judgment in favor of appellees, as personal representative of the Estate of Larry Rasmussen ("Estate"), and awarding the Estate attorney fees. At issue was whether the district court erred in concluding that the Estate's nonjudicial foreclosure was not a compulsory counterclaim to an earlier action between the parties and whether the district court erred in concluding that appellant could not revive fraud-related claims as an affirmative defense. The court held that the district court did not err in ruling that the Estate was not required to assert nonjudicial foreclosure where the Estate commenced a foreclosure by advertisement and sale, which was a nonjudicial remedy it was statutorily entitled to invoke and the rules governing judicial claims and defenses did not apply to nonjudicial proceedings. The court also held that the district court did not err in concluding that appellant's fraud claims were barred where he was the plaintiff in the case and could not assert affirmative defenses nor could he compel the Estate to commence a judicial action so that he could raise an affirmative defense. The court further held that the Estate was entitled to recover attorney fees in the instant case in connection with its defense of appellant's claims in the district court and on appeal.

Plaintiff sued defendant and others claiming, among other things, that defendant breached a written and oral contract and created a public and private nuisance when plaintiff tried unsuccessfully for several years to get defendant to clean up the portion of his property that was visible from plaintiff's property. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding certain exhibits and testimony; in refusing to give plaintiff's proposed jury instructions on breach of contract and negligence theories; by limiting plaintiff's counsel's closing argument with threats of mistrial; and in awarding defendant his costs. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit certain evidence and exhibits during the testimony of the Department of Environmental Quality's section chief, who summarized the legal obligations imposed under the applicable statutes, where the district court sustained the objections and noted that it was the "the province of the court to instruct this jury what the law is and what the definitional aspects of the law require." The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on contract law where no oral or written contract was created; the district court's jury instruction on promissory estoppel potentially benefited, rather than harmed, plaintiff; plaintiff's argument vis-a-vis negligence jury instructions was without merit; the district court refused to instruct the jury on negligence per se upon the conclusion that there was no private right of action under the applicable statutes; and in refusing plaintiff's original proposed instructions on negligence per se. The court declined to address the issue of counsel's closing arguments with threats of mistrial. The court further held that defendant waived his right to recover costs and the district court abused its discretion in awarding them.

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging contract and negligence claims against defendants. Defendants subsequently appealed from a district court order denying its motion under M.R.Civ.P 55(c) to set aside an entry of default and its motion under M.R.Civ.P 60(b) for relief from default judgment. Plaintiff cross-appealed the court's denial of attorney fees. The court held that good cause did not exist to set aside the entry of default where defendants willfully disregarded the judicial process when it failed to answer after being served properly and where defendants had not established that it possessed a meritorious defense that would have completely eliminated its liability. The court also held that no default judgment existed when defendants moved for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) where an interlocutory judgment did not constitute a final judgment order under the rule. The court declined to address the issue raised for the first time on appeal regarding default judgment against defendants. The court further held that the district court correctly denied plaintiff's request for attorney fees where the complaint raised no allegations related to a default on defendants' loan and the trust indenture provision did not entitle either party to attorney fees under these circumstances.

Defendant entered a plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to two counts of felony theft and to pay restitution for the loss incurred as a result of his fraudulent acts. At issue was whether the district court erred in issuing a restitution order where the State failed to submit sworn victim affidavits as required by 46-18-242(1)(b), MCA. The court held that defendant failed to preserve his objection to the pre-sentencing investigation report's omission of victim affidavits where, except for his lone objection on the date of sentencing, defendant did not alert the trial court of any claim that victim affidavits were required for an order of restitution in his case; where defendant's plea agreement expressly consented to the court's determination of restitution upon hearing; where his own filings acknowledged the accuracy of the surrender penalty figures; and where his pre-sentencing briefs stated the dispute in terms of legal argument regarding the measure of loss, which the parties had agreed to submit to the court for resolution, a ruling he did not challenge on appeal.

Appellant, a Montana limited partnership which owned an electrical generating plant in Rosebud County, appealed the district court's order denying its motion to vacate the arbitration award ("Final Award") in its dispute with appellee, a Delaware corporation and a regulated public utility conducting business in Montana. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion when if failed to vacate, modify, or correct the arbitration award. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion where Montana's Uniform Arbitration Act, 27-5-311 MCA, did not permit a court to vacate an arbitration award in part; where Montana law was clear that a non-breaching party was still required to prove its damages; where the district court correctly noted in its order confirming the Final Award that the legal precedent on which appellant relied for its request to modify or correct the Final Award applied only to motions to vacate an award; and where the district court correctly determined that it lacked the authority to vacate the Final Award.

This case concerns two competing wills made slightly over one month apart near the end of decedent's life. The district court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment in favor of the probate of a will executed by decedent in January 2009 and dismissed appellant's formal petition to probate a handwritten document he claimed was a valid holographic will executed by decedent in December 2008 and denied appellant's motion to vacate, alter, or amend the order granting summary judgment. At issue was whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee; erred in denying appellant's motion to vacate, alter, or amend; and erred in denying appellant's M.R.Civ.P. 56(f) motion. Also at issue was whether appellee was entitled to attorney's fees and costs. The court held that summary judgment was properly granted to appellee where the district court's evidentiary rulings were correct, appellant failed to present any genuine issues of fact, and the court correctly analyzed appellant's claim of undue influence. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion based on alleged discovery abuses where the district court's ruling was made irrespective of any information contained in appellee's affidavits that appellant would have been better prepared to rebut. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion where nothing in counsel's affidavit explained what additional facts appellant would obtain through additional discovery that would effectively oppose the motion for summary judgment. The court finally held that appellant's appeal was now no longer pending and appellee had defended a contested will that was later confirmed, entitling him to fees and costs as provided in 72-12-206, MCA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the issue of attorney's fees and costs for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, on behalf of a class of similarly situated plaintiffs who received Medicaid assistance and were subject to a Medicaid lien pursuant to 53-2-612, MCA, sued defendant alleging that defendant had collected a greater amount than it was entitled from plaintiffs' recoveries from other sources. The parties raised several issues on appeal. The court held that Ark. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn applied retroactively to all class members' claims and that defendant must raise affirmative defenses with respect to individual class members to avoid Ahlborn's effect. The court held that the applicable statute of limitations to be 27-2-231, MCA, which provided for a five-year limitations period. The court declined to disturb the district court's order requiring defendant to compile data on individual class members' claims. The court reversed the district court's determination as to interest assessed against defendant, and concluded that no interest could be assessed until two years after any judgment had been entered, under 2-9-317, MCA. The court concluded that the term "third party" in the Medicaid reimbursement statutes included all other sources of medical assistance available to Medicaid recipients, including private health or automobile insurance obtained by the Medicaid recipient. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the class on its proffered distinction between "first party" and "third party" sources. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs' "made whole" claim was immaterial in light of Ahlborn.

Defendant was found guilty of deliberate homicide, DUI, violation of an order of protection, criminal endangerment, driving while the privilege to do so was suspended or revoked, and tampering with physical evidence. At issue was whether defendant's right to be present at all critical stages of his criminal proceeding was violated and whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held that the district court did not commit reversible error when defendant was not allowed to be present at his omnibus hearing where, based on the facts, the court found that defendant suffered no prejudice as a result of his absence from the hearing. The court also held that the record did not demonstrate the reasoning behind any of the alleged errors committed by defendant's counsel and therefore, a postconviction proceeding would better address defendant's claims where the record could be fully developed.