Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellants filed suit against Appellees under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (UDJA), alleging that they possessed a prescriptive easement over a roadway on Appellees' property. The district court concluded that Appellants had failed to establish the elements for a prescriptive easement and awarded attorney fees to Appellees. Appellants appealed, contending that the district court abused its discretion in granting attorney fees because nothing in the UDJA allowed an award of attorney fees solely on the basis that one party prevails over the other, or that one party had to defend property rights. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's award of attorney fees to Appellees, holding that Appellees failed to establish the threshold determination that equitable considerations supported the award.

A jury convicted John Hartsoe of aggravated assault and violation of an order of protection. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded in part, holding (1) the district court erred by by permitting Hartsoe to be shackled in a chair and brought into the courtroom during voir dire, but because the record was insufficiently developed to enable the Court to conduct a harmless error analysis, the matter was remanded to the district court to determine whether the violation was harmless in light of the interests that the right to remain free of physical restraints was designed to protect; and (2) the district court did not err in granting Hartsoe's request to represent himself as Hartsoe voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently elected to proceed pro se.

After Peter Carter was killed in a car accident, Plaintiff filed a wrongful death and survival action against the vehicle manufacturer, the auto rental company, and the other driver in the accident. Plaintiff asserted claims against the auto companies for negligence and strict liability, arguing that the seatbelt system in Carter's vehicle was defective. The district court ruled that Mont. Code Ann. 61-13-106 prohibited evidence of seatbelt use or nonuse in products liability claims but not in negligence claims. The court concluded it would be too confusing for the jury to admit the evidence on the products liability claims but exclude it on the negligence claims and informed Stokes if he planned on using evidence of seatbelt use or nonuse he must drop his negligence claims. The Supreme Court granted Stokes's petition for supervisory control, holding (1) when the plaintiff's injuries are alleged to result from a defect in the vehicle's occupant restraint system, whether the claim sounds in negligence or strict liability, the statute does not preclude evidence of seatbelt use or nonuse; and (2) where the plaintiff's claim is combined with a claim against the driver of another vehicle involved in the crash, a limiting instruction must be given.

Gavin Johnston was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol after the result of a breath test taken by a breath analysis instrument called the Intoxilyzer 8000 showed Johnston had elevated blood alcohol levels. The district court granted Johnston's motion to suppress the results of the breath test pursuant to State v. Gieser because the Intoxilyzer 8000 had not been field tested within a week of Johnston's arrest. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling, holding (1) the reference in Gieser to weekly field testing of breath analysis instruments was dicta and should not have been relied upon as authority as to how often breath analysis instruments must be field certified; and (2) the Intoxilyzer 8000 was properly certified as required by Mont. Admin. R. 23.4.213, which states that breath analysis instruments shall be field certified for accuracy at least once every thirty-one days.

A jury found Robert DaSilva guilty of failure to provide notice of address change as a sex offender, a felony, and resisting arrest, a misdemeanor. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not violate DaSilva's due process rights by instructing the jury as a matter of law that DaSilva's previous Washington conviction of second degree assault with sexual motivation was a "sexual offense" under Montana law; and (2) the district court did not act arbitrarily or err in granting a continuance of trial that was requested by the State to permit an amendment to the information.

In 2003, Joshua Micone applied for Medicaid benefits for himself and his family. In his applications, Joshua did not report his wife Jennifer's interest in a family limited partnership. The Department of Public Health and Human Services approved Joshua's application, and the Micone family received Medicaid benefits from 2003 to 2006. Subsequently, the Department notified Joshua that his household was ineligible for benefits paid over the past three years because of Jennifer's interest in the partnership and demanded repayment. Joshua contested the demand of benefits paid. The State Board of Public Assistance upheld a hearing officer's findings that Jennifer's interest in the partnership was a countable and available resource. The district court affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that that the hearing officer did not violate Mont. Code Ann. 2-4-623 when he did not issue a decision within ninety days after the case was deemed submitted; and (2) the district court correctly determined that substantial credible evidence supported the Department's finding that Jennifer's interest in the partnership was an available resource.

After Madeleine Willson died of metastatic breast cancer and acute aspiration pneumonia, Robert Willson filed a complaint against Benefis Hospitals, Peace Hospice, and Dr. T. Brice Addison for medical malpractice. Robert alleged that the administration of medication expedited Madeleine's death and that Madeleine did not give informed consent to administration of the medications. Benefis filed two motions for summary judgment, the first of which argued that Robert had failed to establish causation through qualified expert testimony. Robert filed a motion for summary judgment seeking default judgment as a sanction for Benefis' alleged spoliation of evidence. The district court granted summary judgment on the issue of causation in favor of Benefis and Dr. Addison. The court denied Robert's motion, finding Robert failed to prove spoliation. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Benefis and Dr. Addison, and (2) although the district court denied Robert's motion for summary judgment for the wrong reason, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion where sanctions were not appropriate.

The State charged Michael Spreadbury with felony intimidation by way of an information. Spreadbury initially pled not guilty and moved to dismiss the information for failure to establish probable cause to charge him with intimidation. After the district court denied the motion, Spreadbury changed his plea to no contest without reserving any issues for appeal. The district court entered judgment against Spreadbury and imposed a one-year deferred sentence. Spreadbury appealed, arguing that the State had no probable cause to believe he committed the offense of felony intimidation. At issue was whether Spreadbury waived the right to raise a probable cause challenge when he entered his no contest plea without reserving the issue for appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment entered by the district court, holding that, by entering a no contest plea without reserving for appeal the question whether there was probable cause to support the information filed against him, Spreadbury waived the right to raise the issue on appeal from the final judgment entered.

C.R. Weaver ordered a coffee urn from defendant Advanced Restaurant Supply for use by Glacier Kitchens, a corporation in which Weaver owns the majority of the shares. Advanced Restaurant sent a coffee urn it ordered from defendant Wilbur Curtis Manufacturing. Glacier Kitchens used the urn to provide drink for forest firefighters under its food service contract with the United States Forest Service (USFS). The coffee urn ultimately malfunctioned, and, later, Glacier Kitchens' contract with the USFS was terminated by USFS. Weaver sued defendants for breach of contract, alleging that a contract attached when he ordered the coffee urn. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, finding that Weaver, as a shareholder in Glacier Kitchens, lacked standing to bring a claim that belonged to the corporation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants; and (2) the district court properly awarded costs to defendants.

While pitching in a baseball game, Brandon Patch was struck in the head by a batted ball that was hit using a Hillerich & Bradsby Company (H&B) aluminum bat. Brandon died from his injuries. Brandon's parents sued H&B in strict products liability for survivorship and wrongful death damages, asserting manufacturing and design defect and failure to warn claims. The district court granted H&B's motion for summary judgment on Patches' manufacturing defect claim but denied summary judgment on their design defect and failure to warn claim. The court granted Patches' motion in limine, excluding H&B's assumption of the risk defense. The jury concluded that the bat was in a defective condition due to failure to warn of the enhanced risks associated with its use and awarded Patches an $850,000 verdict on their failure to warn claim. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the district court properly (1) denied H&B summary judgment, (2) denied H&B's motion for judgment as a matter of law, (3) granted Patches' motion in limine regarding H&B's assumption of the risk defense, and (4) instructed the jury on failure to warn.